Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-a1-q3
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### Article, sole. *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question III. *Whether grace is in the genus of substance or of accident.*

Thirdly it is asked whether grace is in the genus of substance or in the genus of accident. And that it is in the genus of accident, it seems.

1. Everything that comes to a substance already complete is an accident; but grace comes to a substance already complete, namely to the rational soul: therefore grace is an accident.

2. Likewise, that which « is present and absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident »; but grace is of this kind, as is clear, since many just men become sinners, and conversely: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that admits of more and less is an accident; but grace admits of more and less, since it is greater in one than in another, and in the same person it is intensified more at different times: therefore etc.

4. Furthermore, either grace is a substance or an accident. If it is an accident, I have my proposition; if a substance: then either substance-*matter,* or substance-*form,* or substance-*composite*. Substance-*matter* it is not, this is established; substance-composite it is not, since then it would not be unitable to the soul; substance-*form* it is not, since then from grace and the soul there would come to be one thing in essence: therefore if it is not a substance, it remains that it is an accident.

5. Likewise, if it is a substance, then either corporeal or spiritual. Not corporeal, this is established; if spiritual, then either God, or an Angel, or a rational soul; but it is certain that created grace is neither God, nor an Angel, nor a rational soul: therefore it remains that created grace is in the genus of accident.

6. Likewise, no substance is a habit; but grace is a certain habit adorning and beautifying the soul, as is said upon that text of the Psalm: *That he may make the face cheerful with oil*: « Grace is a certain brightness of the soul » etc.: therefore grace is not a substance; and it is [either] a substance or an accident: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. No accident is nobler than a substance: but grace is nobler than the soul, which it perfects and completes, just as the perfection is nobler than the perfectible: therefore grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no accident is more like a substance than a substance [is]; but grace among other creatures is more like God, and God is a substance: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

3. Likewise, no accident is more stable than a substance, for the reason that the substance furnishes support

to the accident, and not conversely; but grace stabilizes the soul itself and confirms it in good, nor can grace itself in any way be bent toward evil: if therefore the soul is a substance, grace is a substance.

4. Likewise, every form that is a principle of life is in the genus of substance; but grace is a principle of life, and of the noblest life: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

5. Likewise, there are three kinds of goods, namely middle goods, least goods, and greatest goods, as Augustine holds in the book *On Free Choice*; but the least goods and the middle goods are in the genus of substance: therefore much more so are the greatest goods; and grace is among the greatest goods: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every accident which is present in something as an accident is present either *per se* or *per accidens.* If therefore grace is present in the soul as an accident, then it is present either *per se* or *per accidens.* If *per se*: then it has its origin from the proper principles of the subject: therefore it will no longer be grace, but a natural property. If *per accidens*; but everything *per accidens* is reducible to something *per se*: therefore if grace is present in the soul *per accidens,* there will be another subject in which it is present *per se.* I ask, then, what that is. But if no such thing can be given, it remains that grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *Grace, as a created gift, is an accident.*

**I respond:** It must be said that those who hold grace to be a created gift must necessarily hold grace to be in the genus of accident.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that there is a certain accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; and a certain [accident] which is related only to something as to a subject, and to another thing as to a cause: for example, blackness in a crow is related to the crow itself as to a subject and a cause; light in the air, or a species in a mirror, is related only as to a subject, not as to a cause, since, although it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin elsewhere.

Now such an accident, which is related to something as to a subject and to another as to a cause, can be under a threefold difference. For there is one which has its origin from something lower; one which has its origin from something equal; one which has its origin from something higher: as from something lower, like the species of a stone in the eye, or even in our intellect; from something equal, like the likeness of a mirror in a mirror; from something higher, like light in illuminated air. — Now such an accident, which has its origin from something higher, insofar as it is an accident, is a complement, not with respect to first being, but with respect to second being. But because it is from something higher, it ennobles the subject in this, that it joins it and conforms it to that which is higher than itself. And if it be such an accident as has its origin from the first supreme being; if its infusion or origin be according to a perfect influence, it not only ennobles, but even consummates and brings to rest; and this it does not only by reason of itself, but also by reason of that from which it proceeds, in which is found every perfection and the aggregation of all goods, and through this complete beatitude. — Therefore the reasons proving that grace is an accident must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that no accident is nobler than a substance; it must be said that that argument fails in three ways. First indeed, because the nobility of substance and of accident, and the goodness of substance and of accident, cannot properly be compared. For an accident is called good not for itself, but for another, not as something ordered, but as the ground of ordering; whereas the substance itself is good as being participative of goodness. — There is also another defect there, since, although no accident is nobler than a substance, insofar as the accident is considered in itself with respect to the essence of the genus or with respect to first being; nevertheless, insofar as the accident is considered in the subject and includes the being of the subject, it adds a certain nobility with respect to second being. — There is also a third defect, because the fact that grace is called nobler than the soul and the perfection of the soul is not by reason of itself only, but because it unites [the soul] to the uncreated good, as was said before.

2. To that which is objected, that no accident

is more like a substance than a substance [is]; it must be said that, just as it was said of goodness, that in one way the soul is called good, in another way grace; so also in one way the soul is assimilated to God, and in another way grace. For the soul is assimilated to God as receptive of the divine likeness, but *grace* as the very likeness or assimilating gift; hence there is properly no comparison between this mode of assimilating and that. — There is also another defect, because, since the soul is assimilated to God on account of grace, and where one thing [is] on account of another, in both there is only one; thus no greater or lesser assimilation is to be spoken of in the grace-given soul than in the grace-giving grace. — There is also a third defect, because, although a substance is more assimilated to a substance in the character of being, nothing nevertheless prevents an accident from being more assimilated to some substance under the character of a property, just as the wise soul is more assimilated to God, insofar as it is *a being per se,* than is the quality of wisdom itself; nevertheless the soul, insofar as it is *wise,* is more assimilated to God, insofar as he is wise, [by that] in which it is wise, than [by that] in which it is a substance. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that no accident is more stable than a substance; it must be said that this is true of that accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; but of that accident which has its origin elsewhere, it does not hold true, as is clear in the ray going out from the sun, which remains fixed though the air be moved. And because grace is such an accident, therefore that argument has no place in the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected, that grace is a form which is a principle of life; it must be said that this holds true of the form which gives life [in the sense] that pertains to *first* being. But grace is a form giving life with respect to second being, or with respect to *well-being*; and therefore that [objection] is of no force. For there does not come to be one thing in essence from the grace-given [soul] and grace, as there comes to be one thing in essence from the vivified body and the vivifying soul.

5. To that which is objected concerning the greatest, least, and middle goods, it must be said that that division of goods is according to the acceptation of good by which something is called good because it is good for another and useful, as is clear from the words of Augustine in the same place: that the greatest goods are those which it is not possible to use badly; and therefore, as to the degree of goodness according to that mode in which Augustine there speaks, it makes no difference whether that good which is called greatest is in the genus of substance or of accident.

6. To that which is asked, whether it is present in the soul *per se* or *per accidens*; it must be said that it is present *per se* in the genus of subject, but not *per se* in the genus of cause. And because it is present *per se* in the genus of subject, therefore there is no need to seek another subject in which it might be present prior [to this]. But because it is not present *per se* in the genus of cause, therefore it is not present in every soul, nor does it have its origin from the principles of the soul; therefore in one way it has the nature of an accident inhering *per se,* in another way the nature of an accident inhering *per accidens.*