Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q1
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### Article (Sole). *On free choice in comparison.*
### Question I. *Whether free choice is equally in all in which it is found.*

For the understanding of this part, since above free choice has been treated in itself, here inquiry is made concerning it in comparison. And concerning this six questions are asked.

First, inquiry is made concerning free choice in comparison to the *subject*.

Second, inquiry is made concerning it in comparison to the *act*.

Third, in comparison to the *object*.

Fourth, in comparison to *some other created agent*.

Fifth, in comparison to the *first mover*, namely God.

Sixth and last, in comparison to the *conjoined body*.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning free choice by comparison to the subject, whether it is equally in all in which it is, or according to more and less. And that it is equally in all, it seems:

1. *First*, through Bernard in the book *On Free Choice*: "The liberty of the will remains as full in the good as in the wicked, but in the good more ordered, just as also whole in its own way in the creature as in the Creator."

2. *Likewise*, in the same work: "The liberty of choice belongs alike to all who use reason, nor is it greater in the good than in the wicked." And he again adds that "neither is grace increased nor fault diminished."

3. *Likewise*, free choice is called *free* by the very fact that it is immune from coercion; but every free choice is immune from all coercion: therefore if the liberty of choice in anything universally excludes coercion, and in a total privation there is no *more* and *less* to be found; the liberty of choice is equally in all in which it is.

4. *Likewise*, *more* and *less* arise through the intermixing of one thing with another; but the liberty of choice can in no way be intermixed in anything with a servitude contrary to it, which is indeed the servitude of coercion: therefore it does not seem that it can be participated according to *more* and *less*: therefore it is equally in all in which it is found.

**On the contrary:**
1. Free choice "is the power of preserving rectitude," as Anselm says; but the power of preserving rectitude is greater in the good than in the wicked, in the confirmed than in the unconfirmed: therefore free choice happens to be participated according to *more* and *less*.

2. *Likewise*, the liberty of choice is a certain noble dignity in the rational soul; but in no property of dignity can the creature be equal to the Creator: therefore it is impossible that the liberty of choice be found equally in the Creator and the creature.

3. *Likewise*, the liberty of choice is a faculty which is founded upon reason and will; but the cognitive power is found much more perfectly in God than in the creature, and in one creature more than in another, and likewise the appetitive power: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is that faculty, from which the power of reason and the power of will are said to be free.

4. *Likewise*, that is freer in which no kind of servitude falls than that in which some kind of servitude can fall: since therefore there are some things which can in no way be subjected either to sin or to misery, and certain others which are subjected to them and serve them; it seems therefore that free choice is not participated equally by these and by those.

> **Conclusion.** Free choice, as to immunity from coercion, is equally in all in which it is found; as to the dignity of excellence it is more eminent in the Creator, but equal in creatures related to one another; as to the faculty of preserving justice, even in creatures it is unequal.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when it is asked whether free choice is equally in all, the question is not concerning it according as it is called free by that liberty which is from *misery* or from *fault*; for in this way it is plain that it is freer in one than in another; but the question is concerning free choice according as it is called liberty from *coercion*; for in this way the authorities of the Saints seem to be at odds with one another.

And therefore, to settle the contrariety that appears, it must be understood that free choice or the liberty of choice both expresses a comparison to that *from which* and to that *to which*. By comparison to that *from which* it is named privatively or negatively; for it is called free from coercion, inasmuch as it is immune from all coercion. By comparison to that *to which* it is named positively, since the liberty of choice is a certain faculty or power of preserving rectitude. Now this faculty, inasmuch as it is joined to the privation of coercion, has a certain dignity; for it belongs to dignity and to power not to be able to be coerced. And so in the notion of free choice three things are enclosed, namely immunity from coercion, the dignity of excellence, and the power or faculty.

As to the *first*, free choice is held equally in all in which it is, as the authorities of Bernard say, and as the reasons adduced to this effect show, inasmuch as in everything in which it is placed it simply and universally excludes *coercion*. Therefore Bernard says that the liberty of choice is as full in the creature in its own way as in the Creator; which, although it cannot be truly understood to be said of anything that is named by *position*, can nevertheless be understood of that which is named by total *privation*.

But as to the *second*, namely as to the dignity of excellence, it is unequal in the comparison of creatures to the Creator, but equal in the comparison of creatures to one another. For the dignity of uncreated free choice supereminently surpasses the dignity of all created free choice, because the former is the supreme dignity, and every created dignity is a dignity beneath it and on account of it; and so there is inequality in the liberty of choice as to dignity, insofar as it is considered in creatures and in the Creator. — But insofar as it is considered in creatures related to one another, thus it is to be found in them equally, inasmuch as every free choice is immediately constituted under God, and each is, after God, the first principle of its own operations. For it is regarded according to the *supreme* element of the rational creature, above which God alone is superior, as Augustine holds.

But as to the *third*, namely as to the faculty or to the power of preserving justice; thus inequality is found not only in creatures and the Creator, but also in creatures compared to one another. For one creature is much more powerful than another in preserving rectitude, as the blessed than the wretched; and this is what Anselm says in the book *On Free Choice*: "The liberty of choice is one kind that is from itself, which is neither made nor received from another, which belongs to God alone. Another is made and received from God, which belongs to the angels and to men. But of that which is made or received, one kind has rectitude which it preserves, another lacks it; of that which has it, one holds it separably, another inseparably; of that which lacks it, one lacks it recoverably, another irrecoverably." From this division of Anselm there appear degrees of liberty not only in creatures with respect to the Creator, but also in creatures related to one another. For this division of liberty is taken according to what is of position in it; and in this way it happens that it is found according to more and less in those having free choice. And thus the reasons previously adduced proceed.

**To the arguments.** It is therefore clear from what has been said what the response is to the question proposed; the response to the objections is likewise no less clear, because the reasons that prove equality argue concerning free choice as regards what it expresses of privation; the reasons to the opposite, as regards what it expresses of position; and therefore both are to be granted, because by diverse ways they conclude what is true.