Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/28/q/bon-sent-II-d28-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the power of free choice apart from freely given grace.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the power of free choice, how far it extends apart from freely given grace. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked whether free choice, apart from freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

Secondly it is asked whether, deprived of all grace, it can resist any temptation.

Thirdly it is asked whether it can, of itself, apart from all grace, [tend] toward a good in general.

### Question I. *Whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing. And that it can, it seems.

1. Zechariah, chapter one: *Turn to me, and I will turn to you, says the Lord.* If, then, for God to turn to us is nothing other than to impart grace; before any grace is conferred, free choice can turn to Him; but by turning itself to God it disposes itself to grace: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Boethius: "There is naturally implanted in us a desire for the true good": therefore, with all freely given grace set aside, the nature of the rational soul remaining intact, free choice can desire the true good; but by desiring the true good it is disposed to the gratuitous gift: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, every natural power naturally seeks its own perfection, by the very fact that it stands in need of it and is born to be completed by it. If, then, free choice is naturally apt to be completed by the gift of grace and of glory; deprived of all grace it will desire and seek the perfection of grace. If, then, this is to dispose oneself to the grace that makes pleasing, it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, he sufficiently disposes himself to grace who does what is in him; and a man is said to do what is in him when he does that which is in his own power. But free choice, deprived of all grace, can do what is in it — for no one doubts that it can do what it can — therefore apart from all grace it can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

5. Likewise, free choice, deprived of freely given grace, either can do something, or nothing. If it can do nothing: then no one would be blameworthy on this ground, that he does not prepare himself for grace. If it can do *something,* let that which it can do be called A; then it is true to say that free choice has power over A; but by doing A with its whole power it prepares itself for grace; and whoever thus prepares himself, sufficiently disposes himself: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, every sin is not only expulsive of grace, but also harmful to nature; but every nature flees what is contrary and harmful to it: therefore free choice, deprived of all grace and left to itself, has by nature to detest and flee sin; but by detesting and fleeing fault a man disposes himself to grace: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*: "Freedom of choice remains for seeking salvation, but with God first admonishing and inviting to salvation, so that one may either choose or follow or act on the occasion of salvation, that is, of the inspiration of God": therefore it seems that our free choice can never prepare itself for the way of salvation unless it is helped by some freely given grace.

2. Likewise, servile fear is that by means of which one turns aside from evil, as it is said in Proverbs, chapter fifteen: *In fear each one turns aside from evil;* but to fear in a servile way is a gift of God, and no one can dispose himself to grace unless he turns aside from evil: therefore no one can dispose himself to grace without some gift of grace.

3. Likewise, a disposition is of the same genus as that to which it disposes: therefore one cannot dispose himself to a gratuitous good except through something freely given: therefore it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to it.

4. Likewise, a disposition precedes that to which it disposes: if, then, free choice could dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing through itself, then it could anticipate grace: if, therefore, this is contrary to the nature of prevenient grace, it seems, therefore, etc.

### Conclusio

> *Free choice, deprived of every gift of freely given grace, cannot congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that scarcely or never is free choice deprived of all freely given grace; for by the name of freely given grace we understand not only those things which the Apostle enumerates in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter twelve, *To one is given through the Spirit* etc., but also there is here called freely given grace whatever it be that is superadded to the natural endowments, helping in some way and preparing the will for the habit or use of grace, whether that freely given thing be a *habit,* such as servile fear, or a piety implanted in the inmost parts of some from infancy, or whether it be also some *act,* such as some calling or speaking by which God arouses the soul of man to seek Him. — Scarcely or never indeed is anyone having the use of free choice found without this freely given grace; and without this it must be granted that free choice is never sufficiently disposed nor can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing, as Bernard says expressly in the book *On Free Choice,* chapter thirteen: "The efforts of free choice toward the good are vain, if they are not helped by grace, and null, if they are not aroused." And afterward he says that "grace arouses free choice when it sows the thought." If, then, the first disposition, which is made toward the grace that makes pleasing, is the thought, and this is not without the gift of freely given grace; it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.

