Dist. 24, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p1-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what the Master says in the text, that *to resist evil would not have made it meritorious for him, because there was nothing in him which might impel toward evil.* For if this is true, then, since there would have been nothing impelling in Adam, he would never have merited in any work of his. — Likewise, Christ had nothing interiorly impelling toward evil, when he withstood the devil in the temptation, and in his works he had nothing drawing back from the good: therefore he merited nothing in his temptation nor in any operation; which is altogether wicked to say. — Likewise, his example seems to be bad, when he adds: *As it was not meritorious for the Angels that they stood firm;* for this is

against the truth and against Augustine, who says in the book *On Rebuke and Grace*, that « the Angels who, when the others fell, remained, received the due reward of this remaining »: therefore it seems that they merited by standing firm.

To this it could be said that there is a merit of the remission of punishment, that is, a satisfactory merit, and there is a merit of eternal life, that is, of the substantial reward. For the first, penalty and difficulty are required, but for the second charity alone suffices. The Master, however, understands of merit according to the first difference, not according to the other. — But since that merit of satisfaction would never have been in Adam, nor any advancement in him, if he had remained in the state of innocence; the aforesaid response does not seem to pertain to the matter at hand.

And therefore it seems it must be said otherwise, that a thing is meritorious as regards the *kind of work,* and a thing is meritorious from the *root of charity.* That is called meritorious from the kind of work which is in itself a work of virtue; and this is arduous and difficult. In another way every work is called meritorious, whatever it be, provided it proceeds from the *root of charity.* The Master therefore means to say that in resisting the temptation of Adam there would have been no merit, if he had not had grace, neither in the first way nor in the second. But if he had withstood it out of charity, it would have been meritorious in the second way, not in the first. In us, however, it is always meritorious, either in both ways or in one of them, on account of the difficulty toward the good and the proneness toward evil. — And by this the response to the objections is clear, since they proceed concerning merit according to the second difference, namely concerning that which is meritorious by reason of the root.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *to turn away from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the palm.* For either one turns away from evil out of charity, or not. If not; likewise neither does doing good apart from charity merit the palm, therefore there is no difference between *turning away from evil* and *doing good.* If so; since everything that is done out of charity is meritorious, it is clear, etc. If you say that it does not merit the palm from the *kind of work,* because it is not difficult; this does not resolve it, because, although it is not difficult for man in the state of innocence, it is nevertheless difficult in the state of fallen nature: therefore it always merits the palm. — Likewise, to turn away from evil is one part of justice, just as to do good: therefore, just as the one is meritorious, so also is the other.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to turn away from evil* is said in two ways, just as *not to will evil:* in one way privatively — as a sleeper is said not to will evil, because he has no affection toward evil — in another way contrarily, so that one is said not to will evil because he rejects it and is affected with a contrary affection against evil; thus also *to turn away from evil* is said in two ways. And if it be taken contrarily, then it is meritorious; but if privatively, it avoids punishment, because he who does not sin is not punished, yet he does not merit the palm, because there is no meritorious work there; and in the first way it is a part of justice, in the second way not, because it is not a work.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *But free choice is the faculty by which evil is chosen, when grace withdraws.* For it seems false to say so, because, if this were true, then free choice, deprived of grace, would always consent to sin; which is plainly false. — Likewise, it seems that this ought not to be placed in the definition of free choice, because, as the Philosopher says, « he errs who defines something by worse things, and by those to which it is not principally ordered ». If therefore free choice of itself, as regards its first condition, is not ordered toward evil, it ought not to be defined by the choice of evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here defines free choice not simply, but according to the state of fallen nature; and because in the state of fallen nature it has a defect and an inclination toward evil: therefore he defines it not only by the choice of the good, to which it is ordered by the mediation of grace, but also by the choice of evil, into which it falls by its own defectibility. Nor is the choice of evil placed there as the end to which it is ordered, but so that through this it may be made more known how it is ordered to its proper end; for it does not attain to that except through the help of grace. — And thus the response to both objections is clear.

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