Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether free choice can be bound as to its use on account of the unfitness of the body.*

In the sixth and last place, inquiry is made about free choice in comparison with the conjoined body, and the question is whether on account of the unfitness of the body it is bound as to its use. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard, *On Free Choice*: "To the insane and to infants and to those asleep nothing that they do is imputed": but this is so only because they lack the use of free choice, and this is so only on account of some impediment on the part of the body: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen from an example, because a holy and chaste man, whose chastity is great, frequently in his sleep consents to a work of sin, which he would in no way do at the time of waking: therefore in sleep the act of free choice is bound; but this is so only through the weariness and unfitness on the part of the body: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, when what is prior fails, that which is posterior fails: if therefore some act, which is preliminary to the use of free choice, is impeded through the unfitness of the body, it is necessary that the use of free choice also be impeded. But the act preliminary to free choice is the operation of the intellect, which is impeded through the unfitness of the body; as is evident in those asleep and in the frenzied, and the Philosopher says that "the intellect is corrupted when something interior is corrupted," and experience itself teaches this: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, just as a man grows weary in sensing, so too he grows weary in thinking and in meditating; but because the body grows weary in sensing, it therefore needs the rest of sleep, in which it is impeded from the operations of the senses: therefore by parity of reasoning it is necessary that free choice, on account of the weariness of the body, be impeded from its own act and use.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Third [Book] of Kings, chapter three, the history relates that the Lord appeared to Solomon in his sleep, and by the merit of the petition which he made, the Lord gave him exceeding great wisdom. If therefore to merit something before God and to receive wisdom is [an act of] the use of free choice and of reason; it seems that on account of the weariness and unfitness of the body and the quiet in sleep, free choice ought not to be impeded from its own act.

2. Likewise, Gregory, on that passage of Job: *Thou wilt terrify me with dreams*, speaking of nocturnal illusions: "That malignant spirits do these things, the supernal dispensation kindly permits in the hearts of the elect, lest sleep at least be free from the reward of passion": therefore it happens that one merits in sleep: therefore on account of the unfitness of the body free choice does not lose its own use.

3. Likewise, the soul as to its proper intellective operation, that is, free choice, is the act of no part of the body, nor does it exercise that operation through any organ: therefore however much the bodily organ may be injured or made unfit, free choice will not lose its use.

4. Likewise, the more the soul is recollected from exterior to interior things, the more the interior operation thrives; but when the organs of the exterior senses are bound, the powers of the soul are recollected from exterior to interior things: therefore then most of all the interior operation ought to thrive. But the use of free choice is regarded according to this [interior operation]: therefore when the body is made unfit for sensing, as through sleep, free choice ought then to have its proper use most especially.

5. Likewise, to see future things is [the act] of reason most highly elevated; but in sleep especially does the revelation and foresight of future things occur: therefore the highest act of reason thrives in sleep, while there is unfitness on the part of the body; and by parity of reasoning the use of free choice [thrives] also.

6. Likewise, the phantastic and imaginative power depends much more on the body than the rational and intellective power: therefore if, on account of unfitness on the part of the body, which indeed exists in the frenzied or even in those asleep, the phantastic operation is not impeded but rather even thrives; it seems that the intellective operation ought not to be impeded.

It is therefore a question: since the operation of free choice or even of the intellect in no way depends on the body, whence comes this, that it is impeded and bound on account of some unfitness arising about a bodily organ? — And again, if it is impeded, although it depends less on the body than the phantastic power, whence comes this, that reason loses its use more in sleep than phantasy or imagination? — And again, since reason as to the act of free choice is most of all potent and free, whence comes this, that on account of unfitness on the part of the body the use of free choice is more easily taken away than some act of reason? For in sleep a man has some rational motions, and in the frenzied likewise we see this, that they say many things which they could not say unless they had reason, when they answer questions put to them; yet in neither is the use of free choice said to be present. — All these things make the question difficult.

### Conclusion

> Free choice can, on account of the unfitness of the body, be impeded as to its use.

**I respond:** That although it is easy to answer this question, when it is asked whether free choice is bound through the unfitness of the body as to its use — since experience itself plainly teaches and shows this, that it is bound in little ones and in those asleep and in the frenzied — yet to that question which follows upon this, namely, why free choice is bound from the unfitness of the body, since it is not a power tied to an organ, it is very difficult to respond and to assign its cause. Nevertheless it must be understood that there is a fourfold mode of satisfying this question.

For some have wished to say that the use of reason or even of free choice is impeded and bound from the unfitness of the body on account of the soul's *conversion* [to the body]; others, on account of the privation of bodily service; the third mode of speaking is, on account of a certain *communication* of the rational operation; while the fourth mode is, on account of the *union* of body and soul unto the constitution of a third [thing].