And the reason for this is the following: not because the grace that makes pleasing necessarily presupposes a disposition of freely given grace, but because it is itself something divine and a thing existing above free choice and even above the natural power of judgment. Therefore free choice never rises either to knowing grace or to seeking it, unless it is in some way aroused from above and through some gift of freely given grace, which holds as it were a middle between the gift of the grace that makes pleasing and the natural liberty of the will. It must therefore be held that free choice, if it is aroused by some gift of freely given grace, can congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing; but if it should happen to be deprived of every such gift, it could never be disposed to it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to free choice to turn to God; it must be said that fallen free choice would never turn to God unless it were aroused by some gift of grace; and because this is at hand, therefore the Lord says: *Turn to me.* For by this very thing, that He invites and calls, He bestows on man some gratuitous gift, by which he is aroused, and being aroused turns in some way to Him, and being turned is accepted by God through the grace that makes pleasing; and from this God is said to *turn to him.*

— Hence, if anyone wishes to attend to the order of free choice and of divine grace, Augustine expressly intimates it in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, setting forth four steps, among which grace precedes free choice. For he says thus: "The beginning of our salvation we have by the mercy of God; that we acquiesce in the saving inspiration is of our power; that we attain what we have learned by admonition to be sought is of the divine gift; that we do not fall away, the gift of salvation having been received, is of our solicitude and equally of the heavenly help." In this saying, therefore, if anyone inspects it diligently, it is intimated very clearly how much free choice can do with respect to grace. For since in the work of salvation there are these four, namely to invite, to acquiesce, to help, and to persevere; the first is of the inspiration of God, the second of the liberty of choice, the third of the divine gift, the fourth of our solicitude and equally of the divine help. And by this the way is sufficiently opened for resolving the arguments that follow.

*To 2.* To that, however, which is objected, that a desire for the true good is implanted in us; it must be said that this is true *in general;* but that it should be known *in particular* what that good is, and be desired and sought, this is not without the gift of God. But that general desire does not suffice for disposing toward grace, as is evident in the philosophers, who greatly desired blessedness, yet never attained the grace of God.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that nature seeks its own perfection, etc.; it must be said that this is true of that perfection which is *within* the bounds of nature; but it need not be so of that which is *above* nature; or if it be understood of that, it seeks it in the manner in which it knows it. But of itself it does not know *in particular,* but only *in general.* And thus knowing and desiring it does not sufficiently dispose itself to the gift of grace, as was shown before.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he sufficiently disposes himself who does what is in him; it must be said that *to do what is in him* can be understood in two ways: in one way *positively,* because he does something ordered to grace, and does as much as he can; and in this way the aforesaid saying holds true. In another way it can be understood *privatively,* so that one is said *to do what is in him* because he does what he can, although that is not ordered to the reception of grace; and in this way free choice, deprived of grace, can do what is in it; and thus the aforesaid saying does not hold true.

*To 5.* And by this the answer to what follows is evident. For as to what is asked, whether it can do something, or nothing; it must be said that it can do something; but that something is nothing with respect to the receiving of grace, just as to be able to eat is a certain ability: yet it contributes nothing to this, that anyone should receive the gift of grace.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that free choice can detest fault by the power of its own nature; it must be said that it happens in two ways to detest fault: either because it is offensive to the majesty and equity of God, or because it is harmful to one's own nature. The first manner of detesting disposes toward the grace that makes pleasing, nor is it ever without the gift of freely given grace in the state of fallen nature. For to know that by fault God is offended is a gift of God. In another way it is to detest sin inasmuch as it is harmful to nature, as someone detests fornication because through it he lost his sight, or incurred some other disease; and such detestation can be from the power of nature; but this does not dispose toward the grace that makes pleasing.

And thus the things asked are clear. It is also clear in what way Pelagius erred, who said that free choice not only has the power of disposing itself to the grace that makes pleasing, but also of meriting it by its own power. For he was twofold a liar: both in this that he said the first grace falls under merit, and in this that he said also that free choice can dispose itself to grace by its own strength.