Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent.*

Fourthly, inquiry is made concerning free choice in relation to another created agent, and the question is whether free choice can be compelled by some created agent. And that it can, seems [the case].

1. Both Damascene and the Philosopher say that there are certain operations partly voluntary, partly involuntary, and in a certain way mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary, such as throwing merchandise into the sea, and the like. If, therefore, the involuntary is that which is by violence, it happens that some operations issuing from free choice are mixed with violence: therefore if it happens that they are mixed more and more, it happens that they are simply involuntary and compelled: therefore free choice can be compelled in its action.

2. Likewise, a greater power can inflict violence on a lesser; but what can inflict violence can compel: therefore a lesser power can be compelled by a greater. But some power is more powerful than the free choice of the wayfarer, such as the power of an Angel: therefore free choice of ours can be compelled at least by an Angel.

3. Likewise, if some power can be impeded from its act, it can be violated; and if it can be sufficiently impeded, it can be sufficiently violated; and if it can be sufficiently violated, it can be compelled. Since, therefore, free choice can be impeded from its act and use, as is evident — for the devil can take away the use of free choice and make a man frenzied — therefore it seems that by him our free choice can be compelled or coerced.

4. Likewise, when a ray [of light] is joined to water, when the water is moved, the ray must be moved; but the soul is joined to the body by a far greater bond than the ray is joined to the water: therefore, when the body is moved, the affections of the soul must be moved. If, therefore, some created power can transmute the body, it will consequently be able to turn and compel free choice, [the soul] itself being unwilling.

5. Likewise, as the intellect stands to the true, so the affection stands to the good; but the intellect can be compelled to believe some truth: therefore also the affection [can be compelled] to love a good. If, then, free choice says nothing other than reason and will, it seems that it too can be compelled by the action of some created agent.

6. Likewise, a created agent by its action can compel free choice by an inducing coercion, which is a disposition with respect to sufficient coercion; but a disposition can, through frequent repetition and intensification of itself, become a necessity: therefore it seems that, if the will can be compelled by an inducing coercion, then in the course of time it can be compelled by a sufficient coercion through the action of some creature.

**On the contrary:** 1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*: "The will, by reason of its innate nobility, is compelled by no necessity": if, therefore, the will can be compelled by no one, and this is for no other reason than because of the liberty of free choice; therefore free choice can be compelled by no creature.

2. Likewise, if some creature could compel a man's free choice, this would most of all belong to the devil himself, of whom it is said in *Job*, the forty-first chapter: *There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him.* If, therefore, the devil cannot compel our free choice — since then he would make us sin continually — it seems that no other creature can compel it.

3. Likewise, no greater compulsion can be brought against a man's free choice than by the threat of death; but the threat of death is not sufficient to compel free choice, as is evident in the holy Martyrs and others, who would rather die than disavow their faith: therefore it does not seem that free choice can be compelled by any creature.

4. Likewise, free choice is according to that which is supreme in the soul, since it belongs to it to rule and move all the powers; but than that which is supreme in the soul, God alone is greater: therefore no creature has power over it: therefore no creature has [the power] of compelling a man's free choice.

> **Conclusion.** Free choice can indeed be compelled by a created agent as to the exterior act; as to the interior act it can in some way be induced and impeded, but not compelled.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that there is [a way of] speaking of free choice as to the exterior act and as to the interior act, or as to its proper act and as to an act belonging to another. — If we speak of free choice as to the exterior act, then with respect to such acts coercion can intervene; for someone can be compelled to bend his knees before an idol and to place incense on the altars with his own hands or to burn it. — But if we speak as to the interior act, which is, namely, to will or to choose or to consent; then with respect to such an act free choice can in some way be induced, and it can be impeded, but in no way can it be compelled.

