Dist. 26, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says: *The will is a motion of the soul toward attaining something*, etc. For, as the Philosopher says: «He errs who defines that which is at rest by that which is in motion»; but the will is a potency: therefore it is ill-defined, when it is said: «The will is a motion of the soul».

— Likewise, to will is more to act than to be acted upon, therefore more to move than to be moved: if therefore motion sounds of passion, it seems that the will ought not to be called a motion of the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Anselm says, "will" is said equivocally of the will-as-instrument, the will-as-affection, and the will-as-use. And Augustine does not here define the will as it is taken for the potency, but as it is taken for the use. — And if you ask, why he rather defines the will as it is taken for *use* than for *potency*? the reason for this is that potencies are made known through their acts, and therefore, once the will-as-use is known, the will-as-potency is consequently known. — To that which is objected, that the use of the will is not a passion but an action, and so ought not to be called a motion; it must be said that motion is not taken only passively, but indeed is also taken actively; and moreover all the actions of the soul are in a certain way passions.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *grace, going before and preparing the will, is faith with love*. For it seems that this notification of grace is not fitting. For since grace and virtue have diverse notifications, it does not seem that the one should be made known through the other. — Likewise, since grace places in the soul not only faith and charity, but also hope; it seems that the Master speaks insufficiently, when he says that it is faith with love.

Alongside this it is asked: since the diverse definitions and notifications of grace are assigned in diverse ways, in respect of what is the ground and distinction of these taken?

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master, in that word, does not intend to make grace, which makes-pleasing, known as to its *essence*, but he intends to make it known as it were *through what is posterior* and in a certain way *through its effect*. For since habits are known through their acts, and the act of grace is twofold according to the twofold potency, namely according to the intellect and the affection: therefore through these grace is made known. And because grace does not go forth into those acts except through the mediating habits of the virtues, namely of faith and charity, therefore he, making grace known, says that grace is nothing other than faith with love, for the reason that through these two habits the soul has its going-forth into the acts through which grace becomes known to us.

But to that which is asked about the plurality of definitions, it must be said that grace may be compared to its *principle*, may be compared to its *subject*, may be compared to its *opposite*, may be compared to its *effect*, and may also be compared to its *reward*; and according to these diverse comparisons diverse notifications of it are found.

According to the comparison to its *principle* there is that of Isidore: «Grace is the gift of the divine mercy, through which there is the going-forth of a good will». — But by the comparison to its *subject*, there is that which is given upon that word of the Psalm: *That he may make glad the face with oil*: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for procuring holy love». — By the comparison to its *opposite*, there is that which is given in the Glosses upon the Epistles: «Grace is justification and the remission of sins». — By the comparison to its *effect*, there is that of Chrysostom: «Grace is the health of the mind and the delight of the heart». — But by the comparison to its *reward*, there is that: Grace is the likeness of glory. — And according to all these comparisons there is thus assigned one magisterial definition, which is as follows: Grace is a form, given freely by God without

merits, making the one who has it pleasing and rendering his work good. But there is also found another notification of grace, by which it is said: Grace is the manifestation of the spirit unto profit, which is taken from that which is said in the first to the Corinthians, the twelfth chapter: *To each is given the manifestation of the spirit* etc.; but this is the notification of grace freely given.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *The faith by which you have been justified has been freely given to you.* For from this Augustine, and the Master, seem to wish to say that justification comes about through the mediation of faith; but the contrary of this is the case, because the justification of the soul is from the same source as is its vivification. But vivification is from grace itself; for faith without grace does not vivify, but rather is dead: therefore it does not seem that justification is from faith, but from grace. If you say that he attributes justification to faith by reason of the adjoined grace; it is asked: why does he not attribute it to another virtue, as to faith? — Likewise, it is asked: what is it that he says, that *faith obtains justification*? Either he understands it of unformed faith, or of formed. Not of unformed, because through it we merit nothing and obtain nothing. If of formed, this cannot be soundly understood. For no one has formed faith, unless he is justified.

**I respond:** It must be said that justification can be spoken of in two ways. In one way justification is called the infusion of justice; in another way justification is called the exercise in justice. But according as justification is called *the exercise in justice*, thus the word of the Master, indeed of Augustine, is true and plain. For no one is exercised in justice except by the mediation of faith working through love; and this is said to obtain justification, that is, the advance of justice, which follows from the multiplication of good works and merits, which does not happen to be without faith and charity. For without faith, as it is said to the Hebrews, the eleventh chapter, *it is impossible to please God*; and without charity it is likewise impossible, as it is said in the first to the Corinthians, the thirteenth chapter. — But if justification be called *the infusion of justice*, thus it still has truth, although not so plainly. For either there is an infusion of justice in an infant, or in an adult. If in an infant; thus it is said to be a justification through a faith not its own, but of the parents, or of the whole Church, as Augustine says to Boniface. But if there be justification in an adult; thus, since four things concur to justification, namely *the infusion of grace, contrition, the motion of free choice*, and *the remission of sin*, as the masters say; and the motion of free choice is a motion which pertains to the virtue of faith: it is not unfittingly said that the adult *is justified through faith*; nor does it stand against this, that he is justified *through grace*. For those four are necessarily required for the justification of the impious; and therefore sometimes a man is said to be justified by *grace*, sometimes by *faith*, sometimes by *penance*, because the remission of sin presupposes those three. And by this the objections are clear. For these things are better explained in the fourth book, the seventeenth distinction.

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