Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/27/q/bon-sent-II-d27-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting.*

Consequently inquiry is made concerning grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace.

Second it is asked, whether one may merit an increase of grace.

Third it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the completion of grace itself, namely the reward of glory.

### Question I. *Whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, through a likeness in bodily things. For a good soldier, by serving valiantly, merits a horse, freely given to him by his lord, through the use of that horse: therefore if the use of a spiritual thing is of such efficacy in meriting a spiritual thing as [the use] of a bodily thing in meriting a bodily thing; it seems that through the good use of grace one may merit the gift of grace already received.

2. Likewise, that which has power for the greater has power for the lesser; but through the use of grace it happens that one merits glory to be had: therefore much more strongly does it happen that one merits grace already had.

3. Likewise, each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another; but the just, in whom there is grace, by praying merit for others their first grace, as Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints*: therefore much more strongly is a man, by using well the gift of grace, made worthy of the habit of grace which he has received. — And that each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another, is proved through what is said upon that text of Matthew the ninth: *Jesus, seeing their faith;* there the Gloss: « How much one's own faith avails for each, if another's availed so much », as if to say: much more.

4. Likewise, as much as petition and prayer for what is to be had pleases God, so much does thanksgiving for what is already had please him; but someone praying out of charity merits

to obtain what he asks, if he asks devoutly and for himself, perseveringly and unto salvation: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who gives thanks devoutly and perseveringly, out of charity, is made worthy of that which he has already received.

5. Likewise, as charity stands to loving, so grace stands to meriting; but through charity it happens not only to love other things, but also charity itself, as Augustine holds, and as was established in the first book: therefore by parity of reasoning, through grace it happens that one merits the very gift of grace.

6. Likewise, there is perfection in the acts and capacities of the soul when the agent is reflected upon itself; for then one understands perfectly, when he understands that he understands: therefore meriting does not seem to be perfect, unless one merits also that through which he merits.

**On the contrary:** 1. Merit and reward are spoken of relatively, as a father is spoken of relatively to a son: therefore just as the same [thing] cannot be the father of itself, so one and the same [thing] cannot be the merit of itself: therefore through grace it does not happen that one merits the gift of grace itself once had.

2. Likewise, merit and reward have an order, as a way and a terminus, and as a disposition with respect to that to which it disposes: therefore it is necessary that merit precede reward either in time or in nature: therefore it is impossible, through grace, to merit the very gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the gratuitous and the owed are opposed; but the more something falls under merit, the more it has the character of the owed: if therefore the use of grace does not take away from grace itself its being a gratuitous gift, but rather adds [to it]; it seems that through the use of grace itself it in no way happens that one merits the gift of grace.

4. Likewise, as much as each thing pleases God, so much is it meritorious; but the use of grace does not please God except on account of grace itself: therefore the use of grace with grace does not merit more than grace by itself. But the gift of grace, by the very fact that it is had, does not merit itself: therefore by parity of reasoning, neither through the use of grace does it happen that one merits the already-had gift of grace.

> **Conclusion.** Through the subsequent use of grace one cannot merit the preceding habit of grace, neither by the merit of congruity nor by the merit of condignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that through the subsequent use of grace it does not happen that one merits the preceding habit of grace, neither as to the merit of congruity nor as to the merit of condignity. — Not as to the merit of congruity, for the reason that the use of grace is not compared to the habit itself as merit to reward; both because it is not ordered to meriting the habit itself, but to something else; and also because it does not have to be ordered to it, except as to its foundation and origin. But every merit, whether of congruity or of condignity, is ordered to reward as a kind of way and preparatory disposition. — Much less does it happen, as to the merit of condignity, that through the use of grace one merits the very gift of grace, which is the principle of that very use; both because grace itself, as to its first character and primary infusion, has the character of the gratuitous in such a way that it in no way admits the character of the owed — for if it were from merits, it would no longer be grace — and also because, if the use of grace were to merit grace itself, the more one used it well, the less he would be bound to be grateful to God for it. And if this is repugnant to the perfection of merit, it is plain that grace cannot be merited, neither by the merit of condignity, because then the perfection of grace and the perfection of merit would be taken away; nor by the merit of congruity, because the order which ought to be observed between merit and reward is not preserved there. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected first to the contrary, concerning the likeness of merit in bodily things, it must be said that it is not alike, because a horse, as to its own character, does not bespeak the character of the gratuitous; therefore, with its character preserved, one can merit it even when already had. But the first gift of grace, by the very fact that it is such, bespeaks something simply gratuitous; therefore whatever a man may do, he never merits it, not only because it is already had, but because it is gratuitous. Hence even if some have said that it happens that one merits glory already had, as in the Angels; nevertheless I do not believe that any who rightly understand have held that it happens that one merits grace already had.

2. To that which is objected, that if something has power for the greater, it has power for the lesser; it must be said that this does not hold true, except when something is ordered to the greater and to the lesser by a like ordering; but it is not so in the case at hand. For the use of grace is ordered to meriting glory, not to meriting grace, for the reason that it presupposes it as a foundation.

3. To that which is objected, that someone merits for another the first grace; it must be said that it is not alike;

first, because the grace in the just man preceded the grace to be infused into the sinner, whereas the use of grace in the same man has to follow the gratuitous gift itself. *Furthermore,* when someone merits grace for another, the gift of grace does not on this account lose the character of the gratuitous, since the character of the gratuitous is regarded in the habit of grace in comparison to him to whom it is given. But however much a just man may pray for a sinner, that the habit making [him] pleasing be given to the sinner, it cannot be without the gratuitous liberality of the divine mercy. And therefore it does not follow that, if one can merit for another grace to be had, that he can merit for himself grace already had. — And as to what is said, that one's own faith avails more for each than another's faith, this is understood with respect to the merit of one's own grace.

4. To that which is objected, that thanksgiving is as effective for what is had as prayer for what is to be had; it must be said that even if thanksgiving is as acceptable to God for the past as prayer for the future; nevertheless from this it does not follow that thanksgiving is ordered to meriting what is already had, for the reason that thanksgiving itself and praise for benefits received holds more the character of reward than the character of merit. But if it holds the character of merit, it is ordered, out of divine liberality, rather to meriting the gift than to meriting what is already had.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of charity to love, and of grace to merit, it must be said that it is not alike. For merit, of its own character, implies order and relation, but love implies the act of a power not bound to matter; and because the same [thing] does not have to be referred and ordered to itself, but the act of a power not bound to matter has [the power] to reflect upon itself; hence it is that love happens to be loved, but merit does not happen to be merited.

6. And through this the response to that which was objected last is clear. For that [argument] does not have truth in those acts which indeed imply relation and order and together with this some imperfection; but the act of meriting, with respect to the glorious act, bespeaks some imperfection and order and relation, as was shown before; and therefore that [argument] does not avail.