Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/28/q/bon-sent-II-d28-a1-q1
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### Article I.
*How much free choice can do without grace that makes pleasing.*

### Question I.
*Whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing.*

Concerning the first point we proceed thus and inquire whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that does not make pleasing. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. *First*, through what is said in Romans, chapter three: *Being justified freely by his grace.* And a little before: *By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified.* And more expressly in Titus, chapter three: *Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according*
to *his own mercy* etc.: therefore, with grace that makes pleasing set aside, free choice cannot of itself rise again from fault.

2. *Likewise*, in Galatians, chapter two: *I cast not away the grace of God; for if justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain:* if therefore by the power of free choice a man could return to justice, it seems that Christ would have died in vain; and if it is impious to say this, the point is clear, etc.

3. *Likewise*, no one asks from another what he has in his own power; but in the Psalm the holy man asks: *Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee.* The Savior himself also teaches us to ask in the Lord's Prayer: *And forgive us our debts:* therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, this is shown by a reason that Bernard makes: when someone becomes pious from impious, he becomes good from bad; and when he becomes good from bad, he is made better; yet no one has power over himself: therefore no one can make himself better by his own power: therefore neither can he rise again from fault without the grace of God.

5. *Likewise*, by every sin God is offended, who is justice itself, and every sin is done against the commandment of God; but the offense is as great as is he who is offended: since therefore he is infinite, the offense has in some way the character of the infinite. If therefore free choice is of finite power, it is impossible that it return to its former state, unless it be brought back by the divine mercy, which by its gratuitous goodness pardons the fault or remits the offense; but this does not happen without grace: therefore etc.

6. *Likewise*, sin is the privation of spiritual life and the privation of light; but spiritual life cannot return to the soul except from the fountain of life, nor light except from the fountain of light: therefore it is impossible that the soul rise again from fault, unless God, who is the fountain of life and perennial light, by his kindness vivify and illumine it; but this happens only through the gift of grace: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Damascene: « Sin is a turning away from that which is according to nature into that which is against nature »; but it is easier for any thing to be moved according to nature than against nature: therefore if free choice by its own power can in sinning be moved against nature, by its own power it will be able to return to nature: therefore as it was able to fall, so also to rise again.

2. *Likewise*, the power of free choice is greater than that of nature; but nature, when it is weakened, can be healed
without the aid of medicine: therefore much more strongly can free choice, when it is weakened through fault, be healed without any grace.

3. *Likewise*, without grace that makes pleasing a man can be made knowing from being ignorant, not only in those things which lie under nature, but also in those things which are above nature: therefore by parallel reasoning, without grace that makes pleasing a man will be able to be made just from being a sinner.

4. *Likewise*, a sinner existing in mortal sin can desire and will justice; but to be just is nothing other than to will justice, since justice is the rectitude of the will; and the will is then right when it wills justice: therefore a sinner in mortal sin can be justified without grace that makes pleasing.

5. *Likewise*, by the same force by which someone is moved toward something, he comes to rest in it: therefore if someone is moved to fault only by the will, he does not rest in it except through the will, and so long as he wills: therefore if he does not will to persist in fault, without grace that makes pleasing, it seems that he can rise again from fault. If you judge that he cannot will it; on the contrary: « Rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says, and the will, so long as it is on the way, is changeable: therefore as it was able voluntarily to seek fault, so voluntarily it can rise again from fault.

6. *Likewise*, between grace and fault innocence is in the middle, as will appear better below: therefore since innocence can be had by someone without grace, as it was had by Adam in the beginning, and since fault is destroyed by innocence had; it seems that without grace that makes pleasing someone can rise again from fault.

### Conclusion.

> That free choice rise again from fault, grace too is necessary, according as it is called a habit of the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the determination of this question the *philosophers* held one view, the *heretics* another, the *catholic treatise-writers* another.

For the *philosophers*, being ignorant of how the divine majesty is offended by sin, and how through it the fitness of the powers is taken away, said that man could be made just through *exercise*, just as through *disorder* away from right reason he had been made unjust.
Hence the Philosopher too says that a depraved man, led to better exercises, either will profit much, or is perfectly restored to the contrary habit.

