Dist. 26
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/26/q/bon-sent-II-d26-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXVI.

#### Cap. I.

#### *On operating and cooperating grace.*

This is operating and cooperating grace; for operating grace prepares the will of man, that he may will the good, while cooperating grace assists, lest he will in vain. Hence Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*: « By cooperating, God perfects in us what He begins by operating, since He Himself, that we may will, operates as the one beginning, who cooperates with those willing as the one perfecting ». « Therefore that we may will, He operates; but when we will, and so will that we may bring it to perfection, He cooperates with us; yet without Him, whether operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety ». — Behold, by these words it is sufficiently disclosed what *operating* grace is, and what *cooperating* grace is. For operating grace is that which precedes the good will; for by it the will of man is freed and prepared, that it may be good and may effectively will the good. But cooperating grace follows the will already good by assisting it. Hence Augustine against the heretic Julian, who said that good will is from free choice alone, and asserted that man through free choice can will and work the good without grace, says: The Apostle put forth a manifest sentence concerning the commendation of grace, when he said: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy*. « If you had attended to this, Julian, you would not have extended the merits of the human will against grace. For God does not show mercy to anyone because he willed and ran; but he willed and ran because God showed mercy. For the will of man is prepared by God, and the steps of man are directed by the Lord. And therefore he fittingly says: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy* »; « not because this is done without our will, but because our will does nothing good unless it is divinely assisted ». Hence elsewhere: « The Apostle says: *Not I, however, but the grace of God with me*. He does not say this because he was doing no good; but because he would do no good if it did not assist him ». — By these testimonies it is openly intimated that the will of man is preceded and prepared by the grace of God, that it may become *good*, not that it may become *will*, since the will existed even before grace, but it was not a good and right will.

#### Cap. II.

#### *What the will is.*

Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls* defines the will itself thus: « The will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward not admitting something, or toward attaining it ». But this, that it may not admit evil and may attain the good, is preceded and prepared by the grace of God. Hence the Apostle, commending preceding and subsequent grace, that is, operating and cooperating, said watchfully: « *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy*; and not conversely, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of him who wills and runs. For if, as it pleased some, what is said be taken thus: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, as if it were said: the will of man alone does not suffice, if there be not also the mercy of God; on the contrary it is said, neither does the mercy of God suffice, if there be not the will of man. And through this, if that was rightly said, that the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not also conversely rightly said: it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, since the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it »? « For man will not be able to believe or to hope, unless he wills, nor to attain the palm, unless he runs by his will ». « It remains therefore that it be rightly understood thus, that the whole be given to God, who precedes and prepares the good will of man to be assisted, and assists it when prepared, precedes the unwilling that he may will, follows the willing, lest he will in vain ». — Behold, by these words and the others set forth before, it is evidently handed down that the will of man is prepared and preceded by the grace of God, that it may will the good, and is assisted, lest it will in vain.

And so good will accompanies grace, not grace the will. Hence Augustine, writing to Pope Boniface against the Pelagians, says: « When faith obtains justification, just as God has apportioned to each one the measure of faith, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but it itself merits to be increased, that increased it may merit also to be perfected, with the will accompanying, not leading, following at heel, not going before ». — Behold, here you have it expressly that grace precedes the merit of the good will, and the good will itself follows at the heel of grace, not before it.

#### Cap. III.

#### *What the grace is that precedes the good will.*

And if you attend diligently, there is nonetheless shown to you what this grace is that precedes and prepares the will, namely faith with love. And therefore Augustine in the same place, treating how we are justified by faith and yet freely — for the Apostle says both, who says: *Justified by faith*, and elsewhere says: *Justified freely by grace* — said this, he says, for this reason, « lest faith itself be proud, lest it say to itself: if we are justified by faith,

how freely? For what faith merits, why is it not rather repaid than given? Let not the faithful man say this, for when he has said: I have faith, that I may merit justification, it is answered to him: *What have you that you have not received* »? For the faith by which you are justified was given to you freely. — Here it is openly shown that faith is the cause of justification, and it itself is the grace and benefit by which the will of man is preceded and prepared. Hence Augustine in the first book of the *Retractations*: « The will is that by which both one sins and one lives rightly. But the will itself, unless it is freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which it has been made the servant of sin, and is assisted that it may overcome vices, cannot be made to live rightly and piously by mortals; and this benefit, by which it is freed, unless it preceded it, would already be given to merits and would not be grace, which surely is given freely ». — Therefore the good will of man is preceded by that benefit of grace, by which it is freed and prepared. And that benefit is rightly understood to be the faith of Christ, as Augustine in the *Enchiridion* evidently shows, saying: « Choice itself must be freed after that ruin from the servitude of sin. And not at all by itself, but by the grace of God alone, which is placed in the faith of Christ, is it freed, that the will itself may be prepared ». — Behold, he says openly that the grace by which choice is freed and the will is prepared is placed in the faith of Christ. « For the faith of Christ, as he says in the same place, obtains what the law commands ».

