Dist. 27, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/27/q/bon-sent-II-d27-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first the question is raised about what he says: *Grace is called* operating *insofar as it frees the will of man;* and *cooperating insofar as it assists that same will.* For Gregory, in the *Morals*, distinguishing prevenient and subsequent grace, says thus, that prevenient grace is regarded with respect to the gifts of nature; but subsequent grace with respect to the gifts of grace: therefore if operating and cooperating grace are the same, it seems that operating grace would not be called that which frees the will of man. — *But if perhaps you say* that *prevenient* and *subsequent* are taken there in another way; then there is a question about the meaning of these names, namely why it is so named, that one is called *prevenient*, another *subsequent*, another *operating*, another *cooperating*. For it seems that all grace is *cooperating*, because no operation is due to any form of itself, except together with a subject. It also seems that none ought to be called *prevenient*; for either prevenient is said by comparison to the *act*, or by comparison to the *subject*. If by comparison to the *act*, then every form ought to be called *prevenient*, because every form precedes its own act. If by comparison to the *subject*, then none ought to be called *prevenient*, since none is before its own subject.

There is therefore a question, since grace is spoken of in diverse ways by diverse authors, and such names are expounded in diverse ways, whence this diversity comes.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although grace is one, it nevertheless has manifold divisions according to diverse considerations. For grace can be compared to its *principle from which*, it can be compared to its *subject in which*, it can likewise be compared to its *opposite against which*, and it can be compared to its *effect, toward which* it is ordered.

By comparison to its *principle*, grace is thus divided into the grace of predestination, of vocation, of justification, and of magnification. For first God prepares grace, secondly he offers it, thirdly he confers it, and fourthly he completes it. And according to this is regarded the aforesaid division, which is taken from what the Apostle says in Romans, chapter eight.

But insofar as grace is compared to its *subject*, it is thus divided into the grace of thought, of will, and of perfection, according to the threefold power of that substance in which grace is, namely according to the intellective, the affective, and the operative. And this division is set down by Bernard in the book *On Free Choice*.

But insofar as it is compared to its *opposite*, there is that division of grace which is the grace of protection, of liberation, of extraction, and of salvation. For this division is taken according as grace assists against manifold evil, namely the evil of temptation or struggle, the evil of persecution or misery, the evil of fault, and the evil of consequence. From the first it protects, from the second it frees, from the third it draws out, and from the fourth it saves. And this division is taken from what is said in Isaiah, chapter thirty-one: *The Lord of hosts protects Judah and Jerusalem, protecting and freeing, passing over and saving.*

By comparison to the *effect* toward which it is, it is divided into prevenient and subsequent, or operating and cooperating, which are differences of grace according to the effects which it has upon the will itself. For grace is called *prevenient* insofar as it makes the will itself good; and so it prevents, because it is not from free choice, but rather is infused by God himself. But it is called *cooperating* or *subsequent* insofar as it assists free choice with respect to eliciting a good work.

And it is to be noted that, according as the name of grace is taken in diverse ways, so also are these two differences, *prevenient* and *subsequent*. For grace is taken in one way most broadly, and so it comprehends natural gifts and gratuitous gifts; for both are from above. And in this way grace can be divided into prevenient and subsequent, such that the natural gifts are called prevenient, but the gratuitous gifts subsequent; and so Gregory takes it in the *Morals*. — In another way grace is taken less commonly, and so it comprehends grace freely given and grace making pleasing; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace into freely given and making-pleasing. And so Bernard divides it, when he

says that there is a certain grace which sows the thought, and this he calls prevenient grace; and a certain grace which perfects the good, and this he calls subsequent grace. For he says thus in the book *On Free Choice*: « These three God works in us, namely *to think, to will, and to accomplish*. The first he works without us, the second with us, and the third through us ». — And grace is also taken strictly, and so it comprehends grace making pleasing and glory; and then to divide grace into prevenient and subsequent is nothing other than to divide grace and glory. And so Augustine divides it in the book *On Nature and Grace*, when he says: « Grace prevents, that we may live piously; it follows after, that we may always live with him. Now it prevents, that we may be called; then it follows after, that we may be glorified ». — And grace is also taken more strictly, and then it names grace making pleasing alone; and then to divide it by prevenient and subsequent is according to the twofold effect of grace, which can be distinguished in three ways: either so that one effect is against evil, and the other toward good; or so that both are toward good, but one belongs to grace insofar as it informs, the other insofar as it moves; or so that both are attributed to grace as moving, but one at the entrance, and the other in the advance. And so it is expounded in three ways by Augustine in the book *On Nature and Grace*. In one way thus: prevenient grace frees and prepares the will of man; but subsequent grace insofar as it assists that same will. In the second way thus: prevenient grace « prevents the will, that we may be healed; and follows after, that being healed we may be quickened ». In the third way thus: grace prevents the will, that it may will; and follows after, lest it will in vain. — And through this the response to the objections is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise the question is raised about what he says in the second chapter: *It must be premised that there are three kinds of goods. For some are great, some least, and some intermediate.* For it seems that this division of good is insufficient, since there are many other differences of goods. For there is the good of fortune and the good of nature and the good of grace and of glory. If you say that these differences are reduced to these; then it is asked under which of these is contained the good which God is, or the soul itself. If you say, under the great goods; on the contrary: those are great goods, as he says, which cannot be ill used; but one can ill use God, as when he loves him for the sake of something else: therefore he is not contained under the great goods. Likewise it is argued from this: if God can be ill used, namely when he is referred to something else; and God is the best among all goods: therefore all goods can be ill used: therefore there are no great goods. Therefore he says something false, when he says that there are great goods which cannot be ill used. — Likewise, he seems to exemplify badly concerning the virtues; for someone can be proud of the virtues, and can also love the virtues for the sake of human praise; and this is to abuse them: therefore it seems that the virtues can be abused: therefore they cannot be contained under the great goods.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine, when he divides good by these three differences, namely by the greatest good, the intermediate, and the lowest, does not take the division of good generally, but of that good which is good for someone, and this is the good through which one can in some way be ordered to an end; and therefore he here divides useful good. And on account of this, since there is a threefold difference of useful good, through which one is ordered to an end, he sets down a threefold difference of good. For something is so useful to an end that nevertheless without it one can attain the end, as are bodily goods. But something is so useful to an end that nevertheless without it one cannot attain the end; yet through it one can be turned away from the end, as is free choice, which can be ill used. Something is so useful that without it the end cannot be attained, nor through it can one in any way be turned away from the end, as is gratuitous virtue. And since in the first good there is least usefulness, in the second greater, and in the third greatest; hence it is that he divides good by these three differences, namely by least, intermediate, and great goods. — And the sufficiency of the division and the response to that which is objected concerning the highest good, which God is, are clear.

