Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.
### *In what manner sin has to come about and to be in the superior part of reason.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether in the superior part of reason there has to be sin in itself.*

About the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that in the superior part of reason in itself — that is, apart from the instinct of the inferior part — there cannot be sin.

1. *First*, through that saying of Augustine against the Manichees, where he speaks thus: «Our reason cannot be led to consent to sin unless delight has first been stirred in that part of the soul which ought to obey reason as its governing husband»: therefore the superior reason never sins unless sin precedes in the inferior part.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book *On the Soul*: «The intellect is always right, but imagination is right and not right»: therefore the intellect, so far as it is of itself, never errs: therefore neither does the superior portion deviate from the truth of justice unless it be inclined through sensuality and the inferior portion.

3. Likewise, sin is through conversion to a changeable good; but the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned to eternal things; the inferior, insofar as it is turned to temporal things: therefore it is impossible that sin be or come about in us from an act of the superior part of reason without an act of the inferior.

4. Likewise, the superior reason is so called insofar as it attends to the eternal laws; but it is impossible for anyone to sin except by turning away from the eternal laws: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

5. Likewise, the woman is the mean between sensuality and the superior reason; but sensuality always moves toward the good *as for now*, so far as it is of itself: therefore the superior reason, so far as it is of itself, always moves toward the good *simply*. But a power which moves toward the good simply does not sin in moving: therefore in the superior part of reason, so far as it is of itself, there cannot be sin.

6. Likewise, the soul, when it is turned to God, is purged, bettered, and perfected; but the superior portion of reason is regarded insofar as it is turned to God: therefore, since sin defiles and beclouds, there cannot be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Jeremiah, chapter two: *The sons of Memphis and Taphnes have defiled thee even to the crown of the head*: if therefore the crown, according as the Saints expound it, is there called the apex of the mind or the superior portion of reason; it seems that this too is defiled and befouled through sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twelfth book, *On the Trinity*: «The man eats, when the superior portion of reason consents to the enticement»; but to sin belongs to him to whom it belongs to consent: if therefore this belongs to the superior part, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, it happens that someone sins by the sin of unbelief in disbelieving certain articles which are in respect of the divinity; but to those articles only the superior portion of reason extends itself: therefore in that kind of sinning the superior portion properly commits fault.

4. Likewise, free choice is agreed to be capable of turning; but free choice consists chiefly in the superior portion of reason, since there are chiefly judgment and command: therefore it seems that in the superior portion of reason also in itself there is turnability toward evil: therefore also sin.

5. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is that which discerns and judges both about things to be done and things to be believed; but the judgment of a creature, so far as it is of itself, without grace fails of those things which are of the catholic faith: therefore of itself it can err and turn away from them; and if this, it can sin of itself.

6. Likewise, the Angel, when he sinned by the first sin, desired to be made equal to God in power, and the woman likewise in wisdom; but this is desirable only by the superior part; therefore it seems that both the sin of man and that of the Angel began from the superior part of reason: therefore in the superior part of reason in itself sin has to come about and to be.

### CONCLUSION.

> Although carnal sin cannot be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, nevertheless spiritual sin can come about and be in the superior part of reason in itself.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the superior portion of reason is nothing other than synderesis, and that the superior portion itself, so far as it is *of itself*, is always right and strong, unless it be bent and softened through the inferior portion; and therefore they said that there is no sin in it *in itself*, but if it sins, this they say to be only by *consenting* to the inferior part, or by not restraining its disorder.

But this position deviates from the truth in three ways. First in this, that it says that the superior portion of reason and synderesis are the same; which is plainly false, since the superior portion of reason and the inferior pertain to the liberty of choice, as Augustine says, and therefore they name the *deliberative* power; but synderesis names the *natural* power, which always uniformly inclines toward the good. — Secondly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says there is in some way sin in synderesis; for this is plainly false, as will be shown below, and the Gloss says expressly, on the first chapter of Ezekiel. — Thirdly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says that in the superior part of reason in itself there cannot be fault, unless it proceed from the inferior and the occasion be attributed to it. For this is contrary to *reason*, since in that portion consists the liberty of choice, and so by nature there is in it a turnability toward evil, and thus a possibility of sinning. — This is also contrary to *experience*, because the superior reason has to judge not only according to the *eternal laws*, but also has to judge according to its *own light*, and according to the *light acquired for it from the inferior*. And although in looking to the *eternal laws* it does not sin in judging, nevertheless according to those things which it perceives from the *senses*, or also according to the *light* given and innate to it, it can fail and err, especially in the state of fallen nature. For grant that there be set before it something *credible* and some article of faith — for instance the article concerning the Trinity and the Unity, since this not only is repugnant to sense and imagination, but also disagrees with the natural judgment of reason: if our intellect were to judge according to its *own light*, or by looking to the inferior parts, it would fail and disbelieve and sin.

