Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-a1-q5
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### Article unique. *On the quiddity of grace.*
### Question V. *Whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies.*

Fifth, it is asked whether grace is present first in the substance of the soul, or in the potencies. And that it is present first in the substance, it seems.

1. No potency of the soul is continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in its act, because it continuously renders a man accepted and pleasing to God: therefore grace is not in the potencies of the soul.

2. Likewise, grace is the life of the soul, as the authorities of the Saints and also the doctors say; but to live, since it is a substantial act, is not present to the substance through the potencies, but to the potencies through the substance: therefore if the first act of grace is to vivify, it seems that it regards the substance prior to the potencies.

3. Likewise, an accident is numbered by its own proper subject: therefore if grace is first in the potencies, since the potencies are many, it is necessary that grace be multiplied in the soul. If therefore in one soul there is only one grace, it seems that grace is first in the substance rather than in a potency.

4. Likewise, in grace and the virtues consists the image of reformation; but the image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation: since therefore the image of creation consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of potencies, and there are three habits of the virtues, which regard the three potencies, it seems that there is some one thing that regards the very essence of the soul; but this is nothing but grace: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, just as operation goes forth from a potency, so a potency arises from the substance: therefore just as no operation is pleasing nor accepted by God unless first the potency is accepted and made pleasing, so it is impossible for a potency to be accepted unless first the substance is accepted: therefore, since acceptance comes about through grace, grace is prior in the substance rather than in a potency.

6. Likewise, in baptized infants God is present through indwelling grace, as Augustine says in the letter on the presence of God, to Dardanus: therefore, since in them there is no potency ready [for use], grace does not regard first the readiness of a potency, but rather the vivification of the substance, and thus it is prior in the substance rather than in a potency.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»: therefore it resides in the soul by reason of free choice; but free choice names a potency: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text adduces an authority of Augustine, in which he divides grace into prevenient and subsequent, and defines each of these by comparison to the will: therefore it seems that the first and proper subject of grace is the will itself. But this is a potency: therefore it seems that grace is present prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

3. Likewise, just as between potency and act there falls a mediating habit, so between substance and habit there falls a mediating potency. Since therefore grace is in the soul as a habit and a certain quality, it seems that it is present to it by the mediation of a potency: therefore it is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

4. Likewise, «opposites are by nature brought to be about the same thing»; but grace as grace is opposed to fault inasmuch as it is fault: if therefore fault first and properly regards the freedom of choice, by the same reasoning so too does grace: therefore it will be prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

5. Likewise, grace, since it is a gift descending from above, is present to the soul according to its highest part; but the highest part of the soul, as Augustine holds, is the mind itself; but the mind is not the substance itself of the soul, but rather the highest potency: therefore it seems that grace is prior in a potency.

6. Likewise, grace has its existence in the soul according to the soul's conversion to God, and is lost according to its aversion. If therefore that according to which the soul is first turned away and turned [back] is a potency: it seems that grace is prior in a potency rather than in the substance.

7. Likewise, grace is not in the soul according to itself, but according to an influence from some principle that is altogether diverse from it. Since therefore the soul receives grace, either it has some potency for receiving grace, or it does not. If it does not have a potency for this: therefore it will never receive it. But if it has a potency by the mediation of which it receives, either that will be reason, or will, or some other potency diverse from these; but there is no positing another potency in the soul besides the cognitive and the affective: therefore it seems that grace is received by the soul by the mediation of these.

8. Likewise, if grace were present to the soul according to substance, since it is possible to abstract the substance from the potencies by the intellect, it would be possible to understand the soul to be pleasing, with its potencies abstracted; but every pleasing soul is disposed to glory: therefore consequently a glorious soul could be understood with the potencies abstracted. But with the potencies abstracted, the soul neither sees nor loves God: therefore it is impossible to posit a glorious soul that neither sees God nor loves God. But if this is impossible: therefore also that from which this follows.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice, and is said to regard the substance because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the common opinion holds that grace first regards the substance of the soul, and the virtues first regard the potencies, so that thus through grace in the virtues there comes about the reformation of the created image, which consists in the trinity of potencies and the unity of substance. But this position can be understood in two ways.

In one way, so that it be understood that God first infuses grace into the essence, and afterward that influence overflows in the substance into the potencies, so that thus there is a conformity of grace to the soul, whether it be considered according to the account of the image, or considered as the perfection of the body. For the soul, as it is the perfection of the body, by reason of its substance or essence regards the balance of the complexion; but by reason of the potencies it regards the diversity of the organs. And again, the soul in itself both has *to live* and *to act*; but *to live* through itself and its own form, *to act* through a potency. In this way, if grace in perfecting is conformed to the soul, under the account of grace it ought first to regard the very substance of the soul, and through the virtues there ought to be the perfection of the potencies. And according to this manner of speaking, when *grace* is said to regard the substance, and the *virtues* the potencies, this is understood to be said not only by appropriation, but even by propriety.

