Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/27/q/bon-sent-II-d27-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited.*

Secondly it is asked, whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited. And that it does, it seems:

1. *First*, through Augustine *to Boniface*: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason. Everyone having grace has whence he can advance in merit; but advancement in merit is only through an increase of grace: therefore grace can merit its own increase.

3. Likewise, one sinning by one kind of sin merits to fall into another kind of sin, whence he becomes worse, just as one sinning by the sin of pride merits to fall into the sin of lust: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who uses grace well through the exercise of good works seems to merit that an increase of grace be made for him.

4. Likewise, more praiseworthy is he who extends himself to a work of perfection with less help than he who extends himself with more: therefore if one having lesser grace raises himself to works of equal perfection with one who has more, it seems that he has to merit as much or more with God: therefore if recompense is given to none except according to the quantity of grace, it seems that such a one merits an increase in grace.

5. Likewise, he who asks *piously*, *perseveringly*, *for himself*, and *unto salvation*, merits to be heard; but he who asks for an increase of grace continually asks in this way: therefore it seems that an increase of grace is merited.

**On the contrary:** 1. There is no merit with respect to that which is altogether impossible; but grace, since it is a simple form, to be increased is impossible: therefore it is impossible to merit an increase of grace.

2. Likewise, there is no merit with respect to that which is in us, but with respect to what is from another; but one having grace

through the power of what he has, can advance into the good; for he not only has whence he can stand, as Augustine says, but also whence he can advance. If therefore the advancement of grace consists in its increase; just as the advancement of grace is in its own power, so it seems that its increase is too: therefore merit does not seem to concur to this.

3. Likewise, nothing is increased except by a thing of the same genus and nature; but grace, which is first given, as far as is of its own nature, is so gratuitous that it does not fall under merit, as was shown above, and Augustine says in the fourth book *On the Trinity*: « What is rendered for merits is not grace ». If therefore it does not happen that the gift of grace itself is merited, it does not happen that the increase of grace itself is merited.

4. Likewise, God recompenses a work according to the quantity of its root: therefore one merits only as much through a gratuitous work as is that grace from which the work proceeds; if therefore the increased grace exceeds that, it seems that lesser grace cannot, through its own work, merit its own increase.

5. Likewise, if anyone merits an increase, then if God did not increase grace for him, He would be unjust; and when He increases it, that work is recompensed: therefore it seems that that work would not be worthy of the recompense of glory. If therefore this is false and impossible, that through an increase of grace the efficacy of meriting glory be taken away; it is impossible to hold that an increase of grace happens to be merited.

### Conclusion

> A man can merit an increase of grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says, it is without doubt to be held that grace merits to be increased. — But what is the mode of increasing, and the mode of meriting, is difficult to assign. — For since there are many modes of increasing, which of them belongs to grace is not easy to discern. For it happens that something is increased by *unmixing* with its contrary, as it is said that « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black ». It happens nonetheless that something is increased on account of this, that a greater *succeeds* to a lesser, as the days are said to increase. It happens also that something is increased on account of the *aggregation* of many, as light is increased in the air on account of a multitude of candles, from whose concurrence there comes to be an aggregation of lights. It happens also that something is increased by *addition*, as a body is increased by nourishment. It happens also that something is increased by the *magnification* of the thing in itself, as the rib was increased when Eve was made from it, and as the five loaves were increased when from them five thousand men were fed. It happens also in a sixth mode, that something is increased by *approach* to its highest, as something is said to be more beautiful and more luminous which approaches more to the perfection of beauty and of light.

