Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin. And that there can be, it seems:

1. Because it happens that someone doubts about some article of faith by surprise; and it is agreed that there is sin there, since it is a motion toward the illicit; it is agreed also that it is in the superior part, since it is about the articles of faith in respect of eternal things; it is agreed also that it is venial, since it is from surprise: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the superior portion of reason then sins, and *the man eats*, when there is full consent, and *the weapons of iniquity are furnished to sin*; but it happens that someone fully consents to an idle word and a jesting lie, and these are nothing but venial sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is corrupted, just as the inferior, since the original [sin] infects and weakens all the powers of the soul: therefore if venial sin can be in the other powers which are subject to free choice, on account of the corruption which it received from the original [sin], by the same reasoning also in the superior part.

4. Likewise, it happens that someone is negligent in turning himself to God through love; but a man is not bound more to this commandment than to the others: therefore if negligence in the observance of the other commandments is venial, then also negligence in loving God is venial. But this is in the superior part of reason: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine says, and the Master in the text recites, that, when «the superior part of reason consents to the enticement, then there is damnable and mortal sin»: therefore it seems that whenever sin reaches the superior part, it is straightway mortal.

2. Likewise, with the superior part of reason resides the rule of direction in the whole kingdom of the soul; but once a deflection has been made in the rule, there now remains no rectitude nor semblance of rectitude: therefore when the superior portion of reason sins, the whole soul is disordered; therefore if a full disorder is not without mortal sin, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, no creature is more excellent than the soul as to its superior portion, as Augustine in many places suggests and says expressly; but the Angel on account of its dignity cannot sin except mortally: therefore it seems by parity of reasoning that neither can venial sin be in the superior part.

4. Likewise, «nothing is so venial that it does not become mortal sin while it pleases»; but complacency is then truly so called when the superior part of reason is bent to fault; and this is when it itself sins: therefore it does not seem that any sin can be in it without being mortal.

### CONCLUSION.

> It is more probable that venial sin can be in the superior reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that in the superior portion of reason there can be only mortal sin, and this on account of its remoteness from the flesh and from sensuality, in which consists the beginning of evil suggestion, and from whose proneness venial sin has its being according to the state of fallen nature. And these said that, since there are three grades in the powers of the soul, corresponding to the *serpent*, the *woman*, and the *man*, namely *sensuality*, the *inferior portion*, and the *superior*; it belongs to sensuality to sin only venially, to the superior part only mortally, to the inferior part in both modes. For since it is the mean between both, it tastes of the nature of each.

But since it is plain that in the superior portion of reason there can in some way be disordered motions from surprise; and it is plain also that there is in it some corruption from the contraction of the original [sin]: therefore to others it seems more probable and better that venial sin has its being in the superior reason. Hence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the opposite:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that when *the superior part of reason eats*, the sin is damnable and mortal; it must be said that this is understood of *full consent*, and this in respect of that sin whose act lies in a prohibition, as is the case with the sin of fornication.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that with the superior part resides the rule of direction; it must be said that the rule of direction is not taken away by just any sin, but by that which induces divine contempt and turning away from God; but this is not in every sin of the superior part, such as in that which is committed from surprise.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that no creature is superior to the soul according to mind; it must be said that, although none is superior according to the order of *efficient [cause]* and *end*, there is nevertheless something of greater *dignity* and of more excellent nature, and on account of this it has less excuse. — Moreover, no rational nature in the state of innocence can sin venially, as was shown above; but no fallen rational nature can obtain pardon from fault, unless a man on account of the frailty of the flesh; and therefore that which it objects about the Angel does not hold.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that complacency makes a mortal [sin] out of a venial one; it must be said that complacency does not there mean any inclination whatever, but *full consent* and deliberate, with a certain full repose; and so from this it is not concluded that every disorder of the superior part passes over into the genus of mortal sin.

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