And on account of this there is another manner of speaking, namely that there is a twofold genus of sin: for some sins are *carnal*, but some *spiritual*. If we speak of *carnal* sins, then it must be granted that sin does not happen to be in the superior part of reason *without the inferior*. But if the discourse be of *spiritual* sins, then it must be conceded that sin has to come about and to be — although it does not always come about — in the superior part of reason *in itself*; and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* And through this the reply is evident to that which is first objected to the contrary. For Augustine in the cited authority speaks of the progress in the perpetration of *carnal* sins.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that the word of the Philosopher is to be understood in those things toward which the intellective power moves by the mode of *nature*; but in those things toward which it moves by the mode of *deliberation*, it does not hold true; whence he calls "intellect" the same thing which we call the natural conscience.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that sin is through conversion to a changeable good; it can be answered in two ways: first, that there is sin not only when the conversion is to that which according to truth is a changeable good, but also when the conversion is to that which is an unchangeable good, and it is desired as changeable. — Otherwise it can be said that the superior portion, although it differs from the inferior in this, that it itself is turned to the supernal things, nonetheless still has to be turned to the inferior things, insofar as it disposes and rules the inferior powers: and thus it can be disordered by ruling them badly, whether by loosening the reins, or by bending them to its command.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the superior reason attends to the eternal laws; it must be said that this is the noblest act of the superior part; but it does not always exercise this act, indeed it also attends to itself and is turned to itself, and thus it can be turned to itself excessively, and through this be turned away from God and deviate from the eternal laws.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that sensuality inclines toward the good as for now; it must be said that sensuality is not always moved inordinately; and besides, granted that it were always moved inordinately, yet it is not concluded from this that the superior portion of reason is always moved ordinately; for another power is assigned according to which it is always moved ordinately, namely synderesis, which is the spark of conscience.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it is *actually* turned, but insofar as it is *born* to be turned. Moreover, *to be turned inordinately* is rather *to be turned away* than *to be turned*. And when it is said that conversion to God purges, illumines, and perfects; this is understood of *ordered* conversion, which it is not always necessary to find in the action of the superior portion.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** In six questions the holy Doctor discusses the doubtful matter of in which powers of the soul, and how, sin can be; other commentators on Lombard for the most part dispatch the same matter in fewer questions, but agree well enough in the solution. They also commonly use the metaphorical manner of speaking which the Master took from St. Augustine (here c. 7 ff.), when they call the superior part of reason the *man*, the inferior the *woman*, and sensuality the *serpent*. — For the easier understanding of these questions we note beforehand these things from St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1): «The acts of the *appetitive* powers are called *motions*, but not properly the acts of the *apprehensive* powers. Now there is in us a threefold appetite, namely the *natural*, the *sensitive*, and the *rational*. The natural appetite, such as for food, is that which imagination does not beget, but the very disposition of the natural qualities by which the natural powers exercise their actions. Now this motion in no way is subject to reason nor obeys it; whence neither can there be sin in it; and therefore it is here passed over. But the *sensitive* appetite is that which follows from a preceding *imagination*, or *sense*, and this is called the *motion of sensuality*. But the *rational* appetite is that which follows the apprehension of reason: and this is called the *motion of reason*, which is the act of the will. But the apprehension of reason can be twofold: one *simple* and *absolute*, namely when it at once without discussion adjudges what is apprehended; and the will, which is called non-deliberate, follows such an apprehension. The other is *inquisitive*… and the *deliberate* will follows such an apprehension. Reason therefore as *inferior*… can elicit the motion of the will about earthly things in either mode… But the *superior* reason, because of itself it does not attend to earthly things, but only insofar as it is regulated by the eternal grounds, no motion follows it except a deliberate one, in respect, that is, of these earthly things».

**II.** In the solution of the two questions of this article there is no difference of opinion among the principal Scholastics except as to the first conclusion of the first question, since Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 2, 3) holds it probable, with certain men, that carnal sins arise from sensuality, or from the inferior reason, not *always*, but *for the most part*, because a man, not incited by any passion, can choose an act of gluttony or lust. But St. Bonaventure seems not to concede this except in respect of the *inferior* part of reason (below, a. 2, q. 1).

**III.** On this and the following question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 108, m. 6 (as to *venial* sin). — Scotus, II Sent. d. 42, q. unica, n. 13 ff., and *Reportata* ibid. q. 1, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 3, 5; *Summa* I-II, q. 74, a. 5, 9, 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12; *Summa* p. II, tr. 15, q. 93, m. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 5. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 1, 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 6, q. 32 (on the first motions). — On these and the four following questions, Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6, and Biel, q. unica.

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