Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-a1-q2
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### Article (unique). *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question II. *Whether what grace places in the justified is created or uncreated.*

Secondly it is asked, granted that grace places something about the justified, whether that thing is created or uncreated.

1. That it is uncreated seems [to follow] from what Didymus says in his book *On the Holy Spirit*: « We say that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, nor ought we to suppose that the Holy Spirit is divided according to substance, because a multitude of gifts is spoken of; for he is impassible and indivisible; but according to differing understandings he is named with many names of gifts ». If therefore the Holy Spirit is an uncreated gift, it remains that grace-making-acceptable signifies something uncreated.

Likewise, this same thing is shown through the *effects* or acts of grace which it is said to have in the justified, which are gathered from various authorities to be nine. For it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to *reform, vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, render acceptable to God* the soul, and to *lead the affection upward* and to *elevate* it.

2. From the first act it is argued thus. « By the same [power] by which God creates He recreates, and to recreate and to create are of equal power, as Augustine says »: if therefore God creates by Himself, not through anything created; then He recreates and reforms by Himself, not through anything created. But that by which He recreates is grace: therefore etc.

3. From the second act it is argued thus. It is of equal power to reform the mind as to *affection* and as to *intellect*; but « the mind is immediately formed by the first truth » as to *intellect,* as Augustine says: therefore it is also immediately formed by the first goodness as to *affection*. But to form the soul as to *affection* belongs to grace itself: therefore grace is nothing other than the highest goodness.

4. From the third act or effect it is argued thus. If to vivify the soul is an act of grace-making-acceptable; and God vivifies the soul by Himself, not through a created medium: then grace is nothing other than God. The *minor* is proved through Augustine, who says that « as the body lives by the soul, so the soul lives by God »; but the soul vivifies the body by itself: therefore God vivifies the spirit by Himself.

5. From the fourth act or effect it is argued thus. If the sun were present to the eye by its presence, no influx of light would be necessary for the eye to be made luminous. If therefore the sun of justice, God, is present to every creature, and is essentially in the soul of each one; it seems that no influx of light is necessary for the illumination of the soul. If therefore it is impossible that God should do anything in vain: it seems that the grace illuminating the soul is nothing other than the divine essence.

6. From the fifth act or effect it is argued thus. If color were its own likeness, no generation of a new likeness would be necessary for the eye to be conformed to the color itself, especially if the color itself could be in the eye; but in God, on account of His simplicity, truth and likeness do not differ — for the Son, who is the likeness of the Father, is of the same essence with the Father — if therefore it belongs to grace to assimilate to God, and grace is the likeness of God, it is impossible that grace be anything other than God.

7. From the sixth act or effect it is argued thus. The medium of uniting is more joined to each of the extremes than the extreme is to the extreme; but God is most inward to the soul: therefore it is impossible that between God and the soul there should fall any uniting medium which is distinct from each of the extremes. If therefore it belongs to grace to unite the soul to God, since grace is not the soul, it is necessary that grace be God.

8. From the seventh act or effect it is argued thus. It is impossible that vanity be stabilized through vanity, but if it is stabilized, it is stabilized through truth. If therefore every

creature is vanity, either it does not belong to grace to stabilize the soul, or it is not anything created; but it belongs to grace to stabilize the soul in good; this is plain: therefore grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

9. From the eighth act or effect it is argued thus. By the same [Spirit] by which He loves, God accepts someone; but the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit, as the Saints say, and as was held in the first book, not by anything created: therefore He accepts us by the Holy Spirit, not through any created gift. If therefore grace is that by which God accepts the soul and reckons the soul pleasing, it seems etc.

10. From the ninth act or effect it is argued thus. Nothing can elevate our mind above itself except that which is superior to the mind; but « God alone is greater than the rational mind »: therefore it belongs to God alone to elevate it above itself. But this act or effect is said to belong to grace: therefore it is impossible that grace-making-acceptable be anything distinct from God. — By these nine reasons it is gathered that grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

**On the contrary**, it is argued first by *demonstrative* reasons, secondly by reasons *leading* *to the impossible.* And to show that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift, let the force of authority be adduced first, and secondly the violence of reason.

