Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether the faculty of free choice resides principally in reason or in will.*

Sixth and last is the question: since free choice is a habit or faculty residing in reason and will conjointly, in which of these powers it principally resides in us. And that it resides principally in reason is shown:

**On the opposite side.**

1. *First*, by the very naming whereby it is called *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice"). For if an adjective sets its [own] reality about its substantive, and something is more principally said of something which is said by abstraction than what is said by concretion; and that habit is named *arbitrium liberum* ("free judgment"), not *libertas arbitraria* ("arbitrary freedom"), and *arbitrium* ("judgment") holds on the side of reason: therefore it seems, etc.

2. *Likewise*, the Philosopher says that "reason is born to rule the irascible and the concupiscible"; but will consists in those two powers, namely the concupiscible and the irascible: therefore reason is born to rule the will; but free choice is more a ruling than a ruled [thing]: therefore it holds rather on the side of reason than of will. If you say that the Philosopher understands [this] of the brute irascible and concupiscible, not of that in which will consists; against this is the letter [of the text] itself. For it is said that free choice "is a free judgment concerning the will": if therefore it belongs to the one judging to rule the thing judged, it is plain, etc.

3. *Likewise*, when the last judgment of reason has been made, the will is always moved according to it: therefore if this goes before as the one judging, and that follows as the thing judged, since freedom resides rather in that which goes before and commands than in that which follows and obeys: it seems that free choice holds rather on the side of reason than of will.

4. *Likewise*, free choice is free by the very fact that it can restrain and repress itself; but the repression of a willed act is only through the judgment of reason, since, unless the examination of reason intervenes, the will always follows the impulse of affection: therefore freedom is rather in reason than in will.

**On the contrary:**

1. Free choice is called free by the very fact that it is immune from coercion: therefore free choice is most of all in that which is more removed from the nature of coercion; and such a power is will itself, not reason; for in many cases reason happens to be coerced, but not so the will: therefore, etc.

2. *Likewise*, free choice is that which is most of all commanding in us; but the will is more commanding in us than reason, for whatever reason may dictate, that will always be done which the will prefers: therefore, etc.

3. *Likewise*, free choice is that from which merit or demerit principally consists in us; but merit or demerit consists principally in the will: therefore, etc.

4. *Likewise*, free choice is the most powerful [thing] in us, as Bernard says, and many authorities sound this; but "nothing is so much in our power as the will and the act of willing": therefore it seems that freedom resides in us most of all in the will.

### Conclusion.

> Free choice is begun in reason and is completed in will; therefore the freedom of choice consists principally in will.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since free choice is a faculty or dominion, from which it is called a power apt not only for moving other things, but also for moving itself; just as the way of moving oneself is begun in reason and completed in will, so too the freedom of choice resides in reason and will, in such a way that it is begun in one of those powers and completed in the other. — Now I say that the motion is begun in reason, because the appetite is not moved except by a preceding cogitation; for we can in no way love what we do not know; and therefore, in order that the motion come about, a disposing cognition goes before, and a perfecting will follows after. For however much cogitation precede, motion never follows unless the affection of will command it. — And just as the will cannot be moved to an object, embracing or fleeing it, except by a preceding cogitation, so likewise it cannot approve or reject, or elicit and restrain its own act, unless an act of reason precede, which dictates it to be good or bad, to be carried out or to be restrained. For from such a preceding act the will, in its own act, begins to be pleased or displeased. — And thus it is plain that the freedom of choice, or the faculty which is called free choice, is begun in reason and completed in will. And since it principally resides in that in which it is completed, therefore the freedom and dominion of choice consists principally in will. — And again, since that in which a thing is begun stands after the manner of the material; that in which it is completed stands after the manner of the formal; and the adjective with respect to the substantive stands after the manner of that which informs: therefore in the naming of that power the name corresponding to reason is signified substantively; but the name corresponding to will is signified adjectivally; and on this account this faculty is called rather *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice") than *arbitraria libertas* ("arbitrary freedom").

**To the objections on the contrary:**

1. And by this the reply to the first objection on the contrary is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that reason rules the irascible and the concupiscible; it must be said that whether the irascible and concupiscible power be understood of the brute appetite, or of the rational appetitive power, reason has to rule each after the manner of one disposing and counseling, as far as is in its own power. But that it rules after the manner of one commanding, this is only by the mediation of the will, which gives it authority. Now the will does not name a power other in essence from the concupiscible and irascible, but names the appetite itself as reasoned-upon or joined to reason, and thus its ruling is also a commanding. But the concupiscible and irascible name the same affective power, insofar however as it has to be ruled; and so they are called inferior, not as to the nature of the power, but as to office. And hence it is that free choice in reality comprehends those three powers, namely the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as Augustine says *On the Five Responses*: "When we speak of free choice, we are not speaking of a part of the soul, but of the whole." Hence it is also that, since the other virtues are not unlearnedly placed in free choice, that does not stand against this which is wont to be said, that the three theological virtues are in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. For the will, as has now been said, does not name a power other in essence and nature from the irascible and concupiscible, although it names [it] in another way.

3. To that which is objected, that reason judges and the will follows; it must be said that the judgment of reason is twofold: one is in mere dictate, and this is of reason in itself; the other is the definitive judgment, that [a thing] be done or not be done, and that is never without the will. For however much reason deliberate, the definitive judgment is terminated to that side which the will prefers. And therefore, when it is said that the will follows the judgment, if it be understood of the judgment which consists in mere dictate, it is not always true that the will necessarily follows it. But if it be understood of the definitive judgment, from this it does not follow that the will principally follows another's act; but rather it draws another's act to its own.

4. To that which is objected lastly, that the restraint is by the mediation of an act of reason; it must be said that it is true that an act of reason is required, but the restraint is never principally from it. For however much reason dictate the act of will to be bad, the will never withdraws itself unless it wills [to]; and therefore, just as the possibility of writing is said to be more principally in the hand than in the eye, although both the power of the eye and the power of the hand concur to it, so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

**Epilogue.** From what has been said, therefore, it is plain what free choice is in reality, and how it is related to reason and will. For if all the things which have been predetermined be conferred together into one, I think the intellect can be sufficiently set at rest; but if anyone should wish to rest in any one of the aforesaid, not treating through the rest, it will not become so evidently known to him what is the quiddity and essence of free choice.