Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher.*

Secondly it is asked whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher. And that it can, it seems.

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text: "If a sin be held long in the thought of delight, even if the will to carry it out be lacking, it is mortal." But the man is not said to eat except when the will to carry it out is present: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter: *Nor indeed* etc., that if the woman alone eats, the whole man is damned: but this is only on account of mortal sin: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

3. Likewise, the higher portion of reason is so called insofar as it is born to look upon higher things; but it happens that one commits some sin in such a way that we think nothing of the eternal laws: therefore it happens that someone sins mortally by the act of the lower part alone, the act of the higher doing nothing.

4. Likewise, often one offends his neighbor while thinking nothing of an offense against God; but the lower portion is that according to which we are ordered to our neighbor, the higher that according to which we are ordered to God: therefore it happens that one sins mortally by an act of the lower part without an act of the higher.

5. Likewise, the lower portion is more prone to sin than the higher, since by its conjunction to sensuality it is softer, and for this reason it is called the woman: therefore, if the higher portion of reason can sin through itself, much more it seems that the lower can.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter: *Nor indeed* etc., where it is said that, "when the mind is delighted by thought alone, of such thoughts pardon must be sought and the breast struck and one must say: Forgive us our debts" etc; but such is the penance of venial sins: therefore, so long as the woman eats apart from the man, the sin is only venial.

2. Likewise, it is impossible that the lower portion be damned apart from the higher; but the higher portion is never damned without fault: therefore it is impossible that the lower portion sin mortally apart from the higher.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mortal sin without consent; but consent resides with the judge and the principal arbiter — and this is the higher portion of reason, as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone sin mortally without an aversion; but it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward, and this belongs to the higher part: therefore it is impossible for the lower portion to sin mortally apart from the higher.

5. Likewise, no one ever merits in the thought of good unless he proposes to do or accomplish it, if he can: therefore likewise no one ever demerits with the demerit of mortal sin in the thought of evil, unless he proposes to carry it out, if he can; but this is not without the higher portion of reason: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when some sin is venial, to consent to it does not make a mortal sin; but carnal delight short of consent is venial: therefore to consent to the delight, in such a way that there be no consent to the deed, will not be mortal. If therefore consent to the deed belongs to the higher part, as Augustine says, there is never mortal sin in the lower part apart from the higher. — And that consent to a venial sin does not make it mortal is proved by this, that consent to an idle word and a jesting lie is not mortal, but venial. — But if you should say that it is not similar, because carnal delight is a way to mortal sin; then I ask, why rather is consent to the delight attributed to the lower part than to the higher? And why is consent to the deed rather appropriated to the higher? For since it belongs to the lower part to govern the members as well as the affections and other things; it seems that it is just as much in the power of the lower part to furnish weapons of iniquity to sin, as also to consent to the delight.

Therefore the question is, what difference there is between sinning and eating; and whether to eat is the same as to consent; and when the woman is said to eat, and when the man; and when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when venially. — For that saying of Augustine about the man's eating does not seem to be generally true, that the man eats then, when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin. For there are many sins that are consummated in interior thought alone; and then he eats, and no members of the body are furnished as weapons of iniquity, since that sin is not to be carried out through the members of the body.

### Conclusion

> The lower portion of reason cannot sin mortally apart from the higher portion of reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, although it is possible for the woman to eat apart from the man, it is nevertheless not possible for the woman to sin mortally apart from the man, that is, for the lower portion apart from the higher; and this is shown thus.

For it is one thing to commit a mortal sin, and another to taste forbidden food. — For mortal sin means a turning-away from God, which is with consent and contempt; but such a disorder is through an aversion, and this belongs to the higher part. For it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward. But to consent pertains to that power with which the judiciary power and the authority of governance reside. And this is the higher portion of reason; and therefore it is impossible that any mortal sin be in us that is not imputed to the higher portion, and in which it is not itself disordered, on account of the nature of mortal sin, which requires that there be both the contempt of aversion and the consent of deliberation, each of which belongs to the higher part. — There is also a reason from the connection of these powers, since between the higher portion and the lower there is a law of marriage, and therefore the one is bound to govern and restrain the other. But it is not so between sensuality and the lower portion; and for this reason, when the lower portion is disordered, it is imputed to the negligence of the man, who ought to have restrained it, and it is judged culpable together with that one. So therefore it is clear that it is impossible for the lower portion of reason to sin mortally apart from the higher.

It is nevertheless possible for one of them to eat apart from the other; and this, because eating means a turning toward the delight according to the proper act of the woman, or of the man. But it happens that the rational power is turned toward the delight offered by sensuality according to the act of the lower portion, yet in such a way that it is not turned according to the act of the higher; and so it happens that the woman eats, while the man does not taste.

