Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *In what manner sin comes to be in the inferior part of reason.*

Concerning the second principal [point], namely that in which it is asked in what manner sin comes to be and to exist in the inferior part of reason, two [questions] are raised.

First it is asked whether any sin has its being in the inferior part without sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether mortal sin can be in that part of reason, the superior part not sinning.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether any sin has its being in the inferior part of reason without sensuality.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that no sin can be in the inferior part of reason without sensuality:

1. First by the authority of Augustine *Against the Manichees*, where he says thus: «In each one of us nothing else is now done, when anyone slips into sin, than was done then in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man»: therefore if that sin began from the serpent, and sensuality is the serpent, as he himself says, every sin begins from sensuality.

2. Likewise, just as delectation precedes every consent, so some suggestion precedes every delectation; but no sin of reason is without some delectation: therefore neither is delectation without suggestion; but suggestion belongs only to the sensible part or to the serpent: therefore no sin is in the inferior part of reason which does not begin from sensuality.

3. Likewise, the inferior reason does not sin except because it desires the good *as now*; but the power which desires the good *as now* is sensuality: therefore it does not sin except by sensuality going before.

4. Likewise, «there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense»: therefore by parity of reasoning there is nothing in reason which was not first in sensuality: therefore if reason is disordered, it was necessary that sensuality be disordered first.

5. Likewise, all actual sins have their origin from original sin, and especially from concupiscence, which has grown ingrained in us from original sin; but both original sin and concupiscence are in the soul from its conjunction to the flesh; but the power according to which the soul is conjoined to the flesh is sensuality itself: therefore every sin of the soul begins from sensuality: therefore without it sin cannot come to be in the inferior part of reason.

**On the contrary:** 1. The superior portion is more conjoined to the inferior than the inferior portion itself is to sensuality, since the superior and inferior reason pertain to the same power and nature. If therefore sin can come to be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, as was proved above, it seems much more strongly that it can come to be in the inferior without sensuality.

2. Likewise, it is possible for the inferior part of reason to sin by a spiritual sin, by desiring some spiritual good; but sensuality desires nothing but a sensible good: therefore the inferior portion can sin without sensuality.

3. Likewise, whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can do: therefore if sensuality can of itself be moved inordinately toward some object of desire without the superior powers, much more strongly can the superior power, namely the inferior part of reason, be moved inordinately without sensuality.

4. Likewise, in the devil there is no sensuality, since he is not [meant] to be conjoined with flesh; but it is agreed that he can sin not only against God, but also against man. If therefore sin against a creature is regarded according to the aspect of reason which we call the inferior part of reason, it seems that without sensuality it happens that that portion sins.

Likewise, in connection with this it is asked: what is it for the inferior portion of reason to *eat*? And when does delectation pass over from sensuality into reason? If you say that this is when reason notices and perceives that it is being delighted; then there is a twofold incongruity: one, because frequently a man consummates sin and thinks of nothing but the object of desire, nor notices that he is being delighted or saddened; and so it seems that someone could sin mortally in such a way that the inferior portion does not eat. Another incongruity is also concluded, because, since to *perceive* delectation is not evil nor augmentative of sin, it now seems that the perception of reason after the suggestion of sensuality would not aggravate the fault; which no one doubts to be plainly and manifestly false.

### CONCLUSION.

> The inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality; yet in the genus of carnal sin it scarcely, or never, sins without a motion of sensuality.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as the Master intimates at the end of this distinction, sensuality can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the power which desires the good *as now*; and this is not only in the sensible part, but also in the rational. And without a motion of sensuality so understood it never happens that there is sin in the inferior part of reason; for always, when someone sins, he longs for the good *as now*. — In another way sensuality is called the power of the sensible soul by which one is bent toward the senses of the body, as was treated above. And without this it happens that there is sin in the inferior part as regards spiritual sins; but as regards carnal [sins] scarcely, or never. For in carnal [sins] corruption comes from the foulness of the flesh and the concupiscence of the sensible part; and so in them sin begins from the *serpent*, that is from sensuality, and reaches the *woman*.

But it is then said to be in sensuality, when someone is delighted from the apprehension of something delectable and is inclined [to it] before the noticing and perception of his delectation; for this is from a stealthy onset, nor is reason said in any way, on account of that delectation, to have tasted of the forbidden food. But then *reason eats*, and sin begins to be in it, when after the noticing and perception of the delectation it takes delight together with the delighting sensuality and persists in the delectation. For from then, namely after the noticing of the delectation, *reason* is said *to eat*, and *sin to pass over from sensuality into it*; because, although *to judge* concerning something delectable and *to be delighted* in it belongs to the sensible part, yet *to perceive* that interior delectation belongs to the rational part. And therefore *reason* is said *to eat*, if after such perception it takes delight together with the sensible part.

Thus therefore I concede that the inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality, as the reasons adduced for the second part show. But by some genus of sin it scarcely, or never, sins, namely the carnal, unless a motion of sensuality precede and draw it. And it is with regard to this genus of sin that Augustine speaks *Against the Manichees*.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* And by this the response to the first, which is objected to the contrary, is clear.

*To 2 and 3.* To that which is objected, that suggestion precedes every delectation; it must be said that if suggestion is taken broadly for every apprehension of the good *as now* under the aspect of the desirable, thus it is true that it precedes every delectation. But if it is taken strictly for that serpentine motion of the sensible part, thus it does not hold true in all sins, but only in sins of the flesh. — And by this the response to the following [objection] is clear, by which it is said that sensuality is the appetitive power of the *good as now*; for there sensuality is taken broadly; and thus, as was shown before, without it there cannot be sin in the inferior portion of reason, although there can be [sin] without sensuality properly so called, at least spiritual sin.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense; it must be said that this is true either *in itself* or *in its likeness*. Yet a man imagines many things which he never saw; many things also, after he has seen them, he thinks of, in such a way that that thinking is not excited by a moving sensitive power. So too it can be understood concerning reason and sensuality.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that all sins have their origin from original concupiscence; it must be said that, although every sin in some manner has its origin from the original [sin], and the original from the flesh; nevertheless it is not necessary that every sin have its origin from the flesh or sensuality as from a proximate mover, for the reason that original sin not only infects the *sensible* part, but rather infects and corrupts the *rational* part. Hence concupiscence is sprinkled throughout all the powers of the soul; and therefore, whether sensuality be the forerunner or not, all our evils are said to come from concupiscence.