Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/27/q/bon-sent-II-d27-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether through grace it happens that one merits its completion.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it happens through grace that one merits its completion, that is, the very reward of glory, and this as regards the merit of *condignity*, since concerning the merit of *congruity* there is no doubt. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Second to Timothy, chapter four: *For the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.* If therefore what is rendered according to justice is owed to merits, and with respect to it merit went before; therefore if such a crown, which the Apostle was awaiting, is the reward of glory, it seems that it happens that one merits it through the gift of grace.

2. Likewise, Zachariah, chapter four: *He will make grace equal to grace*; and the Saints and doctors expound that he will make the grace of the fatherland equal to the grace of the way. And this is had more expressly in Matthew, chapter seven: *With what measure you have measured, it shall be measured back to you.* If therefore where there is an equating of merit and reward, there it happens that the merit of condignity is found; it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, as guilt stands to punishment, so grace stands to glory; but through guilt one merits eternal damnation from condignity: therefore, conversely, through grace one merits eternal beatitude from condignity.

4. Likewise, he who conquers the adversary is equally worthy of honor and glory as he who is conquered is worthy of ignominy: if therefore he who allows himself to be overcome by the devil is worthy of eternal reproach; it seems that he who conquers merits from condignity the kingdom above.

5. Likewise, either through the service which a man does to God he merits something, or nothing. If nothing: then he is foolish who serves God. If something: since the reward is of greater dignity than the merit, and nothing is more excellent than grace except glory, and a meritorious work cannot be sufficiently rewarded by anything except by glory; therefore, speaking of the merit of condignity, it happens that one merits glory through grace.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter eight: *The sufferings of this time are not condign [worthy] of the glory to come, which shall be revealed in us*: therefore through them it does not happen that one merits the glory to come by the merit of condignity.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter six: *The wages of sin is death, the grace of God life everlasting*; the Gloss: « He preferred to say, *the grace of God life everlasting*, that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for his mercy's sake, not by our merits »: therefore if he does not lead us by our merits, it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, by reason. No service which is owed, when it is rendered, obligates in anything the one to whom it is done. Hence the Lord in Luke, chapter seventeen: *Which of you having a servant* etc.; but a man owes to God all that he does and all that he can do: therefore it seems that he does not obligate God to render him anything: therefore we merit nothing before God by the merit of condignity.

4. Likewise, no service which is done gratuitously obligates in anything the one to whom it is done; but works done from grace are done gratuitously: therefore they do not obligate the one to whom they are done to make return out of debt, but only out of congruity: therefore the same as before.

5. Likewise, where there is merit from condignity, there is the account of giving and receiving; but God can receive nothing from us, since he has no need of our goods: therefore the reward of glory, which is the most excellent thing, we cannot merit from condignity before God.

### Conclusion.

> Through grace we can merit the reward of glory, not only by the merit of congruity, but also by the merit of condignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this question certain doctors have held diverse views.

For some have wished to say that, because the merit of condignity implies a certain obligation in the one who rewards and a certain commensuration in the service and the recompense; and God cannot be obligated to anyone, and nothing else can be commensurated to the reward of glory: therefore they said that no one can merit heavenly glory from condignity, but if he merits it, this is only from congruity. And to establish this position of theirs they are supported by many authorities of sacred Scripture and also of the expositors, who seem to hold this.

But since in Scripture it is also often found that *God will render to each one according to his works*, and in the parable in which merit and recompense are expressed, in Matthew, chapter twenty, it is said: *Take what is thine* etc., and many like things are found; therefore there is another position, that it happens that glory is merited not only by the merit of congruity — for such merit can be found in grace gratuitously given — but also it happens that it is merited by the merit of condignity, for this reason, that there is a certain commensuration of grace and glory, and a certain obligation falls upon God, not from *necessity*, but from his mere *benignity*, by which he willed to promise and to confirm a covenant with those who would love him, that he would render himself as their reward, as appears in Abraham.

But if we wish to consider which of these manners of speaking is truer; we shall find that according to the diverse comparisons of the meritorious work, both the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity are found in it. For the meritorious work has a comparison to the *principle* from which it proceeds, and to the *end* for which it is done, and to the *state* in which it is done. — If we speak of it by comparison to the *principle*, then the work both has its rise from *free will* and has its rise from *grace*. And insofar as it has its rise from *free will*, it is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*; for thus it is in a certain way ours and is, as it were, of another kind than the reward itself which must be rendered to it. But insofar as it has its rise from *grace*, then, since grace renders a man acceptable to God and is something divine, and is ordered to this, that it may lead to God; that work is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*.