By all these six modes some have said that grace is increased. But the first three modes can be disproved easily, and in the first book, distinction seventeen, they were disproved in some manner, when grace was treated of the increase of charity. For in the same way both charity and grace have to be increased. — But the three following modes are sufficiently fitting and cannot be disproved easily. The first of them, however, is more famous, for the reason that it accords more with the authorities of the Saints, which seem to say that in the increase of grace a new grace is infused, when they speak of the diverse efficacy of the Sacraments. But in what manner this mode can be sustained was said in the first book, distinction seventeen. But the last mode is not less intelligible than any of the foregoing; nay, according to this mode of speaking the objections which are made against an increase of grace can more easily be set aside. For although increase by apposition seems to be repugnant to simple things, especially since in spiritual things the more simple a thing is, the greater it is in power; nevertheless increase by approach to the highest seems very consonant with them. — But by whichever of these three following modes it be said, no great force is to be put upon it, but, holding for certain that the grace of God can be increased in us, we ought to labor that it be increased in us through good works. For through them, as Augustine says, « it merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

But the mode of meriting an increase of grace we can see thus. For it happens that something is merited *congruously* (*ex congruo*), and it happens that something is merited *condignly* (*ex condigno*). Then there is merit from condignity, when the account of merit is found there perfectly and fully; and then there is a certain commensuration and adequation of the merit to the reward. And because this cannot be when grace is increased; hence it is that one cannot merit an increase of grace by the merit of con-

dignity; if therefore it happens that the increase of grace itself is merited, this is by the merit of congruity. But the merit of congruity is said to be that in which there is some disposition of congruity with respect to that to which that disposition is ordered, which nevertheless falls short of the account of condignity. And this can be in a threefold manner. For either there is congruity without worthiness; and thus a sinner, through good works in their kind, done outside charity, merits congruously the first grace; for there is a certain congruity, because he does what is in him; there is not, however, condignity, because he is an enemy of God and unworthy of the bread on which he feeds. Or there is worthiness with unworthiness, as is the case when a just man merits the first grace for a sinner: for there is worthiness on the part of the just man, who is a friend of God and worthy to be heard by God, but there is unworthiness on the part of the sinner; and therefore the full account of merit is not there. Or there is worthiness with inferiority of degree; and thus one having lesser grace merits, through good use, to arrive at the fullness of grace; and this mode of meriting, even though it falls short of the merit of condignity and is contained under the merit of congruity, nevertheless, among the other aforesaid modes, approaches most to the perfection of merit, and therefore holds, as it were, a middle between the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity. — From the foregoing, therefore, it can be had how grace is increased, and also how it merits to be increased. Hence the authorities and reasons showing that grace merits to be increased are to be granted.

1. *To that* which is objected on the contrary, that since it is simple, it cannot be increased; it must be said, either that grace is not altogether simple, but only by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of bulk, not however by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of power; and as regards such a genus of parts there is increase for it, not as regards the first. Or it can be said, according to the last mode of speaking, that the increase which is attended to by approach to the highest does not posit composition, but a certain perfection of greater simplicity and unity; and therefore it is not repugnant to grace by reason of the simplicity of its essence.

2. *To that* which is objected, that the advancement is in the power of grace; it must be said that there is a certain accidental advancement, namely that which is attended to in the intensity of fervor, or in the rootedness of the habit, or in the multiplication of works; and this advancement is in the power of grace; and according to this advancement grace is not properly said to be increased, because a man is not made worthy of a greater substantial reward through it. But there is another advancement, which regards the substantial reward, according to which a man is said worthy of a greater reward; and this is not in the power of grace, but in the sole power of Him whose it is to infuse grace; and therefore grace is said not to make this, but to merit it: and it is in regard to this effect that the increase of grace is attended to.

3. *To that* which is objected, that the increase of grace is of the same genus as the grace first given; it must be said that, although it is of the same nature as regards the account of *habit*, there is nevertheless a difference as regards *state*, for the reason that it supposes the beginning of grace. And because it is of the same genus as the grace first given, therefore it cannot be merited by the merit of condignity, but by the merit of congruity. But because it presupposes grace, with greater congruity does one merit the increase of grace than the beginning of grace, as was said above.

4. 5. *To that* which is objected, that recompense is attended to according to the quantity of the root; it must be answered that that is understood in the merit of condignity; in the merit of congruity, however, it has no place. And by this mode also it must be answered to that which it objects in the last place.