The *heretics*, however, having some light of faith, recognized that through sin the divine majesty is offended and in some way harmed. Yet, being blinded, they did not consider how nature is weakened by fault; and therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, no *healing grace* is necessary to it, but the gratuitous mercy of God alone suffices, which is inclined to remit our sins on account of the satisfaction which Christ willed to make for himself, when he offered himself on the cross for us. — But this position not only falls short of the truth, but also, while it implies contradictions, destroys itself. For it says that, for free choice to rise again from fault, it is necessary that God remit the fault to him; and yet it is not necessary that he bestow anything on him, or do anything about him. For if God is not changed; and again he himself is a just judge, so that he accepts nothing except only as much as it is worth: for the fault to be remitted and the sinner reconciled to God, it is necessary that something be bestowed on the sinner himself, by which the disease of sin be healed.

The *catholic* treatise-writers, however, both by the light of faith and by the authority of Scripture, recognized that sin is both offensive to God, and also in some way harmful, while man transfers himself from the service of God to the servitude of the devil; and also deformative of the image. And therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, *grace* is necessary, not only according as grace is called the gratuitous will of God, nor even according as it is called the liberal passion of Christ, but also according as it is called a habit of the soul. For the gratuitous will of God concurs that the remission of the offense come about — for voluntarily he pardons us the offense — the liberal passion of Christ concurs that the satisfaction of the loss come about; the infused habit concurs that the curing of the disease and the reformation of the image come about. And therefore, for man to rise again from fault, grace is in every way greatly necessary to him. — Therefore the reasons showing that man cannot rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the motion into that which is according to nature is easier than that which is into that which is against nature; it must be said that this is true of that motion which is according to nature, in such a way that it *lies under* the power of nature; and of that motion too which is against nature, yet in such a way that the power of nature is not there corrupted nor diminished, as is the case in the upward motion of a stone. For it returns downward more easily than it ascended upward: both because to be moved downward is within its power; and also because by the upward motion nothing was diminished or taken away from its weight. — But it is not so in our case, both because to be moved toward justice is by a power above nature; and also because the motion toward fault *diminishes* the fitness of free choice. For through sin man is not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also is wounded in his natural endowments.

2. And by this is clear the response to what follows, which is objected concerning the likeness of the health of nature to the health of the will; for it is not alike. For bodily health is within the power of nature, but spiritual health is through something that is above nature. For when something is weakened corporeally, the power of nature, which was the principle of health, is not entirely destroyed; and therefore from such weakness a return to health can be made naturally. But in sin the very grace of God and justice, through which there was spiritual health, is lost; and to that extent grave sin is said to be mortal, because it takes from man the principle of life. And on this account, just as from a dead man a living one cannot be made except by a marvelous power and above nature; so neither from a sinner can a just man be made naturally, or voluntarily, but marvelously.

3. To that which is objected concerning the ignorant man, that he can be made knowing without grace that makes pleasing; it must be said that it is not alike; for ignorance, as such, rather bespeaks a defect of penalty than of fault. Hence the *ignorant*, as ignorant, is not displeasing to God; but the *sinner*, as
sinning, is displeasing to God; and therefore *grace*, which renders one acceptable to God, is rightly opposed to fault, just as *knowledge* is opposed to *ignorance*. And since an opposite is to be expelled by its opposite, it does not therefore follow that, if ignorance is to be expelled without grace, that fault likewise is.

4. To that which is objected, that a sinner, remaining in mortal sin, can will justice; it must be said that to will something is twofold: either weakly and half-fully, as it is said: *The sluggard wills, and wills not*; or fully and sufficiently, as the Apostle says in Philippians, chapter two: *God works in us to will and to accomplish.* In the first way it can be in a sinner, and such a will does not make anyone just; in the second way it cannot be without grace going before and helping the will. But in this second way, not in the first, the will of justice renders the soul just.

5. To that which is objected, that by the same force by which something is moved, it comes to rest; it must be said that this is true in that motion which is toward some completion; but this need not be the case in a motion of corruption and destruction. For someone is killed by violence; yet it need not be that by that same force he persist in death. And since sin is called a corruption, it need not be that one persist in sin from the mere act of the will, just as by an act of the will he cast himself into sin; as is clear in the one who voluntarily kills himself or voluntarily drowns himself.

6. To that which is objected, that God can restore innocence and thus destroy fault without grace; it must be said that this is true; but the largesse of the divine mercy has so decreed to take away the evil by which man is displeasing to God, that at the same time there be given the good by which man would be pleasing to God; nor does he ever expel fault, without sanctifying the soul itself and dwelling in it through grace. Hence there is nothing in the middle, with respect to time, between the just and the impious; for from the time man is born, it is necessary that his soul be either perverse through fault, or set upright through grace.