Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/27/q/bon-sent-II-d27-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether grace that makes pleasing and glory differ essentially.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning grace in comparison to glory, and the question is whether they differ by essence.

And that they do so seems to be the case.

1. Grace that makes pleasing, though it is not faith, nevertheless is never without faith, because *without faith it is impossible to please God*; but glory in no way coexists with faith: therefore it is necessary that grace and glory differ by essence.

2. Likewise, grace that makes pleasing stands to glory as the way to the terminus, and as that which is ordered to the end to the end. If, then, the terminus is necessarily distinguished from the way, and the end from that which is ordered to the end, by an essential distinction; by parity of reasoning it seems that grace and glory [are too].

3. Likewise, as fault stands to punishment, so grace stands to reward; but fault and eternal punishment differ essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning grace and glory [do too].

4. Likewise, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ by essence; but grace is corruptible and losable, as was shown above, whereas glory is altogether incorruptible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which is knowable by the one who has it differs by essence from that which is not knowable; but glory is known by everyone who has it — for no one is glorious who does not know himself to be glorious — grace is not: therefore it differs by essence from glory.

**On the contrary:**

1. As the charity of the way stands to the charity of the homeland, so grace stands to glory; but the charity of the way does not differ by essence from the charity of the homeland, for as it is said in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen, *charity never falls away:* therefore by parity of reasoning grace [does not differ] from glory.

2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception had glory and had grace; but that grace which he had was for knowing and loving God — for as soon as he was conceived, he knew and loved with the knowledge and love of comprehension — therefore in him grace did not differ from glory.

3. Likewise, the perfect and the imperfect do not vary a thing according to essence; but grace bespeaks the assimilation of the soul to God according to the state of imperfection, whereas glory [bespeaks it] according to the state of perfection: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, either glory renders [the soul] acceptable to God, or it does not. If it does not: then glory does not please God as much as grace does, and so neither does the state of the homeland [please him] as much as the state of the way; which is unfitting. If it does: then, since this is the proper act of grace, it is necessary that glory be grace.

5. Likewise, when someone passes from grace to glory, either he loses grace, or he does not. If he loses grace: then it seems that he ceases to be pleasing to God, and that glory and grace have a mutual repugnance; both of which are false. If he does not lose it, since grace is the life of the soul, as was shown above, and in one soul there is only one life; either glory will not be life, or grace and glory will be the same by essence. But it is established that glory is life: therefore etc.

The question therefore is how grace stands to glory. For if they are the same, how is the passage made from the one to the other, and why do they obtain different names? But if they are different, why is glory called grace? And whence too is this diversity, since the divine grace befits every state, whether the state of the way or the state of the homeland? For God accepts both.

> **Conclusion.** Grace and glory do not differ according to essence, but both according to the states that succeed one another, and according to a different comparison.

**I respond:** It must be said that both grace that makes pleasing and glory name the divine influence by which the soul has God, and God dwells in the soul. Now to have [God] happens in two ways: either perfectly, and thus a man has God under the character of one at rest; or half-fully, and thus a man has God under the character of one tending toward [him]. The first, namely rest, belongs to the state of the homeland; the second, namely tending, belongs to the state of the way; and therefore the first is of glory, the second is of grace. And because the first is of reward, the second is of merit; therefore to grace is attributed the act of meriting, but to glory the act of reigning. Since, then, the same thing can be by essence more perfect and less perfect; hence it is that grace and glory, insofar as they are distinguished according to the mode of having God, differ only according to state. — And since *our having God* is nothing other than *God's dwelling in us;* therefore grace and glory are distinguished not only according to the mode of having God, but also according to the account of God's dwelling in us. Yet when I say that God dwells in a man, I say two things by this, namely the divine condescension, by which he accepts the man and confederates him to himself, and consequently the human exaltation, by which the man excellently participates in those things which are God's. And therefore that influence by which God dwells in us is called grace according to the first comparison, namely insofar as God condescends to the man; and it is called glory as regards the second comparison, namely according to this, that the man is sublimated through that indwelling and ascends to great things. According to this consideration and according to this mode, grace and glory differ only by comparison. Hence eternal life is named glory, and is also named grace, in the letter to the Romans, chapter six: *But the grace of God is eternal life.*

And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For it must be granted that grace that makes pleasing and glory do not differ by essence: but if they differ in any way, this is according to one comparison and another — and thus they are simultaneously in the same [subject], as in the Blessed and in Christ, who are said to have grace and glory — or according to one state and another, insofar as they are present successively in the same [subject], because first grace is present in the state of the way, and afterward glory in the state of the homeland. For first grace is begun, and afterward consummated.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that grace is simultaneous with faith; it must be said that this is by reason of state. For faith, which bespeaks an enigmatic vision, can stand simultaneously with grace according to the state of imperfection; but it cannot stand with grace according to the state of fullness, which excludes everything *that is in part*. Hence from that reasoning it cannot be concluded that grace and glory differ by essence or according to habit, but only according to state.

2. To that which is objected, that grace stands to glory as the way to the terminus; it must be said that this is said by reason of state and of the addition of that which glory superadds to grace, as the perfect is added to the imperfect, when it leads it to completion; and as regards state it is rightly to be granted that there can be a diversity between grace and glory.

3. To that which is objected, that as fault stands to punishment etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because fault is present principally on the part of the soul, whereas punishment [is present] in some part on the part of the body; but grace and glory are present in the soul from the same [source] and according to the same and toward the same, namely in comparison to God. — Yet it could be said that some fault is a punishment, as will be seen below, and so some punishment does not differ from fault, and some does differ; so too in the case of glory. For that [glory] in which the substantial reward consists is the same as grace; but the glory which consists in the stole of the body will be diverse from it.

4. To that which is objected, that the corruptible and the incorruptible vary essence; it must be said that this does not hold except where corruptibility and incorruptibility come from the nature of the constituent principles. But this is not so in the case at hand, because the immutability of glory comes from above, whereas the corruptibility of grace [comes] from below, namely from the mutability of free choice.

5. To that which is objected concerning the one who knows, it must be said that this does not conclude to a difference according to essence. For a difference according to state alone can bring it about that what could not be seen before is seen; just as someone does not know his own affection when it is not intense, but when afterward it is intensified, then it is easily detected and known. Likewise, color in darkness is not visible, and in light it is visible, and yet color does not differ essentially; so neither does the diversity of the mode of knowing with respect to grace and glory have [the power] to make them essentially diverse. — And thus the response to all the points sought is clear.