And this is clear if we attend to the progress of temptation and delight. For first the delightful thing is offered or perceived; secondly the delight is noticed; thirdly there is consent or dissent to that to which the delight draws. To perceive the delightful thing belongs to sensuality, to notice the delight belongs to the lower part of reason, which has to judge and know the interior motions and affections; for this does not belong to the sensitive power. But to define whether this is to be embraced or rejected, this belongs to the higher part, in which the authority of the judiciary power resides. — It happens therefore that one is delighted at the apprehension of the delightful thing before the noticing of the delight; and this belongs to sensuality and is without doubt a venial sin. It happens again that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the perception of the delight, before the full consent of deliberation; and this belongs to the lower part and is sometimes mortal, sometimes venial; and then the woman alone is said to eat. It happens again, thirdly, that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the noticing of the delight and after the full consent of deliberation; and then the man is said to eat, and then it is a mortal sin in those kinds of sins whose acts are under prohibition, on account of the full consent and disorder. — Hence, when the temptation begins from sensuality, it is plainly venial; when it is consummated in the higher part of reason, it is plainly mortal; but when the woman alone eats, it can be mortal or venial; and therefore it is doubtful to discern when it is mortal or venial.

It can nevertheless be discerned in this way: that when the delight is perceived, either it is at once repelled, or it is retained. If it is at once repelled, then the sin is light. But if it is held, this can be in three ways: either because the delight itself and the consummation of the deed are pleasing, in such a way that there is a will to take delight in thought and also in deed, if the opportunity were present; and then there is full consent there and mortal sin, the eating of man and woman concurring together. Or the delight is pleasing, yet the consummation of the sin is displeasing; and then the consent is half-full, and then the woman is said to eat; nevertheless she sins mortally, since she consents to that delight. Or both are displeasing, namely the interior delight itself and the consummation of the deed; and then either he notices the danger, or he does not notice it. If he does not notice the danger of the delight nor repel it, he sins, but not mortally; yet he sins more gravely than if he had at once and manfully repelled it. Or he notices the danger and does not repel that delight, but lets the mind dwell in such thoughts; and then the masters say that he sins mortally, because, although there is no true consent there, there is nevertheless interpretative consent there; and the woman alone eats, yet nevertheless that sin is imputed to the man, because, when he ought to have checked her and was bound to, he nevertheless did not check her.

This, however, which has just now lastly been said, is not altogether certain. For some deny that there is anything mortal in the negligence of restraining, where there is displeasure, however much one notices the danger. — But nevertheless the safer way is to be held, whatever the truth of the matter may be. And if this should befall anyone, it is sound counsel that he do penance for it as for a mortal sin; for in doubtful matters the safer way is to be chosen. — And note that we are not speaking of just any delight, such as that by which one is delighted in thinking of the beauty of a woman, but of that which arises from the thought of that nefarious deed.

And so it is clear that the woman happens to eat apart from the man, for the reason that the man alone is said to eat when full consent is present; and then the weapons of iniquity are said to be furnished to sin, because the whole man is there bent down to sin, whether it be a sin of the flesh or of the spirit. But she cannot sin mortally apart from the man, because there cannot be sin without the true or interpretative consent of the man. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted that show that the lower portion cannot sin mortally apart from the higher, although the last two do not compel. For they show that the woman cannot eat without the man, by this, that they say that consent to the delight is not a sin; which is without doubt false, as Augustine says in the text.

Nor is what he objects about consent to a good thing, or about consent to an idle word, valid. The first is not valid, because more is required for accomplishing a good than for perpetrating an evil; for the defect of one circumstance deforms the operation. The second is not valid, because there is no danger in venial delight, whose act is venial; but there is danger there, when the delight is a way leading to mortal sin.

But to those things that were lastly asked, the response is already clear from what has been said, namely what difference there is between eating and the commission of mortal fault. It is also clear when the man is said to eat, and when the woman. For it is clear when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when she sins venially. It is also clear why consent to the delight is attributed to the woman, and consent to the deed to the man, because consent to the perpetration of the deed is full consent; but consent to the delight without the deed is half-full consent. But if the sin consisted in the delight alone, then consent to the delight could be full consent; and then it would belong not only to the higher part, but also to the lower; whence the man is not only said to consent because he moves the exterior members, but because he is moved by the full will. And Augustine circumlocutes this in what he says, that the man eats when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1 and 2.* As to the reasons that are adduced to the opposite, by which it is shown that the woman can sin mortally without the man; the response is plain. For the first two authorities speak of eating, not of the commission of fault.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected in the third place, that the higher portion of reason has to be turned toward higher things; it must be said that not only is its act directed to the supernal things, but its act is also to discern and pass sentence concerning those things that are done in the kingdom of the soul, and to check the lower powers; and therefore, when it does not check, it is imputed to it.

*To 4 and 5.* To the two following the response is likewise clear. For by those two reasons it is shown that sin can be in the lower portion of reason apart from a proper act of the higher reason. And this indeed is true; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that sin can be in the lower part of reason apart from the higher, because the very negligence of restraining the lower part in the disorder of its motion renders it culpable, as has often been said.

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