Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-a2-q3
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### Article II. *On the division of the powers of the soul.*
### Question III. *Whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made about that division of the powers of the soul which is according to the natural and the deliberative; and it is asked whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers. And it seems that it is.

1. Damascene, when he divides the powers of the soul, first divides them into *thelesis* and *boulesis*, that is, into the natural and the deliberative, and afterwards subdivides them through the other powers: therefore if the greater difference is between the first members, it seems that the natural will and the deliberative are one power and another.

2. Likewise, the division of substance into rational and non-rational varies it according to essence; therefore the division of a power by differences of this kind makes the powers differ essentially; but such is the division of the powers of the soul into natural and deliberative: therefore, etc. The minor is proved by this, that, as the Philosopher says, « rational powers are toward opposites »; but when some power is naturally moved toward something, it is not moved toward the opposite: therefore a power, insofar as it is natural, is not rational.

3. Likewise, when we divide a creature into corruptible and incorruptible, we diversify it essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning, when we divide a power into mutable and immutable, we vary it essentially; but a power that is moved naturally toward its object is moved uniformly, whereas the deliberative is moved changeably: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, a power in which we share with brutes cannot be the same as a power in which we differ; but in natural appetite we agree with brutes, and in rational appetite we differ: therefore, etc. For just as brutes naturally desire the preservation of their being, so do we also desire it.

**On the contrary:**
1. Powers that have the same object and under the same formal account do not have diversity; but the natural will and the deliberative have the same thing for their object, namely the good — for we desire the good naturally, and also from deliberation, when we are well ordered — therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a power that orders toward the end and toward that which is for the end is not one and another;
sed voluntas nostra — but our will, insofar as it is toward the end, is natural, because everyone naturally desires beatitude; insofar as it is toward the thing ordered to the end, it is deliberative: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the same cognitive power is that by which we know something naturally, and by acquisition: therefore by parity of reasoning the same will is that by which we desire something by natural instinct, and by the judgment of deliberation.

4. Likewise, everything that is some nature has a natural operation; but the deliberative will is some nature: therefore it has a natural operation. But the act of the will is to will, therefore the deliberative will wills something naturally; but a will that wills something naturally is natural: therefore the deliberative will is a natural will.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** The natural will and the deliberative, insofar as they differ in the mode of desiring, are not diverse powers, but one, moving nevertheless in diverse modes.

**I respond:** It must be said that when we divide appetite into natural and deliberative, or any other power, this can be understood in two ways: either thus, that the natural appetite and the deliberative have diversity in their objects, as when one thing is desirable only by a rational substance, and another is desirable by a brute substance. And in this way it well happens that the natural power and the deliberative are diverse powers. — In another way appetite or power can be divided into natural and deliberative, yet such that there is no difference in the objects, but in the mode of desiring; as when we hold *synderesis* to be the natural will, which indeed naturally inclines and incites toward the honorable good and murmurs against evil; and the deliberative will to be the appetite by which, after deliberation, we sometimes cleave to the good, sometimes to the evil. And thus the division of power into natural and deliberative does not vary it according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving. And in this way Damascene divides, not because the natural and the deliberative are diverse powers, but because there is one power, moving nevertheless in diverse modes; and this suffices for a division of powers.

Hence it must be noted that the authors have been accustomed to take the division of the powers of the soul in many modes. Sometimes according to the nature of the powers themselves, as when the powers of the soul are divided into vegetative, sensible, and rational, or the rational itself into intellective and affective. — Sometimes, however, according to offices, as when reason is divided into superior and inferior. — Sometimes according to states, as when the intellect is divided into speculative and practical; for the speculative intellect according to another state becomes practical, namely when it is joined to the will and to operation in directing and ruling. — Sometimes, however, a division of powers is made according to aspects, as the cognitive power is divided into reason, intellect, and intelligence, according as it looks toward the inferior, toward the equal, and toward the superior. — Sometimes, however, according to acts, as the division is made into inventive and judicative; for to invent and to judge are acts of the cognitive power ordered to one another. — Sometimes, however, a division of the powers of the soul is made according to modes of moving; and such is that which is according to the natural and the deliberative.

In all these modes of diversity the authors make use of a division of the powers of the soul, and in the first mode of dividing alone is the diversification of powers properly regarded. — It must therefore be conceded that the natural will and the deliberative can be the same power, which indeed according to one and another mode of moving is so and so named. For the same is the power by which I desire beatitude, and by which I desire virtue, or to do this or that good ordered to beatitude; which, insofar as it desires beatitude, is called natural, because its appetite is immutably inclined toward beatitude; but insofar as it desires to do this or that good, it is called deliberative, and according to the judgment of reason it can be inclined toward the contrary.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected concerning the division of powers made by Damascene, the response is now clear. For he himself, as is evident there in his exemplification, regards in this division rather a diversity of modes of moving than a diversity of moving powers.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the natural will is irrational, because it is not toward opposites; it must be said that when it is said that rational powers are toward opposites, this is not understood of all opposites, but of some. For the rational will is so ordered toward something that it in no way desires its opposite, as is evident in the ordering of our will toward beatitude and felicity. But although it is determinately inclined toward beatitude, yet toward many kinds of desirable things that one and the same power of the will is indeterminate, so that it is apt to be moved toward opposites; and on that account it is natural in such a way that nevertheless it does not cease to be rational and deliberative. But if it were so determined to one thing,
that it could in no way be moved toward opposites, as is the power of heating and illuminating in fire, then it would be purely natural, and would not be deliberative or rational.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning incorruptibility, it must be said that the case is not the same with the incorruptibility of substance and the immutability of a power. For incorruptibility in substance is said absolutely; and therefore to be corruptible and incorruptible are directly opposed and are incompossible with respect to the same thing. But the mutable and the immutable in a power can be taken with respect to diverse objects, as is evident, since some will is immutable with respect to the end, and mutable with respect to that which is for the end; and therefore it is not necessary that powers be essentially diversified by these members.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning natural appetite in brutes, the response is now clear; for when it is said that we share with brutes in natural power and appetite, there the natural power is distinguished from the rational not only as to the mode of desiring, but also as to the desirable object; and according to this it happens that diverse differences of powers are taken.