Dist. 25, Part 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/25/q/bon-sent-II-d25-p2-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXV.

#### Part II.

#### Chapter V.

#### *On the difference of the freedom of choice according to different times.*

From the aforesaid it becomes clear that the *first* freedom of choice was greater than the *second*, and the *third* much greater than the *second* or the *first*. For the first freedom of choice was that in which one was able to sin and not to sin; the *last* will be that in which one will be able not to sin and unable to sin; but the *middle* one is that in which one is able to sin and unable not to sin — before reparation even mortally, but after reparation at least venially.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *On the four states of free choice.*

And four states of free choice can be noted in man. For *before* sin nothing impeded toward the good, nothing impelled toward evil. He had no infirmity toward evil and had help toward the good. Then reason could judge without error, and the will could seek the good without difficulty. But *after* sin, *before* the reparation of grace, [the will] is pressed by concupiscence and overcome, and has infirmity in evil but does not have grace in good; and therefore it *can sin* and *cannot not sin*, even damnably. But *after* reparation, *before* confirmation, it is pressed by concupiscence but is not overcome, and has indeed infirmity in evil, but grace in good, so that it *can sin* through liberty and infirmity, and *can not-sin* unto death through liberty and assisting grace; yet it does not yet have *to be wholly able not to sin*, or *to be unable to sin*, because the infirmity is not yet perfectly absorbed and because grace is not yet perfectly consummated. But *after* confirmation, the infirmity being wholly consumed and grace consummated, it will be neither able to be overcome nor pressed, and then it will have *to be unable to sin*.

#### Chapter VII.

#### *On the corruption of free choice through sin.*

Whence it is manifest that, besides the other penalties, for that sin man incurred a penalty in the corruption and depression of free choice. For through that sin the natural goods in man were corrupted and the gratuitous ones taken away. For this is he who was wounded and despoiled by *robbers*: *wounded* indeed in his natural goods, of which he was not deprived, otherwise reparation could not be made; but *despoiled* of the gratuitous goods which had been added to the natural ones. These are the *best gifts and perfect endowments*, of which some are *corrupted* through sin, that is, the natural ones, such as talent, memory, intellect; others are *taken away*, that is, the gratuitous ones, although the natural ones too are from grace; for the *genus* is referred to the *general*. The freedom of choice, therefore, was corrupted through sin and in part lost. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « By misusing free choice, man destroyed both himself and it. For when one sinned by free choice, with sin victorious, free choice too was lost. *For by whatever a man is overcome, to this is he assigned as a slave* ». — Behold, he says that man lost free choice, not because after sin he did not have *free choice*, but because he lost the *freedom of choice* — not indeed *all of it*, but the freedom from *misery* and from *sin*.

#### Chapter VIII.

#### *On the three modes of the freedom of free choice: from necessity, from sin, from misery.*

For freedom is threefold, namely from *necessity*, from sin, from *misery*. — From necessity, choice is equally free both before sin and after. For just as then it could not be coerced, so neither now. And therefore the *will* is deservedly judged before God, which is always free from necessity and can never be coerced. Where there is necessity, there is no freedom; where there is no freedom, there is no will, and therefore no merit. This freedom is in all, as much in the evil as in the good. — There is also another freedom, namely from sin, of which the Apostle says: *Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom*; and Truth in the Gospel: *If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed*. This freedom frees from the servitude of sin and makes [men] servants of justice, just as conversely the servitude of sin makes [men] free from justice. Whence the Apostle: *Being made free from sin, you became servants of justice*. And again: *When you were servants of sin, you were free from justice*. This freedom man lost by sinning; and therefore Augustine says that man, by misusing free choice, destroyed both himself and it, because the freedom was lost through sin — not from necessity, but from sin. *For he who commits sin is the servant of sin*.

This freedom, which is from sin, only those now have whom the Son frees and repairs through grace — not so that they are entirely without sin in this mortal flesh, but so that in them sin does not dominate nor reign. And this is the true and good freedom, which gives birth to a good servitude, namely of justice. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion* says: « No one will be free for doing justice unless, being freed from sin, he begins to be a servant of justice; and this is the true freedom for the joy of right action, together with a pious servitude for obedience to the precept ». — There is another *non-true* freedom, joined to an evil servitude, which is for doing evil, where reason dissents from the will, judging that what the will desires ought not to be done; but toward doing the good reason agrees with the will, and therefore the freedom is true and pious. But concerning the freedom toward evil and the evil servitude, Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*: « What freedom can there be for one assigned as a servant to sin, except when it delights him to sin? For he serves freely who willingly does the will of his Lord; and through this he is *free for sinning* who is the *servant of sin* ».

