Dist. 25, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p1-dubia
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### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, namely that the philosophers, in defining freedom of choice, said it was "free judgment about the will." For it seems that such a definition, assigned by the philosophers, is neither good nor assigned according to philosophical art. The Philosopher in the sixth book of the *Topics* reproves an "equimembered" definition, in which there are as many words on the side of the definition as on the side of the thing defined — as, for instance, if someone defining a black tunic should say that it is a dark cloak. But so it is in the matter at hand. If you should say that it is not a definition, but an interpretation of the name; then there is a question: why is freedom of choice rather called this, than called "free judgment"? — Likewise it seems that it does not pertain to the philosophers to define freedom of choice, because, since the soul is the image of God according to freedom of choice, as Richard says, and merits by means of freedom of choice, but the philosophers did not know that the soul is the image of God nor the origin of merit: it seems that they neither knew nor could define freedom of choice.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been said before, the aforesaid notification is rather an interpretation of the name than a definition. But that faculty is more reckoned by this name, so as to be called *freedom of choice* (*liberum arbitrium*) than *free judgment* (*liberum iudicium*), for the reason that *judgment* (*iudicium*) implies an act of reason regulated according to the rules of truth or of the higher law: but *choice* (*arbitrium*) implies an act of reason regulated according to the command of the will. Hence he is called a *judge* (*iudex*) whose office is to settle a case according to the laws; but he is called an *arbiter* (*arbiter*) who has to settle a case at the proper nod of the will. And since freedom of choice, as far as it is of itself, has to decide about things to be done according to the nod of the will more than according to the precept of law; hence it is that it is more properly named by the name of *choice* than by the name of *judgment*.

From this, therefore, and from what has been said, it is gathered that there was great wisdom in those who imposed the names. For not without cause is this faculty reckoned by a double name; nor without cause is the word pertaining to *reason* signified substantively, while the word pertaining to *will* is named adjectivally; nor without cause is the word pertaining to *reason* rather said to be *choice* than *judgment*. For freedom of choice is the faculty of two powers, so that reason stands in the character of what is material, and the deciding belongs to the nod and command of the will.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that it is not for the philosophers to know freedom of choice; it must be said that freedom of choice can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is the principle of moral works, or insofar as it is the principle of gratuitous works. And in the first way it is of the consideration of the philosophers, especially of those who were occupied about the composing of morals, whose freedom of choice is a principle according to the rule and dictate of the natural law, which is impressed upon each one. In the second way it is of the consideration of the theologians, because thus it has regard to divine grace, the knowledge of which grace is through the Catholic faith, without which all the works of men are vain, even if they should also seem praiseworthy; and in this consideration the skill of the philosophers failed. — And by this the objections are clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, namely that according to the aforesaid assignation freedom of choice seems to be only in those who can change their will. For if freedom of choice is not only in man according to the state of the wayfarer, but also according to the state of comprehension and beatitude, as was determined above in the seventh distinction, the aforesaid assignation or definition does not seem to be fitting. Moreover, not only those who have a changeable will, but also those who have an unchangeable will, have "free judgment about the will": therefore the Master says falsely, who says that the aforesaid assignation befits only those who have a changeable will.

In connection with this it is asked — since diverse assignations of freedom of choice are set down by the Saints, and of one thing there is one definition — what is the difference of those assignations.

Augustine indeed defines, as was had in the preceding distinction, thus: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. Anselm in the book *on Freedom of Choice* defines thus: "Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake." Bernard in the book *on Freedom of Choice* thus: "Freedom of choice is consent on account of the inamissible liberty of the will and the indeclinable judgment of reason." — It is asked, therefore, what is the difference of these accounts; for to dispute about each one is of little use and contributes little to the matter at hand.

**I respond:** It must be said that the word of the Master here proposed does not refer to that notification of the philosophers proposed in this distinction: "Freedom of choice is free judgment about the will," but refers to that which was set down in the preceding distinction: "Freedom of choice is the faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen," etc. And with respect to that the Master says that freedom of choice befits no one except only according to the state of mutability.

Hence note that freedom of choice can be considered in three ways: either in its *generality*, insofar as it befits the creature and the Creator; and thus it is defined by Anselm, when it is said: Freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude, etc. Or according to the *being* which it has in the creature, not regarding the state; and thus is that definition of Bernard: Freedom of choice is consent, etc. Or with respect to the *state of the wayfarer*; and thus is that of Augustine: Freedom of choice is the faculty, etc.

Nevertheless the aforesaid notifications can also be distinguished from one another in another way. For freedom of choice has a comparison to the *act*, has to be compared to the *act and* the *object*, has thirdly to be compared to the *act and the object and the ultimate end*. With respect to the first consideration it is defined by Bernard; with respect to the second, by Augustine; with respect to the third, by Anselm; and this is clear to one considering the notifications themselves. Hence Anselm, defining freedom of choice, not only says that it is the power of preserving rectitude, but also adds *for its own sake*; for *for the sake of* states the final cause, and this word *self* (*se*) is referred to rectitude, so that the sense is, *for its own sake*, that is, for the sake of rectitude itself. — But here it must be attended to that the rectitude which is *preserved* is one thing, and that *for the sake of which it is to be preserved* is another. For the former is created, the latter uncreated. Yet because the one is understood in the other, this relative *self* (*se*), when it is referred to created rectitude, can stand for uncreated rectitude, understood within the created rectitude itself, just as the first truth in every truth, and the first goodness in every goodness.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *But freedom of choice is taken otherwise in the Creator than in creatures*. But against this is what Anselm *on Freedom of Choice* says, namely that the definition of freedom of choice ought to be the same in man and in God, just as the account of man and of an ass is the same in "animal." Likewise, this seems to be so by the reason which he himself assigns, namely that "freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude," which not only befits the Creator, but also the creature. Likewise, if the soul is most assimilated to God according to freedom of choice; it seems that freedom of choice in God and in man is in conformity.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of freedom of choice according to general conditions and according to special ones. If we speak according to general conditions, thus freedom of choice states a faculty free from coercion and ordered to the preservation of rectitude. And in this way it is found in the creature and in God in conformity and according to the same account — not by conformity and unity of univocation, but rather of analogy and of a similar relation, which can exist between God and the creature, as was shown in the first book in many places. — In another way one may speak of freedom of choice according to special properties; and thus freedom of choice is a faculty which indeed is not the substance of the thing, but a certain aptitude. Thus also it is the power of preserving rectitude,

which is not rectitude itself; and therefore it can deviate from rectitude, as far as it is of itself, in the creature. But in God freedom of choice is the divine essence itself, is also justice itself, and therefore it can neither deviate nor be changed. And with respect to these special conditions the Master says in the text that freedom of choice is found otherwise in God, otherwise in creatures.

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