#### Cap. IV.

#### *That the good will, which is preceded by grace, precedes certain gifts of God.*

Yet that same will precedes certain gifts of grace. Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « The good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all; but those which it does not itself precede, in these it both is and itself assists; for both are read in the holy Scriptures: *And his mercy will go before me* — *And his mercy will follow me*. For it precedes the unwilling, that he may will; it follows the willing, lest he will in vain. For why are we admonished to pray for our enemies who are unwilling to live piously, except that God may work in them also the willing? And likewise, why are we admonished to ask, that we may receive, except that by Him from whom it was made that we will, may be made that which we will »? « Hence the Apostle says: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy* ». — From these it appears that the good will of man precedes certain gifts of God, because assisting grace accompanies it; and by certain ones it is preceded, because operating grace precedes it, namely faith with love.

Yet it must not be ignored that elsewhere Augustine seems to signify that faith is from the will, concerning that word of the Apostle, namely: *With the heart it is believed unto justice*, treating thus upon John: « For this reason the Apostle does not say simply *it is believed*, but *with the heart it is believed*, because other things a man can do unwilling, but believe only willing; to enter the church and to approach the altar he can do unwilling, but not to believe ». Likewise upon Genesis, where Laban and Bathuel said: *Let us call the girl and ask her will*, the expositor says: « Because faith is of the will, not of necessity ». — Responding to which we say that these are not to be so taken that faith be understood to come forth from the will of man, since it itself is properly *the gift of God*, as the Apostle says, and from it the good merits of man begin. For through it, as Augustine says upon the sixty-seventh Psalm, « the impious is justified, that is, from impious he is made pious, that thereafter faith itself may begin to work through love; whence all good merits begin ». But rather these things were said thus because there is no faith except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes, not in time, but in cause and nature. Hence Augustine above fittingly said that the good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself assists; because it assists those by whom it is preceded, while it consents with them to the effect of the good, and is in them, because in time it is not preceded by them.

Furthermore, the words of Augustine which he uses in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, treating that word of the Apostle, sharpen and press this question more: « *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves*. Let them attend, he says, here, and let them weigh these words, who think that the beginning of faith is of us, and the supplement of faith is of God. For, commending that grace which is not given according to any merits, but effects all good merits, he says: *Not that we are sufficient to think anything good*, namely of ourselves. But who does not see that to think is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it must be believed. If therefore to think the good is not of us, as the Apostle here hands down, neither is to believe; although to believe itself is nothing other than to think with the assent of the mind ». — Here he seems to intimate that good thought precedes faith, and so that good will precedes faith, and is not preceded; which seems to be opposed to what was said before. — To this, however, we say that sometimes good thought or will precedes faith, but that is not the good will or thought by which one lives rightly. For that does not exist without faith and love. For as Augustine says to Anastasius, « without the Spirit the will of man is not free, since it is overcome by desires », « it is not free toward the good, unless it has been freed ». But it is not freed unless through the *Holy Spirit* love is poured forth in hearts. The will is not free unless grace frees it *through the law of faith*, that is, it is not free

without faith working through love; and that will is sufficiently and truly good. « For there is no good fruit which does not rise from the root of love. But if there is present faith working through love, the delight of the good comes about ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *That thought of the good precedes faith.*

But that thought or will which precedes faith and love and the other justifications does not suffice for salvation, nor is one made to live rightly by it. By this will is desired that good will which is a great good, but this latter is not. Therefore that will or thought is one thing, this is another.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *That the intellect precedes both thought of the good and delight.*

And just as that precedes this, so the intellect precedes that. Hence Augustine, distinguishing these, treating upon that place of the one hundred eighteenth Psalm *My soul has desired to long for thy justifications*, says: « *It has desired to long for*, he says, *it has not longed for* ». « For we sometimes see by reason how useful the justifications of God are; but hindered by infirmity, sometimes we do not long for them. Therefore the intellect flies ahead, there follows a slow affection or none; we know the good, and it does not delight to do it, and we desire that it may delight. So this one once longed to desire the things which he discerned to be good, desiring to have the delight of those things whose ground he could see ». « It shows therefore by what steps, as it were, one arrives at them: for first it is, that they be *seen* how useful and honorable they are; then, that their desire be *longed for*; lastly, that, grace advancing, the working of those things *delight*, whose ground alone used to delight ». — Attend to this order of graces, which Augustine here distinctly assigns, namely how the intellect of good things precedes the longing for them, and the longing itself the delight, which comes about through faith and love; which once had, the will is truly good, by which one lives rightly, and is itself the companion of faith, not its forerunner.

#### Cap. VII.

#### *Whether through free choice man works the good without grace.*

He who considers the aforementioned words of Augustine according to this distinction observes that there will be no contradiction there, not being ignorant that, even before preceding and operating grace, by which good will is prepared in man, there precede certain goods from the grace of God and free choice, and certain ones also from free choice alone, by which, however, he merits neither life nor the grace by which he is justified. « *For of that grace which is to be received, which heals the will of man, that healed it may fulfill the law, no merits precede* ». For it is that by which the impious is justified, that is, made just, who before was impious; « but to the merits of the impious not grace, but punishment is owed; nor would this be grace, if it were not given gratuitously ». But it is given gratuitously, because we had done nothing good beforehand whereby we might merit this. We do not deny, however, that many goods are done by man before this grace and apart from this grace through free choice, as Augustine hands down in the *Responses against the Pelagians*, where he says that men through free choice till fields, build houses, and do many other goods without cooperating grace.

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