In the first place, on account of *conversion* some have said that the soul is impeded from the act of reason when there is unfitness on the part of the body. For the body is either unfit from some interior injury, as is the case in the frenzied and in the phrenetic; and then the soul ceases from the operation of understanding because, by excessive compassion, it is turned toward the body by reason of the noble organ injured. Or it is unfit from imperfection, which is in the members and organs, as is the case in little ones; and then the soul is so intent on the governance of the body and on the things which it perceives through the senses of the body, that it almost forgets itself. And therefore from excessive conversion to its own body, which is from the injury of the organs, or from imperfection, it happens that the use of reason and of free choice is impeded. — But this mode of speaking does not fully satisfy. For we see that a vehement pain, occurring on the part of the body in the extremities, does not impede the use of reason, and yet the soul much flees that pain. Likewise, in sleep [the soul] is not more turned to bodily things than in waking; if therefore the conversion which is in waking does not take away the use of reason, by parity of reasoning it seems that neither does the conversion which is in sleep concerning the governance of the body.

And therefore there is a second mode of speaking, namely, that free choice is impeded from its proper use on account of the privation of bodily service. For although the operation of the intellect is not done through an organ, nevertheless the sensitive powers render some service to the intellective power so that it may exercise its act. For the phantastic power serves the intellect in two ways in the act of understanding, namely, in this, that it offers those phantasms to the possible intellect, just as the object offers a species to the eye; and also in this, that our intellect has to be excited by what is lower, as long as it is conjoined to the body. And therefore, when there is injury and unfitness on the part of the organ of the sensitive power, and a disturbance of the phantasms arises, the use of free choice and of the intellect is impeded for this reason, that the service due to it is taken away; just as my eye can be impeded from the act of seeing on account of some darkening arising in the visible thing, which is to offer me a species and to excite my sight. — But this mode of speaking still does not fully satisfy, for the reason that we see the operation of the intellect impeded, when no impediment has been made in the work of the interior sensitive power, such as imagination and phantasy. And again, since the intellect and the intelligible memory has some species abstracted in itself, which it conserves in itself and within itself, which the soul draws with itself when it is separated from the body; it seems that, every service of phantasy and of phantasms being set aside, the intellect ought to have its use with respect to those things of which it has the habit in itself. And this is plainly false, because a man is thus impeded in sleep from the consideration of the things he knows, just as from the inquiry into the things he does not know.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that the operation of free choice and of reason is impeded from the unfitness of the body on account of a certain communication of operation. For the intellective power communicates in a certain way its operation to the conjoined body, since it communicates being to it, and from these there comes to be one [thing] by essence, not only insofar as the soul is vegetative and sensible, but also insofar as it is rational. For the rational soul, coming to the human body, just as by its union it makes it to be an *animal* and an *animate* [thing], so it makes it to be *man*; and therefore, just as it communicates some operation to the body insofar as it makes it *living* and insofar as it makes it *animal*, so too it communicates some [operation] insofar as it makes it *man*, although not altogether uniformly. For the soul communicates to the body in a different way the operations which regard the vegetative and sensitive power, and the operations of the intellective power. For the operation of the sensitive and vegetative [power] is so communicated to the body that it is in the body and through the body, and also that it is in the body and not without the body; for the soul does not nourish except by means of a bodily organ, nor does it nourish except as long as it is in the body. But understanding the soul so communicates to the body that it understands with the body acting in some way, yet so that it does not understand through the body; so that it understands also in the body, yet so that it also understands when it is separated from the body. But because, while it is in the body, it communicates the rational operation to it, therefore, when disorder has been made on the part of the body, that operation has to be impeded. — But this mode of speaking is open to objection in this, that it says that the operation of the intellect is in some way communicated to the body, since this does not seem true, and the Philosopher seems expressly to contradict it in the sixteenth [book] *On Animals*, where he says that "the intellect is from without" because it is in no way mixed with the body. And he says this same thing in the third [book] *On the Soul*. And again, even if it be conceded that man understands, it is in no way conceded either of the whole body or of a part that it understands. Whence it seems that this is said of the whole composite by reason of a part, namely the soul; just as, when it is said "man is white," this is said only by reason of the body.

And therefore there is a fourth mode of speaking, namely, that the operation of the soul in the body has to be impeded on account of the unfitness of the body. And the ground of this is the union of soul and body unto the constitution of one third [thing], which is one by essence, and to which a proper operation is owed insofar as it is one. But this operation is not merely to live, nor to sense or to move, but to reason and to understand. And on account of this very union the soul depends on the body not only as to the act of sensing, but also in some way as to the act of understanding, as long as it is in the body, but in very different ways. For as to the act of vegetating and sensing it so depends that it can in no way exercise those acts except in the body — but not so as to the act of understanding — and it so depends that it exercises those acts through the body and through a bodily organ — not so is it as to the act of understanding — and therefore the soul is said to communicate the act of sensing to the body. Whence it is not altogether absurdly said: the eye sees; but it is not so said of the act of understanding. And the soul is said to sense through the body, and not to understand through the body, because, since two things concur in the act of understanding and of sensing, namely to receive and to judge, in sensing the reception of the species is from the body, but the judgment is from the power; whereas in understanding both are from the intellective power, namely from the possible and the agent intellect. And therefore the intellect is called a power not tied to matter, and it can have this operation when it is separated from the body; but as long as it is in the body, it does not altogether understand apart from the body. For just as the being of the soul in the body in some way depends on the body, although the being of the soul itself in itself does not depend [on it] — therefore for the soul to be in the body it is necessary that the body be duly disposed in temperament; and upon the corruption of that temperament it happens that the soul is no longer in the body — so, as long as the soul is in the body, its understanding is not without the body and without some disposition on the part of the body, whose actuality communicates with the act of understanding, just as a congruous disposition corresponded to the existence of the soul in the body and to its perfection. But that actuality is regarded according to that which is supreme in the body, and according to the noblest spirits, which have their place in the noblest organs of the body. And since, when something is taken away from something, that which is most excellent in it is first taken away; and when some power is weakened, the highest is first taken away from it, before that which is below the highest: hence it is that in an injury of the body that is more quickly taken away according to which the body was conformed to the *intellective* operation, than that according to which it was conformed to the sensitive operation. And therefore the fumes ascending to the brain, which disturb the spirits in sleep or in children or in the phrenetic, or any other injury of the organs in which reside the subtlest and noblest bodily spirits, more easily impede the use of reason than that of imagination. — And thus is evident the reason why the use of reason is impeded from the unfitness of the body, and why it is impeded more than the use of the lower power.

