Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q3
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### Article Unique. Question III. *Whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.*

Thirdly there is an inquiry concerning free choice in relation to its object, and the question is whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil. And that it can, seems [to follow].

1. No one is blamed or praised except for that which is from free choice, insofar as it is free; but a person is blamed and punished for sin and evil: therefore sin is from free choice, insofar as it is free: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward sin and toward evil.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice, insofar as it is free, is *to choose*: but free choice of itself, when it is destitute of grace, has [the power] to choose evil; whereas it does not choose the good except by the help of grace: therefore free choice, so far as concerns itself, has evil for its object more than the good.

3. Likewise, rational powers are directed to opposites, insofar as they are such; but free choice, insofar as it is free, is a rational power: therefore it is directed to opposites, so far as concerns its own nature. But it is not directed to the opposites that are sweet and bitter, true and false, and the like: therefore to the opposites that are good and evil: therefore evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free.

4. Likewise, free choice can do evil, either therefore by itself, or by another. If by another, I ask: by means of what? and none can be given; for then one would have to ask whether that [other] were free or not; and if it were not free, then in its work it would be neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, and so it could not even sin. But if it were free: then either there will be an infinite regress, or it must be granted that free choice sins by itself. If therefore it can tend toward evil by itself, and is free by itself: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, has evil itself for its object.

**On the contrary:**
1. Anselm, *On Free Choice*: «What, when added to liberty, diminishes it, and when separated increases it, is neither liberty nor a part of liberty»; but the power of sinning is of this sort, as he says: and from this it is concluded that the power of sinning is neither liberty

nor a part of liberty. If therefore evil is not the object except of the power of sinning, free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil for its object.

2. Likewise, to be able to sin bespeaks impotence rather than power, and bespeaks defect rather than completion; but «free choice, insofar as it is free, is the most powerful thing under God»: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil or sin for its object.

3. Likewise, if evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free: then wherever there is freedom of choice, there is the power to evil: therefore either there is in God a power to evil, or in Him there is not free choice; but if each of these is impossible and contrary to Augustine, the rest follows, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice never does nor desires evil except under the aspect of the good; but wine, since it is not desired except under the aspect of the sweet, is not desirable in itself, but [only] the sweet: if therefore evil is not desired except insofar as it appears good, the good alone is the object of free choice.

5. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is conjoined to its object by means of an act than when it is not conjoined: therefore if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, free choice would be more complete when it went forth into evil. But this is false: it is manifest therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, then it would be insufficiently defined by Anselm, when it is said: «The power of preserving rectitude». And if you say that the good is the object *per se*, and evil *per accidens*; this does not solve it, for he does not sufficiently define medicine who says that it is the science of the healthy, unless he add its opposite, although medicine is the science of the healthy *per se*, and of the sick *per accidens*.

### Conclusion

> The object of free choice, both according to its common notion and as it is in creatures, is *per se* the good, so that it does not choose evil except insofar as it is deficient.

**I respond:** It must be said that free choice can be spoken of in two ways: either according to its *common notion*, according to which it is found in the Creator and in the creature; and thus its object is the good and the equitable, while evil is not its object — unless someone should say that this is its object, because free choice rejects and detests it; but here that is called its object which free choice intends through its proper act, or which it effects. — In another way it happens to speak of free choice as it is found in the *creature*; and thus it can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is *free*, or insofar as it is *deficient*. If insofar as it is *free*, it is then naturally apt to go forth into an act capable of equity and informed by equity. But if we speak of it insofar as it is *deficient*, then free choice, insofar as it is free choice, can and does go forth into a deliberative act; for since it is deficient, it goes forth into a deformed act, and so into evil. So therefore it is plain that free choice, insofar as it is free, has the good for its object and goes forth into the good, not into evil, as the arguments adduced for the second part show. Nevertheless, insofar as together with liberty it has defectibility, it can tend toward evil, in such a way that *malice* is not the object of free choice nor [does it come] from free choice, insofar as it is *free*, but insofar as it is *deficient*. But the underlying act, since it is deliberative, goes forth from free choice insofar as it is *free*. — And by this the reply to the first objection is plain.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* As to the objection that praise and blame are owed to the works of free choice alone; this is true not only of those things which free choice regards insofar as it is *free*, but also insofar as it is *defective*. For thus the work coming from it is worthy of blame by reason of the *deformity*, which has not an *efficient* cause but a *deficient* one, as will be shown below.

*To 2.* As to the objection that free choice of itself chooses evil; it must be said that although it suffices for choosing evil — because it is easier to fail than to advance — yet it is not principally ordered to it, since this does not belong to it according to the completion of its proper nature, but rather according to the defect of its proper nature. Moreover, although of itself it may choose evil, nevertheless it never chooses evil except insofar as it appears to be good.

*To 3.* As to the objection that rational powers are directed to opposites; it must be said that although this is true of defectible and created rational powers, it is nevertheless not true of rational powers in which there can be no defect. For far be it that that philosophical saying should be true, by which it is said that «God can do depraved things»; for this is against the truth and against Augustine, as was shown in the first book and will be shown below in its place. For that rational powers are said to be directed to opposites is not because they are rational, but because they are deficient; especially if it be understood of those opposites of which one is the privation of the other, as the good and evil stand. And thus from this it does not follow that free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.

*To 4.* As to the objection that free choice can tend toward evil by itself; it must be said that although it can [do so] by itself, nevertheless it cannot [do so] by itself as *sufficient*, but rather by itself as *deficient*; for by itself it can fail, nor is it necessary that anything else intervene in order that it go forth into evil.