Dist. 25, Part 1, Divisio Textus
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p1-divisio
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### Commentary on Distinction XXV.

### Part I.

### *On free choice considered in itself and in general.*

*Now let us return to our subject* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of free choice in comparison to the other powers; here, however, he treats of free choice in itself. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first he determines what free choice is *in itself* or in general. In the second he determines concerning the freedom of choice according to its different *states* in particular, there: *From the foregoing it is clear* etc. The first part has two subdivisions. In the first of these the Master sets down the definition of free choice. In the second he removes a certain difficulty toward the explanation of the foregoing definition, there: *And indeed, according to the aforesaid definition* etc. The first part has two [divisions]. In the first he determines what free choice is. In the second, from that definition, he draws out that free choice is not of present nor of past things, but of *future* things, and of these not of any whatever, but of *future contingent* things, there: *This too must be known, that free choice* etc. Likewise the second part has two [divisions], in the first of which he raises a difficulty, and in the second he determines it, there: *But free choice is taken otherwise* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part there arises here the question what free choice is in reality. And since its quiddity and nature is known in assigning its agreement with, and difference from, the will and reason, therefore inquiry must be made concerning it in comparison to reason and the will. Now for the clarification of this comparison there is occasion to raise doubt and inquiry concerning six [points].

For, first, it is asked whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will.

Second, granting that it is, it is asked whether it is a power distinct from reason and will, or not.

Third, granting that it is not, it is asked whether it embraces reason and will together.

Fourth, granting that it does, it is asked whether it embraces those two powers after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit.

Fifth, granting that it is after the manner of a habit, it is asked whether that habit adds anything by essence to reason and will.

Sixth and last, it is asked according to which of those two powers the freedom of choice more principally resides in the soul, namely whether according to reason, or according to the will.

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