From this same reason it is gathered why reason is more impeded as to the use of free choice than as to the other rational acts, which it is sometimes recognized to have in sleep and in the frenzied. For the act of free choice regards the rational power insofar as it is in complete and full liberty. For free choice bespeaks the dominion of the power with respect to the act, as was determined above. And since, when some operative power is impeded, that act is first taken away from it which was in it according to its fullness — as is evident, when someone is sick in the foot, the power of running swiftly is more easily taken from him than the power of walking, or rather this act is more easily impeded than that — so too in the matter at hand it happens more easily and more frequently that the use of liberty is taken away than any act of the power of understanding. — The arguments, therefore, that show free choice to be impeded as to its use from the unfitness on the part of the body must be conceded, just as it is impeded in infants and in the frenzied and in those asleep.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the petition of Solomon, which was in sleep; it must be said that it was [a matter] either of special grace and privilege, not of common law, that he could merit in sleep and was worthy to be heard; or else this is said, not because it pleased God [that he merit] while sleeping, but because beforehand, while waking and pondering that thing, it pleased God, and what had pleased [Him] in waking, the Lord willed to manifest through revelation in sleep; for [He] was more accustomed to appear in sleep than in waking.

2. And by this is evident the response to the following word of Gregory. For as to what he says, that holy men merit in sleep; this is said because, an occasion being taken from what they suffer in sleep, they afterward merit in waking; just as a sinful man is said to demerit in a nocturnal pollution, which he provoked by his thought, or from the recollection of which he afterward takes delight.

3. To that which is objected, that the soul according to its intellective operation is not the act of any part of the body; the response is already evident from what has been said. For although it does not operate through a bodily organ, nevertheless, for the soul to operate in the body, it is necessary that the body, as to its noble spirits and noble organs, be in due actuality and disposition, as was shown before. And since this disposition is taken away through the unfitness of the body, therefore consequently the act of reason and the use of free choice is impeded.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul in sleep is recalled from exterior to interior things; it must be said that this is true, but not as to all the interior operations, but as to the natural operations. For sleep is the rest of the animal powers together with the intensification of the natural [powers]; and therefore it does not follow that the use of reason or of free choice is intensified in sleep, since these are rather contained under the animal powers than the natural.

5. To that which is objected, that in sleep the soul sees future things; it must be said that, as was determined above in the seventh distinction, in sleep there is no foresight of future things unless a visitation is sent from the Most High, as is said in Ecclesiasticus, the thirty-fourth [chapter]. But the Lord visits more in sleep than in waking in revealing future things, both because the soul in waking is dispersed to grasping exterior sensible things; and also because the Lord, who *made darkness his covert*, for the concealment of Himself wishes to send forth revelations more in sleep than in waking; and also because in sleep a man is acted upon more than he acts, and in divine revelation a man stands more in the manner of one receiving than of one acting; and because also in sleep a man holds a mean between the dead and the living, and so in a certain way withdraws from the life of this world, of which the Lord says in Exodus, the thirty-third [chapter]: *Man shall not see me, and live.* From this, therefore, it cannot be concluded that the use of free choice is present in sleep, although it happens that revelations are made there, since in sleep the soul is acted upon more than it acts; but in the use of free choice it acts more than it is acted upon.

6. To that which is objected, that the phantastic power is not impeded in sleep; it must be said that although phantasy seems to thrive more in sleep than in waking, nevertheless it too has to be impeded in some way. For a man is more powerful in waking to imagine everything that he wills than in sleep; although the motion of the imaginative [power] does not so appear in waking on account of the soul's conversion to exterior things, and in sleep slight motions are felt on account of the soul's quietude. — And if one should object that it is not so impeded but that phantasy in some way has its use, therefore neither ought the higher power to be impeded; the response is already evident from what has been said above; for every power is more easily taken away in the highest than below the highest. And besides, in sleep the animal powers are quieted more than the natural; but the motion and course of those phantasms is natural: and therefore the use of phantasy is not impeded as the use of the intellective power [is]. — And to the questions that follow, the response is plain from what has been said before.