In another way the aforesaid position can be understood by a certain appropriation, not because God first infuses grace into the substance rather than into a potency, but because, since the soul receives grace and the virtues by the mediation of a potency, and both grace and virtue are present to the soul through a potency, yet the one and the other are present in different ways. For *virtue* expresses perfection with respect to a work, but *grace* expresses perfection with respect to God who accepts. And since with respect to works the potencies are distinguished, hence it is that the virtues regard the potencies as distinct, and are then in act when the potencies are in act. But the potencies, inasmuch as they are compared to God who accepts, are accepted by a single acceptance together with the very substance whose they are, and according to one nature found in them. And hence it is that grace is one, just as the substance is, and is always in continuous act; and it is said first to regard the substance, not because it is in it apart from a potency, or prior to being in the potency, but because it has being in the potencies as they are continued into one essence. But *virtue* is said to be in the potencies because it is in them as they are referred to diverse operations.

And this manner of understanding is more consonant with the words of Augustine, who says that «grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse»; who also describes cooperating and operating grace by comparison to the will. — It is also more consonant with reason. For if we understand grace as a certain habit and influence, which is present to the soul turned to God; since such an enabling and the reception of the influence and the conversion cannot be understood except through a potency, it does not seem that it can rightly be understood how grace is in the soul with the potency abstracted. — Again, if grace is called grace because it makes pleasing, and by the very fact that it makes pleasing it has an opposition to fault; since «opposites are by nature present according to the same thing», according to the same very thing the soul is by nature made pleasing, according to which it is by nature also faulted. But faulting and praise and blame are present to the soul first according to free choice, and through this so too is the gift of grace. For not just any acceptance is called a making-pleasing, but only that by which God so accepts the soul that He reckons it worthy of reward, and such [acceptance] regards the very freedom of choice. And therefore grace is present to the soul first according to the freedom of choice; and a sign of this is that it extends itself to those potencies alone to which the freedom of choice extends itself. — The reasons showing that grace is present to the soul according to the potencies are therefore to be granted. But to the reasons to the contrary it is easy to respond through what has already been said.

1. As for what is objected, that grace is continuous in its act; this does not stand against what has now been said. For although a potency in relation to a work is not in its continuous act, and thus is not perfected by *grace* but by *virtue*; nevertheless in comparison to the substance in which it is, it is in its continuous act. For thus a certain *living* and a certain continuous act is owed to the potencies themselves, insofar as they are continued to the substance itself, just as also to the substance itself; and therefore according to this comparison they are perfectible by grace. — It could also be said here in another way, that the act of the form itself is twofold: one, which is from the form by way of *informing*; and another, which is from the form by way of *efficiency*, as whiteness whitens its subject and dilates the eye. As to the first, every form is in continuous act, because that is the act as a habit; but as to the second, not.

So too grace, although it is in its continuous act as to that act which it has by way of *informing*, is nevertheless not in continuous act as to that which it has by way of *prevenient* and *subsequent*, or *cooperating* and *operating*.

2. To what is objected concerning the act of vivifying, it must be said that although life, according as it expresses the first being, first regards the essence itself rather than a potency; nevertheless this need not hold of life according as it expresses the second being. For since it is an accident superadded not only to the essence but also to the potency, it is present to the soul by the mediation of a potency, as color is said to be in the body, in such a way that it is first in the surface.

3. To what is objected, that an accident is numbered by its subject; it must be said that this is true when those things that are subjected are diverse and are subjected as diverse. But when they are subjected through the same nature, there need be no diversity in the accident; and thus grace is in the potencies of the soul inasmuch as they are continued into one substance, and inasmuch as they share in the freedom of choice, as was said before. Hence, just as one health is said to be in all the members of a man because it is in them according as they are reduced to one origin, and according as they agree in complexion; so too it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

4. To what is objected concerning the conformity of the image of creation and of reformation, it must be said that since the deformation of the image cannot be except through the potencies, so neither can the reformation; and therefore the image of reformation as such sufficiently reforms the soul itself when it is present to it through its potencies. For when the potencies are formed and perfected, consequently the substance itself is also perfected and formed. Therefore for the perfect reformation of the soul there is no need to posit something that is prior in the substance rather than in a potency, unless this be said by a certain appropriation.

5. To what is objected, that God does not accept an act unless first accepting the potency; it must be said that it is not similar, because a potency can be without act, and grace [can be] in a potency without the merit of a work. But the substance cannot be without a potency; and even if it could be understood [so], yet it cannot be understood to receive the divine gifts apart from the potencies, in which gifts the face of the soul is said to be adorned by that kind of adornment by which God accepts.

6. To the last [objection] which is raised concerning infants, it must be said that although the potencies in an infant are not fit for going forth into the use of grace and the virtues; nevertheless they are fit to be adorned and perfected not only by the gift of grace, but also by the habits of the virtues. And this is better explained in the fourth [book], where the effect of baptism, which it has in infants, is treated.