1. For it is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the twelfth [chapter]: *There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit*; but there is no division of an uncreated gift: therefore [it is a division] of a created gift: therefore etc. — *But if you say* that this authority must be understood not of grace-making-acceptable, but of grace-freely-given; it is then *objected* through the word of Augustine to Boniface, saying: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ». Therefore about this gift there consists merit and increase; but increase consists only about a created gift, and merit consists only about the gift of grace-making-acceptable: therefore grace-making-acceptable is something created. — *But if you say* that that increase is regarded in grace not according to what it is, but according to its effect; there is adduced for this the authority of the Master in the text, which he takes from the words of Augustine, there: « And if you attend diligently, it is nonetheless shown to you what is that grace preventing and preparing the will, namely faith with love ». If therefore faith is a created gift, it remains that grace itself, preparing the will, is a created gift.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason,* and from all these acts of grace assigned, one reason is gathered. For if it belongs to grace to recreate and to *reform* and to vivify, and so of the others, since every such act is from something as from a formal principle — for there is no recreation nor reformation nor vivification, and so of the others, without a form — it is necessary that some gift be placed in the soul which is informative of the soul itself. But God can be the *perfecting* form of nothing, although He can stand in the character of an *exemplary* form: therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is God, in order that the soul be made gracious, it is necessary to posit a created gift. Now the necessity of this reason is gathered from the nine media, from which nine arguments can be formed; but it is worth as much to gather them into one medium as to set them out separately. — Thus therefore by *demonstrative* reasons it appears that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reasons *leading to the impossible,* of which the first is this: either grace-making-acceptable places *something* created in the justified, when God makes the non-pleasing pleasing, or *nothing*. If *nothing*: then no change occurs on the part of the justified creature: then change occurs on the part of the one justifying, which is impossible. — And *again,* if it placed nothing created, he who is pleasing to God would not be better than he who is not pleasing. If therefore it is impossible to hold that one pleasing to God is not better than one not pleasing; and it is impossible that he be better unless he has some goodness which the other does not have; and this cannot be except something created: it is necessary that grace place something created in the justified. If therefore it places something created, either it is a *gift* or some *habit,* or it is an *act* or the *use of a gift*. If it is a *gift* and some *habit,* I have my point, namely that grace places in the justified some created gift. But if it is an *act* or *use,* then it will be no more in the justified than in the non-justified, except when he is operating: therefore grace would not be in baptized infants and in the sleeping just any more than in the non-baptized and in sinful men. And if this is false and foreign to the faith, it is necessary that grace place some created gift in the justified.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *another reason.* Both from faith and from authorities it is necessary to suppose that it is impossible that any merit exist without grace, and this will be better manifested below. This therefore being supposed, I then ask: either grace is some property of free choice, or it altogether names another distinct substance. If it is some property of free choice, I have my point, namely that grace in

free choice is some created gift. If grace is not some property of free choice, but God; since free choice goes forth into a meritorious work, which is above it, in meriting it is acted upon rather than acts, and is moved rather than moves. And if this is so, just as upward motion is not attributed to a stone, nor is the stone praiseworthy or blameworthy from it; so the meritorious work is in no way to be attributed to free choice; and thus neither will free choice from it be worthy of any reward. But if this is impossible and false, it remains therefore that what is said is false, namely that grace is not some created gift.

### Conclusion

> Besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to grace as the effective principle, there must be posited a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question the wise hold the contrary of the wise. For in this question there is something which *faith* determines, something which *reason* investigates. Faith and Scripture *determine* that without the gift of grace it is impossible to please God; they determine also that without the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, man cannot be made acceptable to God nor be taken up into the adoption of the sons of God. And therefore all who understand rightly grant that there is in the just the gift of grace, and they believe also that there is in them the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is determined by faith and by Scripture; and therefore one who held the contrary of this would be a heretic. — But whether besides the uncreated gift there is to be posited in us a created gift, by which we are acceptable to God, or not; because it is not expressly determined by the authority of Scripture, it is *investigated* by the doctors with the probability of reasons. And since habits as well as gifts as well as virtues are known through their proper operations; therefore according to the diverse comparison of the acts and effects of grace to grace itself, the opinions of the doctors on this matter are diverse.

For just as was touched upon in the objecting, it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to *reform,* vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, make acceptable, raise upward. These acts, therefore, some have compared to grace as to an *effective principle.* And since God suffices for perfecting these acts or effects in the rational creature; and they befit God alone by reason of their *dignity,* and are possible to God alone by reason of their *difficulty*: therefore they said that to posit a created gift for perfecting these effects in man is superfluous and unfitting and impossible.