Here it can be asked whether this freedom, by which one is free toward evil, is the freedom of choice. For if it is the freedom of choice, it is indeed something good, because the freedom of choice is a natural good. — To some it seems that it is the very freedom of choice, which is always good, but which on account of the servitude of sin is freer and more prone toward evil; and therefore it is said not to be true freedom, because it is toward evil. — But to others it seems that this freedom toward evil, which Augustine mentioned above, is not the freedom of choice itself, but is a certain proneness to sinning and a crookedness which is from sin and is evil.

Likewise it is also wont to be asked whether that true freedom, which is for doing justice, is the freedom of choice itself. — Some say that it is the same one, but repaired through grace, by whose help it is free toward the good, while without grace it is not free toward the good. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « Whence will this freedom for doing well belong to a man assigned and sold [into bondage], unless he redeem him who says: *If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed*? And before this begins to come to pass in man, how does anyone glory in free choice, who is not yet free for working well »? — Behold, he plainly shows that free choice is freed through grace, so that through it one may work well. And therefore they say that the true freedom, which is for doing well, of which Augustine made mention above, is the freedom of choice itself, freed and assisted by the grace of God. — But others think that it is not the freedom of choice itself, but a certain other [freedom], which from grace and free choice begins to be in the mind of man, God working, when it is repaired.

But it pleases us more that the freedom of choice itself be both that by which one is free toward evil, and that by which one is free toward doing good. For from various causes it obtains diverse names. For it is called the freedom for doing evil before it is repaired through grace; but when it has been repaired through grace, it is called the freedom for doing good, because before grace the will is free toward evil, but through grace it becomes free toward the good. Always therefore the will of man is in some way free, but it is not always good. For it is not good unless freed from sin, yet it is free from necessity. Whence Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*: « The will in us is always free, but it is not always good. For either it is free from justice when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves justice, and then it is good ».

Again, there is a freedom from *misery*, of which the Apostle says: *And the creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God*. This freedom man had before sin, because he lacked all misery and was touched by no trouble, and he will have it more fully in future beatitude, where he will be unable to be wretched. But in this life, which is between the first sin and the final confirmation, no one is free from misery, because one is not without the penalty of sin.

From the aforesaid it now appears in what way free choice has been diminished and corrupted through sin, since before sin there was for man no difficulty and no impediment from the law of the members toward the good, no impulse or instigation toward evil. But now through the law of the flesh he is impeded toward the good and instigated toward evil, so that he cannot will and accomplish the good unless he is freed and assisted by grace, because, as the Apostle says, *sin dwells in the flesh*. Free choice, therefore, although it is always and in each one free, is nevertheless not equally free in good things and in evil, and toward good things and toward evil. For it is freer in good things, where it is freed, than in evil things, where it is not freed. And it is freer toward evil, which it can do of itself, than toward the good, which it cannot do unless it be freed and assisted by grace.

#### Chapter IX.

#### *On the freedom which is from grace, and that which is from nature.*

The freedom, therefore, from *sin* and from *misery* is through grace, but the freedom from *necessity* is through nature. Both freedoms, namely of nature and of grace, the Apostle notes, when from the person of unredeemed man he says: *To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not*; as if he said: I have the freedom of nature, but I do not have the freedom of grace; therefore the perfection of the good is not with me. For the will of man, which he has naturally, is not able to be raised toward the good for willing it effectively or fulfilling it in deed, unless through grace it be *freed* and *assisted*: *freed* indeed, that it may will, and *assisted*, that it may accomplish; because, as the Apostle says, *it is not of him that wills to will, nor of him that runs to run*, that is, to work, but *of God that shows mercy*; *who works in us to will and to accomplish the good*, whose grace the will or working of man does not summon, but grace itself prevents the will by preparing it, that it may will the good, and assists it once prepared, that it may accomplish.

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