Dist. 24, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/24/q/bon-sent-II-d24-p2-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: *If a sin is not held long in delight, it is venial; but if it is held long in the delight of thought, even though the will to carry it out is absent, it is mortal.* For from this it seems that delay alone makes a venial sin into a mortal one. **On the contrary:** a circumstance does not change the kind of a sin: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance, it will never make that which was venial to be mortal. — Likewise, the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely; but a circumstance does not aggravate infinitely: therefore if delay of time is a circumstance, it seems, etc.

In connection with this it is asked, how great a delay of time makes that which was venial to be mortal — and whether this holds in other kinds of sins, as in the sin of the flesh — and again, when someone doubts whether he has sinned mortally or venially, how he is to be counseled.

**I respond:** It must be said that delay of time, as far as it is of itself, does not make that which was previously venial become mortal, but only occasionally, namely, because it induces consent, true or interpretative. Now it induces true consent when, from the long duration of the delight, desire grows so much that a man wishes utterly to persist and tarry in the inner delight. But it induces interpretative consent when a man, perceiving the danger of the retained delight, neglects to repress it; for this is not without contempt of his own salvation, inasmuch as he exposes himself to peril. For that delight slips in like a serpent and pours out venom, by which the rational spirit perishes by the death of guilt. As, therefore, a man would be neglecting his bodily safety who knowingly placed a serpent beside himself, so in such delight one who perceives the danger, or ought to perceive it, willingly tarries and exposes himself to peril when he neglects to drive it off; and to that extent the Master says that he sins mortally. — And the answer to the objections is clear, because delay does not do this of itself, but by reason of the consent or the contempt.

But to that which is asked, how great a delay does this; it must be said that in general it is determined that so great a delay does this, in which the delight and desire grow so much that consent supervenes; or there is such negligence in repelling and such carelessness of one's own salvation, that contempt and interpretative consent supervene. — But if it be asked in particular how great this delay is, whether of one hour, or of half an hour, or of a longer span; no single answer can be given, because sometimes it is greater, sometimes less according to the diverse states and conditions of persons; whence neither knowledge nor learning determines this, but rather an upright conscience and the anointing. And an upright conscience well perceives that it is not slightly harmed when, from morose delight, consent or contempt supervenes. — But if it does not perceive this at times, on account of the darkness and the entanglements of our affections, it ought to choose the safer part and confess purely, and likewise grieve as though it had sinned mortally.

To that which is asked, whether it is so in all kinds of sins; it must be answered that in all sins morose delight is to be vigilantly and strenuously avoided. Nevertheless the saying of Augustine seems chiefly to be understood of the sin of the flesh, which from the incitement of the flesh has a delight more closely joined to itself, and toward which a man is more easily bent down; and therefore it is to be avoided with great diligence, yet not this alone, but every sin. For many things are frequently believed to be venial which are mortal, and it is most difficult to discern in such matters; and therefore, as it were *from the face of the serpent*, the man who wishes to be saved must flee sin.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *there are certain things which, if they are done but once, condemn; and certain others which do not, unless they are done more often.* **On the contrary:** the multiplication of acts does not change the kind: therefore if the first sin is venial, so also the second and the third: therefore they never make one mortal sin. — Furthermore, every venial sin stands with grace: therefore if none takes away grace, none takes away life: therefore venial sins never condemn, however much they are multiplied.

To this it must be briefly answered for the present that this question is determined in the fourth book, distinction sixteen; therefore for the present let it suffice to have said that many venial sins do not condemn nor make a mortal sin, as far as it is of itself, but only dispositively; for from the frequent repetition of venial sins desire is increased, and contempt frequently intervenes; and to that extent the saying of the Master is to be understood as having been said.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says in the last chapter: *Often in Scripture by the name of sensuality the lower portion of reason is understood.* For this does not seem to be reasonably said, because, since the rational portion is divided against the sensible, in no way does it seem that the account of sensuality ought to be reckoned under that name. — Likewise it is asked about what he says, that this is often found in Scripture. For since the philosophers have treated sufficiently of the powers of the soul and make no mention of sensuality; how is it that sacred Scripture and the doctors of sacred Scripture use this name?

In connection with this there is a question, whether by the name of sensuality one power is understood or several, and whether a cognitive or a motive power is understood. For that a cognitive power is understood seems to follow from this, that it is called from *sense*; for sense is a cognitive power. But that it is called motive seems to follow from this, that in it sin has its being and it inclines to evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that Scripture distinguishes the interior and the exterior man, as is had in the second to the Corinthians, the fourth chapter: *Though our exterior man is corrupted, the interior is nevertheless renewed from day to day.* Now by the exterior man it calls not the body alone, but the body together with the powers of the soul, by which it has to attend to these senses and to cling to them. But by the interior man it calls the rational spirit itself, according as it has to occupy itself about heavenly things. According to this it must be understood that man has powers of the soul by which he is turned to spiritual things; and he has powers by which he is turned to sensible things. And those powers by which he is turned to spiritual things, gathered together at once, make up one perfect capacity of the soul; and there results a certain power governing the interior man, which indeed is called the freedom of choice, in which merit and praise and blame principally consist. But according as man has to be turned to these sensible things, he likewise has also his powers, which likewise concurring into one make up as it were one perfect capacity, by which there is an attending about these sensible things; and this is reckoned under the name of sensuality in Scripture, which together comprehends the sensible cognitive and motive powers, as also the freedom of choice does, as will be seen below. And this is what was had above, in the same distinction, that *sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises the motion that is directed to the senses of the exterior body and to the appetite for things pertaining to the body*; and so by its own proper acceptation it comprehends the sensitive and the brute motive power. And

since the lower portion of reason is much drawn by sin toward sensuality, and man *is compared to the senseless beasts and is made like to them*; therefore the lower portion of reason is sometimes reckoned in Scripture under the name of sensuality on account of the excessive turning of itself toward sensible things. And by this the answer to all the objections is clear.

But to that which is asked, why the philosophers do not use this name: it must be said that sensuality names not only the sensible power itself as to its proper nature, but also inasmuch as, with respect to the rational, it has a certain rebellion, which is transmitted into man from original sin. And since they did not arrive at the knowledge of original sin nor of the fall of man, therefore they do not use this name, as sacred Scripture does.

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