But to that which is objected, that the virtues can be ill used; it must be said that to use something is in many ways, as was said in the first book, namely as an instrument and a directive habit, or as an object. In the first way it is in no way possible to ill use a virtue, because virtue, so far as is from itself, always directs toward good, nor is anything ever ordered toward evil through virtue.

because « virtue is the good use of the will », as Augustine says. In the second way it is possible to ill use the virtues, nor is there anything so good, concerning which free choice cannot turn itself away, by loving it inordinately.

### Doubt III.

Likewise the question is raised about that account of virtue which he sets down in the text: *Virtue is a good quality of the mind* etc. For it seems that this notification can first be refuted from the *manner of predicating*. « For nothing which is predicated of another in the abstract has to be predicated of another in the concrete », as the Philosopher says: if therefore virtue is goodness, in no way is virtue to be said to be good. — Likewise the aforesaid definition is refuted from a *defect of convertibility* in predicating, because this whole account can belong to grace and to gifts and to other habits of the soul. — Likewise it can be refuted from *falsity* in this which it says: *which God works in us without us*; for this is against Augustine, who says that « he who created you without you does not justify you without you ». And Bernard too says that to the work of our salvation two things concur, namely God and free choice.

In keeping with this the question is raised, since of one thing there is one definition, and virtue itself is defined differently by different authors: how are those definitions distinguished?

**I respond:** It must be said that virtue is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. — According as it is taken commonly, so it comprehends moral and natural virtue; and so it has to be defined in two ways: either in comparison to the act, or in comparison to the act and the ultimate end. In the first way it is defined by the Philosopher in *On the Heavens and the World* when he says: « Virtue is the ultimate of a power with respect to a thing ». In the second way it is defined by the same in the seventh book of the *Physics*: « Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best ». For these two are notifications of virtue in its generality, insofar as it comprehends moral and natural virtue.

In another way virtue is considered properly, insofar as it comprehends moral virtue only, yet it is extended to the political and the gratuitous. And so it has to be considered in two ways: either by comparison to the act itself, or by comparison to the directive principle. If by comparison to the act, so it is defined by the Philosopher in the *Ethics*: « Virtue is a habit which perfects the one having it and renders his work good ». But by comparison to the directive principle it is thus defined by the same Philosopher in the same place: « Virtue is a voluntary habit consisting in the mean, determined by right reason, as the wise man will determine ». And according to this it is also defined by Tully in other words: « Virtue is a habit of mind consenting to reason after the manner of nature ». According to this twofold comparison moral virtue is defined by Augustine in other words, signifying the same thing, in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* thus: « Virtue is a habit of a well-composed mind »; in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*: « Virtue is an equality of life, consenting to reason on every side ». These two notifications, if one attends, are really the same as the aforesaid, and both these and those belong to that virtue which is acquired through habituation.

In the third way virtue can be considered more properly, insofar as it is taken for gratuitous virtue; and so

it can be compared in four ways, namely to the end, to the subject, to the act, and to its principle; according to the fourfold kind of cause, namely final, material, formal, and efficient. In comparison to the end it is thus defined by Augustine in the *Soliloquies*: « Virtue is right reason attaining to its end ». But in comparison to the subject, which it informs, which is the will itself, it is thus defined by the same in *On the City of God*: « Virtue is a good will ». But in comparison to the proper act or completion, that one is given from *On the Morals of the Church*: « Virtue is the order of love, or ordered love ». But in comparison to its effective principle is given that one which is set down by the Master in the text: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind » etc. In which definition, that which is said, *quality of the mind*, is set down for the genus, and three differences are subjoined. By this which is said, *by which one lives rightly*, it is separated from bodily goods. By this which is said, *which no one uses ill*, it is separated from spiritual and natural properties. But by this which is subjoined, *which God works in us without us*, it is separated from spiritual properties and from acquired habits, which, though they be good uses of the powers of the soul, are nevertheless not through infusion, but through acquisition. — And so the understanding of this definition and its distinction from others is clear.

To that which is objected, that it ought not to be called *good*, since it is *goodness*; it must be said that in first intentions there is a reflexive predication on account of simplicity. But this has no place in those things which are of a *determinate genus*, of which the Philosopher speaks; for it is not said: whiteness is white.

To that which is objected, that it is not convertible; it must be said that virtue is not here defined insofar as it is distinguished against gifts and other gratuitous habits, but insofar as under the name of virtue is enclosed every gratuitous quality of the soul. — Yet it could be said that by appropriation *to live rightly* belongs to the virtues, *readily* to the gifts, but *perfectly* to the beatitudes, as will be shown elsewhere.

To the last it must be said that *without us* does not deprive, on the side of free choice, the receptive disposition of virtue itself, but the effective power.

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