Dist. 25, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, that *the freedom of choice has in part been lost through sin*, in that chapter: *Whence it is manifest* etc. For this is against Bernard, who says in his book *On Free Choice* that «free choice is neither lost through misery nor diminished through fault». Likewise, in the same book, speaking of free choice: «It suffers no diminution or defect whatsoever of itself». And again, the same author there says: «The freedom of choice is in no way changed from that state in which it was created, but equally, so far as in it lies, it is possessed by the heavens and the earth and the realms below»: therefore the Master wrongly assigns diverse degrees of freedom. Likewise, if the freedom of choice can be diminished through sin, since it is not infinite, at some point it could be lost: therefore if it is impossible for a rational creature to be without freedom of choice, it is impossible for that freedom to be diminished through sin.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that freedom of choice may be spoken of in respect of *being* and in respect of *well-being*. If we speak of it in respect of *being*, then free choice cannot be diminished through sin. But if we speak of it in respect of *well-being*, then it excludes a twofold evil, namely that of *fault* and that of *punishment*; and in respect of this free choice can be diminished, and this freedom can be taken away through sin, as in the damned, who are necessarily subject to the evil of fault and the evil of punishment. And through this the objections against this are clear, because they proceed concerning freedom understood in respect of *being*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *For the freedom of choice is threefold, namely from necessity, from fault, and from misery.* It seems that this division is superfluous. For since there is only a twofold evil, namely of fault and of punishment, it seems that there should be only a twofold freedom. Since therefore freedom denotes a deliverance from some evil, it seems that there ought to be only a twofold differentia of freedom. — Likewise, since there is not only the evil of fault and of punishment, but also that of temptation, it seems that the aforesaid division is deficient, since it omits one differentia, namely the freedom of choice from the evil of temptation. *If you say* that this is contained under freedom from misery; then I *ask*: why is freedom from fault likewise not contained under freedom from misery? — Likewise, since Bernard in his book *On Free Choice* divides the freedom of free choice into the freedom of choice, of counsel, and of complacency; it is asked what is the difference among these divisions, and according to what the members of these divisions are taken.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as can be gathered from what precedes, the freedom of choice is spoken of both *privatively* and *positively*. It is spoken of *privatively* by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as *from which*; *positively* by comparison to that with respect to which freedom is called freedom as *toward which*. — Now freedom is opposed to servitude. But servitude is twofold, namely the servitude of coercion and the servitude of subjection. And the servitude of subjection can fall under a twofold differentia, according as evil is twofold, namely the evil which we suffer, and this is the evil of misery, and in this freedom from misery is regarded; and the evil which we do, and this is the evil of fault, and in this the third differentia of freedom is regarded. And thus it is clear that freedom, insofar as it is considered by comparison to that *from which* it delivers, must be divided into three differentiae, which are freedom from necessity, from fault, and from misery. — But if freedom be considered by comparison to that *toward which*, namely toward the act into which it goes forth, this can be in a threefold way: either as it is considered *simply* with respect to the act of willing, and so it is called the freedom of choice; or as it is considered with respect to the act of willing related to an *end*, which is called *use* or *to use*, and so the freedom of counsel is regarded; or with respect to the act of willing at rest, which indeed is called the act of fruition, and according to this the freedom of complacency is regarded. — And thus the sufficiency of each division is clear, and the diverse modes according to which the aforesaid divisions are to be assigned.

They could, however, be reduced to one common ground of dividing in this way. For freedom of choice may be considered in respect of *being* and in respect of *well-

being*. If in respect of *being*, then it is called by the Master freedom from coercion, and by Bernard freedom of choice, by the one positively, by the other privatively. — If in respect of *well-being*, since to *well-being* there concur a twofold good, namely the good that *rectifies* and the good that *delights*, that is, the good that *orders* and the good that *brings rest*; and conversely there is excluded a twofold evil, namely the evil that *deforms* and the evil that *afflicts*: thus there is a twofold differentia, of which one is taken with respect to the *directing* good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of counsel, and by the Master freedom from fault; while the other is taken with respect to the *quieting* good, and this is called by Bernard the freedom of complacency, by the Master freedom from misery. For the very same thing which Bernard names positively, that is, by comparison to the *term toward which*, the Master names privatively, that is, by comparison to the term *from which*.

And thus the sufficiency of the divisions is clear. The reply to the objections is also clear. For besides the evil of fault and of punishment there is to be assigned a third differentia of the freedom of choice, which is not taken with respect to an evil, such as that one which is regarded in respect of *being*. And the evil of *temptation* must be reduced in one way to the evil of *fault*, in another way to the evil of *punishment*: to the evil of *fault*, insofar as it enters within; to the evil of *punishment*, insofar as it afflicts without; and thus it does not constitute a fourth member distinct from those three.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *But it is more pleasing to us that that be the freedom of choice whereby one is free toward evil, and that whereby one is free toward good.* For this is against Anselm, who says that «the power of sinning is not freedom nor a part of freedom». — Likewise, it also seems to be against reason, because each thing ought to be named from its best; and the freedom which is from all misery and fault, this is from all misery; therefore free choice ought to be named from it. — Likewise, if the freedom of choice is so called not only because it is toward good, but also because it can incline toward evil; since in the Blessed it cannot incline toward evil: it seems that the freedom of choice is spoken of equivocally in wayfarers and in the Blessed. But against this is the fact that comparison according to greater and lesser is with respect to the univocal alone. If therefore free choice were spoken of equivocally in the Blessed and in us, there would not be a greater freedom in the Blessed than in us; which is against the Master in the text, who assigns the degrees of freedom differently.

On account of this there is the question, whether freedom from coercion and from fault and from misery is spoken of equivocally or univocally; and to which the name of freedom is first applied.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since a name is imposed on a thing from a property which inheres in it inseparably and essentially; and the essential freedom of free choice is not freedom from fault, or from misery, but freedom from coercion: from this free choice is to be named. And since this, in creatures, of itself is indifferent toward good and toward evil; therefore the Master, understanding it of this, says in the text that the freedom from which free choice is named free is not freedom toward good only, but also toward evil; not that it principally regards evil, but because by the general signification of the name it is not determined to good, although it more principally regards good than evil. — And through this the reply to the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that naming ought to be done from the best; it must be said that this is true of the best not in any sense whatever, but of the essential and inseparable best.

To that which is asked, whether freedom is spoken of equivocally or univocally; it must be said that it is neither thus nor thus, but according to a certain *analogy*, which, on account of its agreement with the univocal, admits of comparison according to greater and lesser; on account of its agreement with the equivocal, admits of a certain distinction of multiplicity; for the analogous holds a middle place between the univocal and the equivocal. — And thus the things which were asked are clear.

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