Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the superior and inferior portions of the powers are diverse powers.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by the superior and inferior portion; and the question is whether the superior portion and the inferior are diverse powers. And that they are, it seems.

1. As Augustine says in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*, between the superior portion of reason and the inferior there is a marriage, because the one is called *man* and the other is called *woman*; but there is no marriage of the same with itself, but of one diverse with another: since therefore between these two there is a marriage, inasmuch as they are powers, therefore in the genus of power they are diverse.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says in many places in the book *On the Trinity*, the image does not consist in reason as regards the inferior part, but as regards the superior; but *to be according to the image* is not an accident of the powers of the soul, but is essential to them: since therefore the superior portion and the inferior differ by *being according to the image* and *not being according to the image*, it seems that they are powers diverse by essence.

3. Likewise, as Augustine holds, the superior portion stands to the inferior as *ruling* to *ruled*; but the *ruling* and the *ruled* are relatively opposed to one another: if therefore relative opposites cannot be about the same thing, it is necessary that the power which rules be one, and the power which is ruled be another.

4. Likewise, nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing; but it belongs to the superior portion to *move* the inferior, and to the inferior to *be moved*: therefore it is impossible that they concur in the same power: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if superior and inferior reason did not differ except because the one is intent on eternal things and the other intent on temporal things, then they would differ no more than an eye looking upward and an eye looking downward; but the eye is in no way divided into superior and inferior because it looks upward and downward: therefore neither ought reason to be so divided. If therefore it is divided, then superior and inferior reason do not differ only in respect of acts and aspects, but also in respect of what they are.

6. Likewise, if there were difference there only in respect of diverse aspects and acts, then since the reason of an Angel looks upon both higher and lower things, it seems that it ought to be divided into superior and inferior; but such a division is not customarily assigned in the powers of the Angel: therefore they differ more than according to acts and aspects: therefore the same returns as before, that they are diverse powers according to what they are.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine says in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*: « When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are discussing one single thing; nor do we make it twofold by these two which I have mentioned, except by their offices » — the discourse had preceded concerning the superior portion of reason and the inferior — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul, as the Philosopher says, according to the intellect is in a certain way all things »; but this would not be so unless the intellective power, since it is one, were of a nature to know all things: if therefore reason is called *superior* inasmuch as it knows higher things, and *inferior* inasmuch as it knows lower things, then it is not one power and another.

3. Likewise, the habit which directs the soul to the love of God and of neighbor is the same, namely charity: therefore much more strongly is the power the same by which we are turned to God and to neighbor; but this is superior and inferior reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the uncreated light stands to creatures as the light of the sun stands to colors, as Augustine says in the book of the *Soliloquies*; but the sensitive power is the same by which we know both the light and the color: if therefore the intellective power is much more ample and freer than the sensitive power, it seems that the power is one and the same by which the soul is turned to the eternal light and to these temporal things.

> **Conclusion.** The superior and inferior portion are not diverse powers, but differ according to dispositions and offices.

**I respond:** It must be said that the division of reason into the superior portion and the inferior is not so much by diverse members that the one and the other is a power distinct and distinct, as the reasons adduced for the second part show; nor is it by members so harmonious that there is no difference in them except only according to aspects. For there is a difference in them according to dispositions and according to offices: according to dispositions, because the one is strong and the other weak; according to offices, because the one rules and the other is ruled. By reason of the diverse disposition in weakness and strength the one is called *man* and the other *woman*; by reason of the diversity in office and rule the one is called *superior* because it rules, and the other *inferior* because it is ruled.

But such diversity of dispositions takes its origin not from diversity of nature, but from the diverse comparison of the same power. For when our reason is turned to higher things, it is purged and illumined and perfected; when it beholds the eternal laws and the immutability of the divine power and equity, it is fortified and invigorated in the good; but when it is turned to these lower things, namely to sensibility and the flesh, it is in a certain way drawn down and softened. And therefore superior and inferior reason are of the same nature, differing according to the disposition of strength and weakness. — And because the one arises from the other and is joined to it as a *helper like to itself*; the one is rightly called *man*, and the other is called *woman*, and between them there is said to be a marriage.

But the diversity of offices likewise does not come from diversity of natures, but from diversity of dispositions. For because the one is strong and the other weak, the one understanding and consulting the divine will, the other carrying it out in work; therefore the one rules and the other is ruled, and from this the one is called *superior* and this other *inferior*.

And so it is plain that the superior portion of reason and the inferior, even though in some way they are rightly co-divided, are nevertheless not diverse powers — for these members, namely the superior and the inferior, do not vary the essence of the power — but the dispositions and offices do; and this the very names suggest.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**
1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the marriage, the response is already plain. For this was said relatively, not because superior and inferior reason are diverse powers, as *man* and *woman* are diverse persons, but because, since the one is brought forth from the other, yet they do not differ in nature, but are joined to one another for mutual service.

2. To that which is objected, that the one is according to the image and the other not; it must be said that when we deny that the inferior portion of reason is according to the image, we do not say this because the image is not *in* that power, but because it is not *attended to* according to that conversion. Hence the character of image is not removed from the inferior portion, according to that which is *image* and according to that which is *reason*, but only according to the *superadded comparison*.

3. To that which is objected, that the ruling and the ruled are opposites; it must be said that this is true; but from this there does not follow diversity in a spiritual power, especially in one which is of a nature to reflect upon itself; and such is reason and will. — As to what is objected, that relative opposites cannot be about the same thing; it must be said that this is true according to the *same* and *to the same*; but when something is compared to diverse things, nothing prevents mutual relations being found in it at once without conflict and opposition. — Furthermore, that holds in relatives according to *being*, and not according to being *said*.

4. And by this the response is plain to that which follows, that nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing. This is true of *physical* action and passion; but of *spiritual* passion, by which we say that the same thing is moved and ruled by itself, it does not hold, since Anselm says « that the will is an instrument moving itself ».

5. 6. To the last two the response is already plain. For I concede that that division is attended to not only according to diversity in *aspect*, but also in *disposition* and *office*, which is not found in the Angel, or in the eye, as is plain from what has been said before. And let these things suffice.