It can indeed be induced, since it loves something other than itself and what is beneath itself. Hence, by the offering of some loved thing, or by its removal, it can be induced to consent to something by a very efficacious persuasion, in the manner in which idolaters tempted the holy Martyrs to consent to idolatry, now by promising delights, now by inflicting griefs. Yet this inducement is far removed from coercion; as the outcome itself proves, since they could neither be allured by blandishments nor terrified by torments to the point of being turned from the truth of justice. And thus free choice can be induced, because it loves something beneath itself, such as temporal life, or another like thing, which a created agent can confer or take away.

It can also be impeded on account of its inclination and conjunction to corporeal nature, which is subject to the power of a creature; hence someone could well injure another in such a way that he would lose the use of free choice; yet from this he would not compel free choice. For coercion posits the act and use of free choice; but binding or impeding takes [them] away. And again, impeding can come from below, [whereas] coercion has to come from above. — And hence it is that free choice, although it can be induced by a created agent by reason of an exterior good loved, and can be impeded by reason of the conjoined body, cannot be compelled with respect to its proper act. For free choice has this dignity, that, insofar as it is free, it is subject to God alone; and because,

insofar as it is free, it is subject to no created agent, since coercion is from a superior, no created agent can compel it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that there is an action mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary; it must be said that this is understood of the exterior action, and as to that coercion can intervene. Moreover, it is understood there of the involuntary, insofar as the involuntary is said [to be] by violence — not, I say, by the violence of sufficient coercion, but only of inducing [coercion].

2. To that which is objected, that a greater power can violate a lesser; the response is already evident, because as to the dignity of liberty, as was shown in the first problem, all rational creatures have equality; nor is one [creature] of a nature to act upon another according to this property, and on this account neither to violate nor to compel another. For when it is said that a greater power can violate a lesser, this holds true if, according as it is greater, it is of a nature to act upon the lesser.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice can be impeded in its action; it must be said that this is true; yet from this it does not follow that it can be compelled. For an impediment deprives [it] of the act of liberty, but coercion posits the act of free choice, and along with this posits that it is not [an act] of liberty; and these are incompossible, just as if it were posited that some act were of the will and were not voluntary; and this will be better seen below. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected, that when water is moved, the ray joined to it is necessarily moved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the multiplication of the ray is natural, nor can light not multiply itself when it finds matter suitable to it; and as the multiplication of rays is natural, so too is their reflection natural, and [their] repercussion; and therefore, when the water is moved, the ray is received in another mode; thus it must necessarily be reflected in another mode. But free choice presides over the body, since it goes forth into its act voluntarily, and the variation of its proper act is from itself, not from the fact that there is some change in the conjoined body.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of the intellect to the true, and of the affection to the good, it must be said that, although there is in some way a similar comparison, nevertheless there is not an altogether perfect likeness, since, as was shown above, the liberty of choice holds more on the side of the motive [power] than of the cognitive; and therefore coercion is more repugnant to the affection than it is repugnant to cognition; and on this account it does not follow that, if the intellect can be compelled, the affection [can be] also.

6. To that which is objected, that it can be induced; it must be said that, although inducement may seem to be a kind of coercion — especially according to human laws, which say that what is done by reason of fear is not to be held valid, especially concerning that fear which can fall upon a constant man, for the reason that they consider exterior works — nevertheless according to truth this inducement stands together with the liberty of the will, nor is it repugnant to it in any respect, but rather is repugnant to the fullness of love and will. For one does not will so fully when he wills under a condition as when he wills absolutely, as is evident in the throwing of merchandise into the sea; nevertheless the account of liberty and will is preserved there. Hence such fear does not excuse from fault before God, as is openly evident in the denial made by Peter; and on this account it does not follow that, if it can be induced by a creature, it can be compelled. — Nor is what is objected concerning the disposition that becomes a necessity through repetition of any avail. For this is true with respect to a natural power and act, which is determined to one term of a contrariety; but it is not true with respect to the will, which is absolute, and, as far as it is concerned, is changeable. Moreover, that has place in that genus of disposition which is of the same genus and property, as is a proximate and a remote disposition. But it is not so in the case at hand, as was shown above. And thus the objections are clear.