Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article Unique. *On free choice in comparison to reason and will.*

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question, what free choice is according to the thing itself. And since its quiddity and nature is known by assigning its agreement and difference with respect to the will and reason, therefore an inquiry must be made about it in comparison to reason and will. For the clarification of this comparison there are six points on which one may raise doubt and inquire.

*First,* then, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

*Second,* granted that it is so, it is asked whether it is a power distinct over against reason and will, or not.

*Third,* granted that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

*Fourth,* granted that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

*Fifth,* granted that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

*Sixth and last,* it is asked according to which of those two powers the soul's freedom of choice more principally inheres, namely whether according to reason, or according to will.

### Question I. *Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason, or whether it is also in the brute animals. And that it is in the brute animals seems to be the case.

1. That power is said to be free whose office is to choose the good and to flee evil; but we see this power to be in the brutes, as is clear in the sheep, which flees the wolf and seeks the shepherd: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that power has freedom which is able toward opposites; but in the brute animals there is a power for doing opposites, since now they show gentleness, now ferocity, now they go, now they come: therefore such animals are not foreign to freedom of choice.

3. Likewise, that power is free which is mistress of its own act, and this is one that can restrain and check itself in its act; but such a power is found in the brute animals, which is clear, because from those things which they desire they are checked through training, as is plain in animals that are tamed and domesticated: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, that power has freedom in moving whose motion begins from an intrinsic principle; for this is the motion of a power perfect in moving; but in the brute animals it begins from an intrinsic principle: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, that power is especially free whose office is to exercise foresight not only concerning present things, but also concerning future ones; but such is found in the brute animals, as is clear in ants and other irrational animals: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, that power participates more in freedom which cannot be reduced to servitude than the one which can; but men are reduced to servitude, whereas there are certain brute animals which can in no way be tamed, such as dragons and lions: therefore it seems that such have the freedom of choice in the highest degree.

**On the contrary:**
1. Free choice is thus defined by Augustine: «Free choice is the faculty of reason and will», as was held in the preceding distinction; but in nothing is there a faculty of reason in which there is not reason, and this is in rational beings alone: therefore so too is free choice.

2. Likewise, everything that has free choice is praiseworthy and blameworthy; but rational beings alone are worthy of praise and blame, of punishment and reward: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that has free choice is born to take counsel and to deliberate; but this belongs to the rational being alone: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is the noblest thing that is in man: therefore if free choice were found in the brutes, the noblest thing that is in man would be found in them: therefore the brute animals would be equally noble, as the rational beings are. And if this is unfitting, the matter is clear, etc.

> ### Conclusion
> In rational substances alone is free choice found.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt free choice is found in rational substances alone. — And the reason for this is taken both on the side of *freedom* and on the side of *arbitration* (judgment). On the side of *freedom*: for freedom is opposed to servitude. Hence that power alone is said to be free which has full dominion both with respect to its *object* and with respect to its *own act*. Now that power has dominion from freedom with respect to its *object* which is not narrowed to some one genus of the desirable, but is born to desire all *desirable* things and to reject everything *to-be-fled*. Now there are three things which are among the things *desired*, and whose opposites are among the things *fled*, namely the *good, the advantageous,* and the *pleasant*; and by the name *good* there is understood the *honorable* (the morally good). But since the *advantageous* and *pleasant* good are born to be desired by irrational beings, the *honorable* good can be desired by rational beings alone; and therefore in them alone is found the power which is not narrowed to some genus of the desirable, and through this has freedom with respect to its *object*.

In them alone too is found a power having freedom with respect to its *own act*; which is clear. For the will in rational beings not only checks the outer hand or foot, but also checks and restrains itself, beginning often to hate what it previously loved; and this from its own command and dominion. But in the brute animals, even though in some manner dominion is to be found with respect to the *outer* act, since they do indeed restrain themselves at times, as is clear in domestic animals; yet with respect to the *inner* proper act, namely appetite, there is no dominion. Hence if they love something, they cannot not love it, although they may be kept from the pursuit of some loved thing by fear of some inflicting passion. And therefore Damascene says that they «are driven rather than drive»; and through this, since they cannot repress their own act, they do not have freedom with respect to their own act, nor even with respect to the *object*; and therefore, freedom being lacking in them, they cannot participate in free choice.

The reason is also taken on the side of arbitration. For *arbitration* (judgment) is the same as *judgment*, at whose beck the other powers are moved and obey. But to judge belongs to that one, according to complete reason, whose office is to discern between the just and the unjust, and between the proper and the alien. Now no power knows what is just and what unjust except that one alone which is a participant of reason and is born to know the highest justice, from which is the rule of all right. And this is only in that substance which is to the image of God; such as is only the rational power. For no substance discerns what is proper and what alien unless it knows itself and its own act. But never does any power know itself, or reflect upon itself, which is bound to matter. If therefore all the powers are bound to matter and to corporeal substance except the rational alone, that alone is the one which can reflect upon itself; and therefore it alone is that in which there is full judgment and arbitration in discerning what is just and what unjust, what proper and what alien. — Therefore, both by reason of *freedom* and by reason of *arbitration*, free choice is found in rational substances alone. And the arguments which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To the arguments to the contrary the response is plain from what has been said. For to that which is objected in the first place, that brutes choose the good in preference to the evil, it must be said that this is true of the advantageous and pleasant good; but it is not true of the honorable good, in respect of which free choice properly consists.

2. To that likewise which is objected, that brutes can be moved toward opposites, the response is clear, because they cannot be moved toward all opposites, but only toward those which are below the dignity of free choice.

3. To that which is objected, that brutes have dominion over their acts because they can repress themselves, it must be said that they do not have dominion over their inner acts, although they have dominion over the outer ones; for even if they are restrained from the act, they are nonetheless not drawn back from the appetite. — Or it can be said otherwise, that even if they also are drawn back from their act, this is nonetheless not through their own dominion; for this is from the imagination

of an outer evil, which so terrifies that it draws back more than the appetite attracts; and therefore, just as in desiring and pursuing they are driven rather than drive, so also in abstaining or drawing back they are repressed rather than repress themselves.

4. And through this the response to the other point is clear, which says that the principle of motion is from within in the brute animals. For it can be said that even though the principle of outer motion proceeds from within, nonetheless the inner appetite takes its rise rather from the outer desirable thing than from the command of the appetitive power. Hence not just any motion from within makes a power free, but that motion by which the moving force moves itself; «for the will and free choice, as Anselm says, is an instrument moving itself».

5. To that which is objected, that it belongs to free choice to exercise foresight, it must be said that a certain foresight comes from the act of deliberation and foreknowledge, and a certain foresight comes from natural instinct. The first belongs to the freedom of choice and is found in rational beings alone; but the second is of natural sagacity and industry; for nature is most prudent; and this is found in the brute animals, and such does not posit free choice.

6. To that which is objected, that certain brute animals cannot be tamed, it must be said that for some animal not to be reducible to servitude can be so in two ways: either by reason of voluntary freedom, or by reason of natural ferocity. In the first way it is impossible for a man to be reduced to servitude. For although someone may be able to compel another as to the outer act, yet as to the inner willing no one can compel another, as will be clear below. In the second way certain beasts are untamable and cannot be reduced to servitude, because so great is their ferocity and impetus toward the things of ferocity that they cannot be habituated to the things of gentleness; and therefore that argument does not compel.