Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.*

Secondly it is asked whether free choice is a power distinct over against reason and will. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*, speaking of the power of free choice: «What is more like eternity than that which is not eternity»? If therefore eternity regards neither reason nor will, it seems that free choice is some power besides these.

2. Likewise, reason corresponds to the Son, will to the Holy Spirit: therefore if in us a power corresponding to the Father is to be posited as something to be reformed, then there is to be posited in us some power besides reason and will which pertains to reformation; but such [a power] is nothing other than free choice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, for the production of a work these three are necessary, namely to be able and to know and to will: therefore if we know through reason, we will through will, it seems that there is to be posited in us a third power through which we are *able*; and this we call the faculty of free choice: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when a stone is moved downward, these three are found: intention, appetite, and power. For we say that the stone intends to be moved downward, since nature operates through intention; it also has an appetite to be moved downward; nonetheless it has power by which it is moved downward: therefore it seems that these three are to be found in the rational soul. If therefore it belongs to reason *to intend*, to will *to seek*, there will be a third power to be posited whose [function] is *to act with power*; and this we call the faculty of choice: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover takes precedence over the movable; but «free choice is a free judgment concerning the will»: therefore it belongs to free choice to judge concerning the will. Likewise it belongs to free choice to move all the powers of the soul and to command reason, that it may discern, and the will, that it may seek: therefore it seems that it is a third power distinct from these.

**On the contrary:**

1. The powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective: therefore if reason comprehends the cognitive powers, and will the affective, it does not seem fitting to posit a third power differing from these.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice is *to judge*; but everything that we judge, we judge through reason: therefore it does not seem that free choice is a power distinct from reason and will.

3. Likewise, with another power set aside, while will and reason alone remain, we can consent, because deliberation can precede through an act of reason, and a prior choosing can follow through an act of will: if therefore to consent is an act of free choice, it seems that free choice is not a power other than reason and will.

4. Likewise, it belongs to free choice to move: therefore either it moves the will, or not. If not: then it does not seem to be fully free. If it moves the will; and it is another power: then the will is moved by another power. If it is moved by another power: then it is not free: therefore if the will in us is most free, it seems etc.

5. Likewise, it is the same cognitive power by which I understand something and I understand that I understand: therefore it is the same power, and not another, by which I will something and I will that I will it; but the power by which I will that I will

is free choice, [and] the power by which I will is will: therefore free choice is not a power other than will.

### Conclusion.

> *Free choice does not name a power really distinct from reason and will, yet it implies some distinction from these powers according to reason.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid question it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse positions among the doctors.

For some have wished to say that, just as *mind* is taken in two ways: sometimes *commonly*, and thus it comprehends memory, intelligence, and will; sometimes *properly*, and thus it is distinguished over against intelligence and will: so free choice is taken in two ways, namely *commonly*, and thus it is *not distinguished* over against reason and will; and *properly*, and thus over against reason and will it *can be distinguished* and is a power commanding reason and will and ruling and moving each, whose first act is not *to discern and to will*, but a reflexive act over these two and moving and ruling these two, namely that [act] by which one is said *to will to discern*, or *to will to will*. And this *act* is preambulary to reason and will, and this *power* corresponds to the Father, for the reason that its act is most powerful and is first, since it is not *moved*, but *moves*. And therefore by the Saints it is called the *faculty* or *power* of will and reason, that is, a power readily moving the will and reason; and there consists in these three a certain character of image on the part of the *motive* [power], which is principally reformed through grace in the wayfaring state and through the endowments in the homeland.

To others, however, it seems otherwise, namely that since it belongs to reason and will to reflect upon themselves, and these two powers suffice for accomplishing all the acts of the soul, namely for judging and fleeing and choosing, it would be in vain that any power differing from these be posited in the soul. If therefore «nature does nothing in vain», the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into cognitive and affective, or into reason and will; and therefore they say that free choice is not a power distinct from these two powers.

But each of these positions has much probability; and if we are willing to understand each of them carefully and devoutly, we shall find that they do not disagree with one another, but converge toward a greater expression of one truth. For when we say that some power is distinguished from others, this is in two ways: either according to the thing, or according to reason. According to the *thing*, as intellect and affection are distinguished; according to *reason*, as reason is distinguished, insofar as it is cognitive and motive, that is, dictating that there be motion, or disposing toward motion. — Speaking therefore of distinction according to reason, it can be said that free choice is in a certain manner distinguished from reason and will, namely in this, that free choice names [something] in the character of mover, while will and reason [are] in the character of moved; this in the character of commander, those two in the character of executor. — And from this part, through a certain character of appropriation, a certain character of image is found in the soul; and through this manner the first position is understood, and the reasons hold which are adduced for the first part. For they do not conclude to a distinction of free choice from reason and will according to the thing, but only according to reason and appropriation, as is clear to one running through them one by one.

But speaking of the distinction of powers according to the thing, free choice in this way does not name a power diverse or distinct from reason and will, for the reason that the powers of the rational soul are sufficiently divided into the cognitive and the motive, and all the acts of the soul can be exercised through these powers, which are the cognitive and the affective, or reason and will, as the reasons adduced for this show. For since both reason and will are born to reflect upon themselves; when I name will as willing something, and will as willing to will, I do not name one power and another according to the thing. For mover and moved in spiritual things need not differ according to substance, because, as Anselm says, «the will is an instrument moving itself», and reason also is a power knowing itself, by like reasoning; and therefore, if there is any distinction there, this is only according to reason. — And thus the answer to the question is clear, and to the reasons on each side. For I concede that free choice according to the thing does not name a power distinct from reason and will; yet I concede nonetheless that it has some distinction accord-

ing to reason, by reason of which it is called the faculty of both. But how great the distinction is, will appear better below. For the present let it suffice to have said only this, that the distinction is not so great as to make it be another power in the genus of power, really distinct from reason and will.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And as for what is objected, that it is more like eternity, and is appropriated to the Father, and is a power from which there is *being-able*; all that posits nothing but only a certain distinction according to a certain appropriation and a certain reason. And this is clear, because reason itself includes in itself intelligence and memory, and so something through which it is assimilated to the Father, and something through which it is assimilated to the Son. The will itself includes in itself the irascible and the concupiscible, and so a power through which it seeks, and a power through which it is able. And therefore it is not necessary that free choice be some other power besides these.

*To 5.* As for that which is objected last, that the one judging takes precedence over the thing judged, and the mover over the moved; it must be said that in spiritual things, speaking of precedence, it is not necessary [that there be a precedence] which makes a diversity according to essence. For as has often been said, it is the same power which wills something and which wills to will, and which judges and which judges that it judges; otherwise it would go on to infinity. Nonetheless it obtains as it were a more worthy office, while it is in the character of the one judging, than when it is in the character of the thing judged; and when it is in the character of the mover, than when it is in the character of the moved.