But if we compare the meritorious work to *him for whom* it is done, this can be in two ways: either to the *bounty of the one dispensing*, or to the *truth of the one promising*. If it is compared to the *bounty of the one dispensing*, then it is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*; for on account of the immensity of his liberality it is fitting for him to render a great reward for a slight service. But if it is compared to the *truth of the one promising*, by which he promised and in a certain way voluntarily obligated himself that to so great a work he would render so great a reward; then that work is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*.

But if in a third manner we compare the meritorious work to the *state*, this can be in two ways: either as regards the *opportuneness of the time*, or as regards the *difficulty of the work*. If as regards the *opportuneness of the time*, since now is the time of sowing, as the Apostle says, and he who does meritorious works casts seed into good ground: it is *congruous* that from this ground he should receive great fruit. And therefore God rightly promises to render a hundredfold to him who in the present remits a little. But if the *arduousness* of the work is considered; since such a work is in the will of the doer in such a way that it is above his powers; and a man is lifted up in doing it above himself, and prefers the eternal good to his own good: hence it is that such a kind of work is worthy of eternal remuneration, and thus through it one happens to merit by the merit of *condignity*.

It is therefore clear that the meritorious work, considered in comparison to the *freedom of the will* and the *liberality of the dispenser* and the *opportuneness of the time*, is meritorious by the merit of *congruity*. But compared to the *dignity of grace*, to the *truth of the one promising*, and to its own *difficulty*, it is meritorious by the merit of *condignity*. — And by this can be resolved the reasons and authorities adduced for either side, for this reason, that they proceed by diverse ways. For the reasons which prove that through grace it happens that one merits the eternal reward by the merit of condignity, proceed according to one of these considerations. — That reason, however, which is made from the similar comparison of guilt to punishment, does not compel for the comparison of grace: both because glory excels much more in the good than punishment in the evil: and also because it is easier to descend than to ascend. — But the reasons to the contrary proceed by another way, namely insofar as the work has to be compared to our will; for thus it is not of itself sufficient for meriting; for *all our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman*; and also insofar as it has to be compared to the divine liberality,

which can be obligated to no one, but whatever it does it does from mere liberality; and in this manner they conclude truly that there is no merit of condignity there; for otherwise those reasons would not compel.

1. For as to what is said, that *the sufferings of this time are not condign* etc.; this is true insofar as they are *sufferings*; yet they are *condign* insofar as they *are done from charity*, which gives efficacy and worth to actions and sufferings.

2. To that which is objected, that God does not lead us to glory by our merits; it must be explained that this is understood according as the merits are compared merely to our will, not according as they have their rise from grace.

3. To that which is objected, that all that a man does he owes to God; it must be said that although that work is owed, insofar as it is *the creature's*; yet it is gratuitous, insofar as it is done *from grace and charity*. And therefore, just as the account of debt does not take away the account of the gratuitous, so neither does it take away the account of merit. — And if one objects that neither a gratuitous work nor a debt can obligate God; it must be said that although God cannot be obligated to us in the account of *giving and receiving*, as the last reason also shows; yet he is said to be obligated in a certain way from his mere *benignity*, by which he willed to promise himself to those who love him. Moreover, the merit of condignity does not necessarily posit an obligation in the one who rewards, but it posits a sufficient ordination of him who is rewarded toward the reward itself, through the mediation of some praiseworthy operation. But grace posits a sufficient ordination in the wayfarer toward obtaining glory, both by reason of *its dignity*, by which it renders the whole man both acceptable and dear to God, and also by reason of the *divine covenant*, and by reason of the *arduous operation*, as was touched on before.

4. 5. And thus appears the response to the two following reasons. For as to what is objected: that *what is done gratuitously* does not obligate; it must be said that, granted that it does not obligate, on account of this it is not taken from merit, so that it cannot be condign. Moreover, although it does not obligate him whose [office] it is to repay and reward a service done to him, his own utility being weighed; yet it obligates in a certain way the one who rewards, the faithfulness of the service being weighed. Hence he merits more before God who serves him out of filial and liberal love than he who serves out of mercenary love, awaiting wages and recompense. — But if anyone objects that there cannot be merit of *condignity* there, since there is no commensuration there; it must be said that although there is no commensuration through *every kind of equality*, yet there is commensuration through a certain *fitting proportionability*, just as fruit is rightly said to be commensurated to the seed, when it exceeds it by as much as befitted the fecundity of the seed and the germinating earth. Hence just as someone would not be content if he did not receive tenfold from the seed, so no one could be content from the meritorious works done, unless for them he received the perfect reward, which completes and terminates the whole desire.