Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/28/q/bon-sent-II-d28-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind.*

Thirdly it is asked whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind. And that it can, seems [to be the case].

1. A habitual virtue does not give a new power to the will, but only renders it facile. If therefore the will, having a habitual virtue, can attain to good *in its kind* and good *from circumstance*; it seems that one lacking that virtue can attain to this, albeit with difficulty.

2. Likewise, a brute can have compassion on a brute by nature: therefore a man too can have compassion on a man by nature, every gift of grace being set aside; and if he can have compassion and be merciful, he can also bestow alms; and this is a good in its kind, to give alms to the needy: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, vice does not fortify nature; but a vainglorious man can preach the Gospel or do some work good in itself: therefore if a man depraved by the vice of vainglory can do this, much more strongly can he do this from the power of nature.

4. Likewise, it is more difficult for a miser to give all that he has than to give a part of what he has; but a miser, without any gift of grace, can become prodigal and squander all his goods: therefore much more strongly, without a gift of grace, can he give a single alms, since that is much easier.

5. Likewise, either free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good, or it cannot. If it cannot: then it is of no power. If it can attain to something, since the principle which is the will is distinguished from the principle which is nature, that will be not only a natural good, but also a moral good; but the least among all moral goods is good in its kind: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Lord says in John, the fifteenth [chapter]: *Without me you can do nothing;* the Gloss: « Not even a little good »: therefore without the help of God's grace free choice cannot accomplish anything of good.

2. Likewise, in the second [Epistle] to the Corinthians, the third [chapter]: *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.* If therefore to think the good — this is the beginning of all good; and this we cannot do through ourselves: therefore free choice, deprived of divine grace, can do no good through itself.

3. Likewise, Augustine to Pope Boniface: « A man cannot will anything of good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil ».

4. Likewise, Isidore: « Let the defenders of free choice know that they can do nothing of good unless they are sustained by the help of divine grace »: therefore the same thing returns as before.

5. Likewise, Bernard on the Canticle, homily thirty-second: « Let the enemies of grace know, he says, that the human heart is not even sufficient for thinking the good ». And more expressly in the book *On Free Choice*: « God works three things in us: to think, to will, and to accomplish. The first without us, the second with us, the third through us ».

6. Likewise, in the same book, chapter six: « To will indeed is in us from free choice, but not to be able [to do] what we will; I do not say to will good or to will evil, but to will only ». — From all these authorities it is concluded that free choice, deprived of grace, cannot attain to any good however small.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Free choice, by the general cooperation of God alone, without grace making-pleasing and freely given, can, albeit with difficulty, do some moral good, which is orderable to the ultimate end, but not ordered [to it].

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that a work can be called good in three ways. — In one way something is called good *simply*; and this is the good which is ordered to the [ultimate] end; and such is the meritorious good. And to good of this sort fallen free choice cannot attain without the help of grace making-pleasing.

In a second way something is called good from this, that it in some way disposes *congruously* toward the good; and such is the good which is done outside charity; nevertheless with a right intention. And to such [good] free choice cannot attain without the gift of grace freely given, by which it may be illumined and directed and roused to will to do something pleasing to God. And that for this a gift of grace is necessary is expressly intimated in Wisdom, the eighth [chapter], where it is said: *I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it; and this very thing was wisdom, to know whose gift it was.* Hence it is no small gift of grace to know the gift of grace itself, and to know that without grace a man cannot be saved.

In a third way something is called good because it is *orderable* to the end, and has some ordering within itself, whether from passing over the due matter, as feeding the hungry, or from a due circumstance superadded, namely when he does this when the time and place and opportunity require. But for the completing of this kind of good, even though grace freely given is necessary for it to be done easily; nevertheless, every gift of grace being set aside, and free choice left in its pure naturals, by the natural faculty of judgment and by instinct it could attain to such good, God cooperating with it, just as he cooperates with the other creatures. For without the first agent no agent can act, as will be shown in its place below, when it is treated whether every action is from God. For the present, let it suffice to have said only this, that free choice, by the cooperation of God alone, without any gift of grace, can, albeit with difficulty, go forth into some moral good. Yet through this it is neither disposed to grace nor to glory, because it is not ordered to the ultimate end, but only orderable.

And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude; and therefore they are to be granted. But to the good which leads to the perfect good, whether by the merit of congruity or by the merit of condignity, [free choice] cannot [attain] without the help of God, as the authorities of the Saints adduced to the contrary expressly say; and so they are all to be understood. — And that they ought to be understood in this way is plain. For if free choice is left in its naturals alone, there will still remain to it the judgment of reason, by which it will know that parents are to be honored. And it is certain that, if it has this natural faculty of judgment, by that through which it can know that parents are to be honored, by that it can think; and since it has the natural instinct, it can also will; and since it has the external organs subservient to it, it can fulfill [the work] in deed. But inasmuch as it makes this judgment of right reason without the gift of grace, it does not direct toward obtaining the end, which is God, and the reward of eternal beatitude, which it cannot know unless God reveals it. And therefore the Saints say that one can neither think nor will nor do good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of the good according as it is ordered to the attaining of beatitude. — But if the authorities are understood of another good, then by the name of grace there is not to be understood some habit superadded to the naturals; but there is understood the gratuitous influence of God, by which he conserves and aids the rest, that they may complete their operations. And thus is understood that word of John, the fifteenth [chapter]: *Without me you can do nothing;* and that of Isaiah, the twenty-sixth: *All our works you have wrought in us, O Lord;* and the like.

Thus too is to be understood that which is said in the book *On the Teacher*: « no one can learn anything unless God teaches ». For this is not said because all knowledge is infused, but because the created light cannot perfect its operation without the cooperation of the uncreated light, by which every man is illumined who comes into this world. And in this way are to be understood the words of Dionysius and of the other Saints, who say that every essence is from the first essence, and every life from the first life, and every intelligence from the first intelligence, and every goodness from the first goodness. For these things have been said, not because God is the whole cause, but because without him no created power can act.

It is plain therefore from what has been said how necessary grace making-pleasing is to free choice, because without it [free choice] cannot rise again from sin, nor can it conquer the adversary, nor can it fulfill the commandments of God. It is plain nevertheless how necessary grace freely given is, because without it free choice cannot dispose itself to grace making-pleasing; nor can it resist every temptation: nor can it attain even to some good, however small, that is ordered to salvation. And although it can attain to some moral good, it would scarcely or never do [it] but rather evil, on account of the corruption of original sin.