Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-a3-q1
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### Article III.
### *How sin comes to be and exists in sensuality.*

Next, concerning the third point — by which it is asked how sin comes to be and exists in sensuality — two questions are raised.

For first it is asked whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether there can be mortal sin in sensuality.

### Question I.
### *Whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there can be venial sin in sensuality:

1. *First*, by that statement of Augustine, in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*, which the Master recites in the text: «If the enticement of sin be held only in the sensual motion, it is venial».

2. *Likewise*, upon that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: *Seven times a day* etc., the Gloss says: «Through the necessity and frailty of the flesh we sin each day, whether unwilling or willing». If therefore we sin against our rational will, that sin is not in the will, but only in sensuality.

3. *Likewise*, it seems so by reason. A motion toward what is illicit is disordered, and so reprehensible and evil; but first motions are of this kind: therefore first motions are sins. But first motions are in sensuality: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, everything that is ordinable according to the rule of justice has fault in itself when it is disordered; but sensuality is ordinable according to the rule of justice, and it happens that it be disordered in its motions: it seems therefore that it becomes culpable.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the City of God*, distinguishes a threefold kind of cause: there is one that only makes, and this is God; one that is only made, as nature; one that both makes and is made, as the liberty of choice or the will. And in the first cause there cannot be sin on account of its dignity; in the second there cannot be sin on account of its constraint: since therefore it belongs to sensuality rather to be moved than to move, to be acted upon than to act, it seems that sin cannot be in it.

2. *Likewise*, in faults we differ from beasts: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in us according to that in which we have a common nature with beasts; but this is sensuality: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, the foolish and the frenzied have the use of sensuality, and yet in none of their acts do they sin: therefore sin is never in us from the disorder of sensuality: therefore no sin is to be placed in sensuality.

4. *Likewise*, fault is born to be only in that power according to which a man is capable of praise and blame; but as regards the sensible part a man is worthy neither of praise nor of blame: therefore according to it fault cannot be present.

### Conclusion.

> Venial sin, insofar as it has the character of fault, is in free choice; insofar as it has the character of vice, it is placed in sensuality.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that, when it is asked whether venial sin can be in sensuality, the common reply is that sensuality can be considered in two ways: either in itself, or as it is ordinable by reason and under reason. If it be considered in itself, in this mode it has its use in the frenzied, and in this mode Augustine says that in it we have a common nature with beasts. And so there cannot be sin in it, as the reasons for the second part show. — In another way one speaks of sensuality according as it is ordinable to reason and under reason; and in this mode it can be regulated according to the law of justice. And so, when it is moved toward what is illicit, its very disorder comes to be a sin; and so it is commonly held that, although in sensuality considered in itself sin cannot be, nevertheless sin can be in it as it is ordered to reason. And by this the arguments adduced for either part can be made clear.

Nevertheless there still remains the question how there can be sin and fault in sensuality, since in no way is virtue or grace placed in it; and therefore, to those willing to examine this question more inwardly, a twofold mode of speaking will appear.

For there were some who said that even in sensuality ordered to reason sin is not altogether to be placed, but in some way according to something. For sin states two things, namely the act and the disorder concerning the act. And although sin is said to be in sensuality by reason of the underlying act and by reason of the motion, nevertheless the disorder itself is in reason, which was less cautious and careful to foresee, lest such a disordered motion should arise in sensuality, or which is also less diligent in repressing it. Therefore that disorder of venial sins is placed in reason itself, which neglected to govern sensuality. But it is imputed to it as venial, not as mortal, on this account: that it was not bound to restrain it by the law of marriage, as the superior reason is bound with respect to the inferior. — But this mode of speaking seems to be less sufficient: first, because according to it all venial sins would be rather from omission than from disordered inclination. Secondly, because there are certain venial sins which reason cannot avoid, as Augustine says, and as is shown below. And thirdly, because disorder is there where there is also an act that is disordered; and so, if the motion and act of sin be placed in sensuality, the disorder too ought to be placed in it.

Therefore there is another mode of speaking, namely to speak of sin insofar as it has the character of fault, and insofar as it has the character of vice. Insofar as it has the character of fault, it is thus opposed to grace and makes the one in whom it is worthy of blame; and in this mode every sin is in free choice. In another way sin is to be considered insofar as it holds the character of vice; and thus it states the disorder of some power with respect to the act due to it according to its natural institution; and because such a disorder has its being in sensuality, so that that disorder is the way to a work worthy of blame, so it is placed that sin is in sensuality. — And by this distinction the intention of the question and the resolution of all the preceding objections is made manifest. But this will be better laid bare below, when treatment is made of the subject of virtue and grace, and of the opposition of virtue and fault.