Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-a1-q1
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### Article (Sole). *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question I. *Whether grace places something in the one made pleasing.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the grace of God places something in the one made pleasing.

1. For it is said in John, chapter one: *Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.* If, therefore, what we have received is in us, the divine grace has being in those made pleasing or accepted by God.

2. Likewise, first to the Corinthians, chapter twelve: *There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit, dividing to each one as he wills;* but this would not be so, unless the gift of grace placed something in each one: therefore etc. If you say that this is said of gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*); then it is argued *from the lesser*, that if gratuitously given grace places something in the one made pleasing, much more does grace that makes pleasing (*gratia gratum faciens*), which is of greater efficacy and renders him more pleasing and acceptable to God.

3. Likewise, by grace that makes pleasing one is made worthy of supernal beatitude; but every worthiness places something in that in which it is: therefore the worthiness of eternal reward places something in him who is worthy; but this is nothing other than grace: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, fault, by reason of which God hates and reprobates a man, places some deformity in him who is reprobated: therefore by parity of reasoning grace, on account of which God loves and approves someone, places something in him who is accepted.

5. Likewise, it happens that someone who is not pleasing to God is made pleasing; but this is not on account of any change made on the part of God who accepts: therefore it is on account of some change made on the part of the man who is accepted. But such a change takes nothing away from the man: therefore it places something in the man who is accepted.

6. Likewise, God is *a just weigher*: therefore he does not accept one man more than another, unless some gift and some good is in the one which is not in the other; but this we call grace itself: therefore the grace of God places something in the very one made pleasing and accepted by God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Daniel, chapter one: *The Lord gave Daniel grace in the sight of the prince of the eunuchs* etc.; but it is plain that at that time nothing new was conferred upon Daniel that he should be accepted by that prince of the eunuchs: if therefore God is more benign and more ready to accept, it seems that nothing need be placed in a man that he should be accepted by God. If, therefore, to have the grace of God is nothing other than to be acceptable to God, it seems etc.

2. Likewise, we see by experience that one man becomes pleasing to another from his mere appearance, nor does the one man give the other anything when he receives him into his favor: therefore by parity of reasoning it is not necessary that anything be given to a man that he be received into the favor of God.

3. Likewise, everyone is pleasing to another who is loved by him; but the love of God does not place anything new in the beloved, since he loved *us before the foundation of the world,* as is said to the Ephesians, chapter one: he loved us also *while we were yet sinners,* as is said to the Romans, chapter five: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does that acceptance or making-pleasing place anything in the one made pleasing.

4. Likewise, by someone's prayers alone, without any gift intervening, one can be made a friend and pleasing to someone whose enemy and hateful he formerly was. If, therefore, this is so in man, then, since God is far more prone to mercy than man, it seems that this can far more strongly be found in the case of God's grace.

5. Likewise, grace is related to the one made pleasing, and acceptance to the one accepted, just as praise is related to the one praised; but praise places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising: therefore neither does grace place anything in the one made pleasing, but in the one making pleasing.

6. Likewise, it belongs to a more abundant charity to love and accept him who is less worthy of love, such as an enemy, than a friend: therefore divine charity and goodness accepts not only the good, but even the wicked, however wicked; not only the worthy, but even the unworthy, however unworthy: therefore divine acceptance or making-pleasing does not seem to place anything in the very one accepted or made pleasing.

### Conclusion.

> *Divine grace places something in the one made pleasing.*

**I respond:** It must be said that divine grace places something in the one made pleasing or accepted. — And the reason for this is this: that the divine *will* in accepting is not affected, the divine *truth* in approving is not deceived, and *neither* of them is changed in making pleasing. — Because the divine *will* in accepting is not affected, nor does it accept anyone on account of a new *affection*, it is necessary that it accept on account of some *effect*, and thus some effect is placed in him who is accepted. — Because the divine *truth* in approving is not deceived, therefore it does not prefer one to another, nor approve one more than another, except because he has in himself something which is more worthy of divine approval. But it accepts no one except whom it approves, and thus no one is pleasing or accepted by God unless he has in himself something by which he is worthy of approval. — But because the *will* is not changed in accepting, nor the *truth* in approving; when someone newly begins to be approved or accepted, and no change falls on the part of God who accepts or approves: it is necessary that some change fall on the part of the one accepted and approved. But this is not because something is taken away from him: the change is therefore because some gift is conferred upon him by God. — And thus it is plain that grace places some gift in the very one made pleasing. Hence the reasons that show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the opposing side:**

*To 1 and 2.* As for that which is objected to the contrary concerning human grace, of which it is said that *God gave grace to Daniel* etc.; it must be said that that comparison fails in the three conditions assigned beforehand: both because man in accepting is *affected;* and because his judgment is frequently *deceived;* and also because, when from a non-accepter he becomes an accepter, he is *changed* in himself. But this is not posited in God; and therefore it is not similar. And by this the first and second objections are answered.

*To 3.* As for that which is objected concerning love, that it does not place anything in the beloved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that *love* extends not only to the present, but also to the future — whence God loves us not only with a temporal love, but also with an eternal one — whereas *acceptance* and making-pleasing extends only to the present; and therefore it places an effect in the one accepted and made pleasing not only in habit, but even in act.

*To 4.* As for that which is objected, that prayers alone reconcile; it must be said that that holds where reconciliation is brought about through a change of *affection*, as when someone who was previously angry at another is mollified through someone's prayers. But this is not posited in the case of God; and if at times in Scripture it seems to be said, it must be understood figuratively, namely *by anthropopathy.*

*To 5.* As for that which is objected concerning praise, it must be said that just as the praise of a creature places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising; so too the grace by which one man accepts another. But God, who praises him not by word, but by approval, in praising places something in the one praised. Hence from this it does not follow that divine grace places nothing. — Yet it could be said that *praise* and *grace* are not similar, because *praise* regards an extrinsic person, to whom the one praised is made manifest: but *acceptance* regards intrinsic goods, by which one person is rendered acceptable to another.

*To 6.* As for that which is objected, that it belongs to a greater charity to accept him who is less worthy; it must be said that *acceptance* regards not only the *work* or effect or gift of *generosity*, but also the *judgment of truth.* For whoever accepts another also approves him. And since divine truth and equity cannot approve anything except the good and the equitable; no one, so long as he remains in his iniquity, can be pleasing to God, even though many benefits be bestowed upon him by God. And thus it is plain that his argument does not compel, because the immensity of the divine generosity is such that the infallible equity of the divine truth is not excluded.