Others, however, compared the aforesaid effects to grace as to a *form.* For it is necessary that vivification and reformation be from something as from an *efficient cause,* and from something as from that which *informs.* And since it is neither possible nor fitting that God be the perfective form of any creature; therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to these acts as the effective principle, it is fitting and opportune to posit a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

Now I believe this position is to be preferred to the prior, both because it is *safer,* and also because it is *more reasonable*. — For it is *safer,* because it accords with the common opinion of the masters and the words of the expositors and the piety of the Saints. For the Parisian doctors commonly hold this and have held it from ancient days. The words of the expositors also point to this, who say that grace is given in the Sacraments and increased by the exercise of virtue. Pious and humble minds also consent to this position, for the reason that, although the gift of grace cannot be so perceived by just anyone, yet from men distinguished by holiness the influence of the divine goodness is sometimes not hidden, which they know by experiencing it within themselves rather than by reasoning. This too belongs to pious minds, that they attribute nothing to themselves, but all to the grace of God. Hence however much one ascribes to the grace of God, he does not depart from piety, even if by ascribing much to the grace of God he subtracts something from the power of nature or from free choice. But when something is subtracted from grace, and what belongs to grace is attributed to nature, there danger can intervene. And therefore, since this position, which posits grace created and uncreated, ascribes more to the grace of God than the other, and posits a greater need in our nature; hence it is that it is more consonant with piety and humility, and therefore is more secure. For granted that it were false, yet because it does not turn aside from piety and humility, to hold it is nothing but good and safe. — This opinion therefore is to be preferred to the prior, for the reason that it is safer and recedes further from the error of Pelagius. For who would safely dare to deny that in our justification some created gift is conferred on us by God? For each one ought to fear, lest perhaps by denying the gift of created grace he be made an adversary of uncreated grace.

It is to be preferred also because it is *more reasonable.* For just as was shown in the objecting, reasonably such acts and effects cannot be thought to be in us

unless they are from something as from an *efficient cause,* and from something as from that which *informs.* For how will the true act of reformation and of vivification be in the soul, unless there be some completing form by which the soul is informed? And therefore according to this position the *created grace* itself is compared to the influx of light, and its *principle* is compared to the sun. Hence Scripture also calls God or Christ the *sun of justice,* because, just as from that material sun corporeal light flows into the air, by which the air is formally illuminated; so from the spiritual sun, who is God, spiritual light flows into the soul, by which the soul is formally illuminated and reformed and made gracious and vivified. Hence among all corporeal things the influx of light is most assimilated to the grace of God. For just as this is a certain influx which assimilates the bodies receiving it to the very source of light as to its property; so grace is a spiritual influx which assimilates and conforms rational minds to the source of light. Now this influx is rightly called *grace,* both because it is given out of mere liberality, with no necessity compelling nature — for it does not arise from the principles of the subject, nor does it go forth from God of necessity, but by His mere benignity — and also because it *makes gracious* — for while it conforms and assimilates man to God, it renders him a friend of God and makes him pleasing and acceptable to God — and also because it makes man *do gratis* the things he does. For man's affection is curved-in-on-itself and mercenary, so far as it is of itself; hence if he does anything, he does it intending his own advantage; but when divine grace supervenes, it so makes the whole man gracious that, whether for the advantage of his neighbor or for the honor of God, he wills to spend the whole gratuitously. — And thus it is clear that such an influx is very reasonably named grace. Holding therefore this position as the safer and the more reasonable, it is easy to respond to the objections to the contrary.

1. For that which Didymus says, that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, and whatever other authorities are found, are to be understood *by cause* and *appropriation,* because the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all the other gifts are given, and who is the fount of all gifts; but a created gift is not excluded by that word. For just as, when someone holds a horse by the bridle, he is said to hold the horse, nor is the holding of the bridle thereby excluded, because by holding the bridle he holds the horse: so, when the Holy Spirit is said to be the substance of the gifts, a created gift is not excluded, but rather included. For the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us for no other reason than because He is so in us from God, that He may be had by us. But He is then had by us when we have a habit by which we can enjoy Him; and this is the created gift of grace. And thus the response to that authority and to similar ones is clear.

2—10. But as to that which is objected concerning the act or effect of recreation, that it is from God alone; it must be said that it is true that it is from God alone as from the *effective* principle; nonetheless, however, because recreation is of a thing already existing, [it is] to be reformed through some disposition apt to it — for recreation and reformation are the same — and therefore it regards not only the effective principle, but also the *informative* principle. It is not so with creation, which is simply from non-being, in which there is simply the production of a thing, not alteration according to quality. — By this way a response can be made to all the following reasons. For all proceed according as those acts are compared to grace as to an effective principle. But in this mode they are not from created grace, as was said before; and this is better seen if one is willing to treat it diligently; it is nonetheless passed over for the present for the sake of avoiding prolixity.

7. But as to that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that grace does not unite as to the *first being,* as to which God is most inward to every creature *essentially, potentially* and *presentially*; but grace is the medium of uniting as to *cognition and love,* in which mode God is far distant from sinners.