Dist. 28, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/28/q/bon-sent-II-d28-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, refuting the word of Pelagius: *He cunningly substituted grace for the unbelieving free choice, saying that it is given to men for this purpose,* etc. For it seems that Pelagius spoke truly. For if grace is a habit, and every habit renders a power facile, it seems that grace is given to free choice for this, that it may *more easily* go forth into good works. But if you say that he does not rebuke him in this, but in that he denied that he conferred any *power* upon free choice, it seems that in this too he spoke truly, since, if "to be able" belongs to power alone, and grace is not a power, then it gives no new *power*. — Likewise, no other habit brings a new power to that in which it is: therefore it seems that neither does grace; or if this is the case with grace, I ask: why rather in it than in others?

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain habit which has its origin from a power, like that which is acquired by habituation in the one in whom it is; and concerning such a habit it is true that it does not give a new power, but renders the prior power apt. And there is another habit which descends from above and depends not only on that in which it is, but more on that from which it is; and such a habit has the property of ennobling a power, and can also

move and elevate above itself that in which it is, by reason of that *from which it proceeds*; and such a habit is grace itself. And because Pelagius did not attribute more to the habit of grace than to other habits, hence it is that Augustine and the Master argue against him as a heretic. — And through this what was objected is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he reproves in Pelagius in the text, namely in this, that he said that *the grace of God, by which men are freed from impiety, is given according to merits.* For it seems that he spoke truly, by that which Jerome says concerning the prodigal son: « There is no greater justice than to pardon the penitent and to open the bosom of mercy to one returning to mercy ». If therefore justice renders to each one according to merits, it seems that a man, by returning to the divine mercy, merits for himself the grace of God. — Likewise, we see that a man can merit the favor of a man by services rendered to him: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems, and much more strongly, that he can merit the grace of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that first grace cannot be merited, both because it is the foundation and principle of all merit, and also because it is a purely gratuitous gift. For unless one has the grace of God, he can merit nothing before God by condign merit, since without it God accepts nothing in our works. Again, it is so a gratuitous gift that it is not given in return for merits. For as the Apostle says to the Romans, in the eleventh chapter: *If grace is from merits, then grace is no longer grace.* — And from this it is clear how greatly Pelagius opposed the divine grace, who said that someone could merit it. For he took away from grace itself its *dignity* and excellence, when he made it depend on the merits of free choice. He took away also its *efficacy,* when he attributed the power of meriting to another than to grace.

To that word of Jerome it must be said that *justice* is there called a befittingness of the divine goodness, not insofar as it regards the requirement of merits.

To that which is objected concerning the favor of a man, it must be said that it is not similar: both because the acceptance of a man is not so purely gratuitous as the divine, and also because it is not so equal a weigher as that.

But if it be asked whether one existing in the state of grace can merit for himself first grace after a relapse, and this by praying and asking that, if he should fall, God would raise him up; it must be said that he cannot by merit of *condignity,* but only by merit of *congruity.* For merit of *condignity* implies perseverance, since a subsequent sin mortifies and leads into oblivion the good works previously done.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of Pelagius, which the Master sets down in the text: *If a man cannot do those things which are commanded, it is not to be imputed to him unto death.* For it seems that Pelagius speaks truly, although the Master contradicts. For Jerome says: « Let him be anathema who says that God commanded the impossible »: therefore if He commanded a man having free choice, it seems that Pelagius speaks truly. Likewise, Augustine in a certain Sermon: « He would not condemn the lazy servant, if He commanded things that could not be done »: therefore the same returns as before.

It is asked therefore, to what extent that word has truth, namely that « no one sins in that which he cannot do, or avoid ».

**I respond:** It must be said that to be able to *do, or avoid* something can be attributed to someone in two ways. In one way someone is said to be able to do something, because *by himself,* without any external help, he can do it, as someone can eat when he is healthy and has food. In another way someone is said to be able to do something, not only because he can do it *by himself and in himself,* but because he can do it *together with another* which is at hand to him; and taking *posse* in *this way,* everything which God commands is in our power, because He who commands is at hand to furnish the helping grace through which we are able to accomplish it; taking *posse* in *another* way, not everything which He commands is in our power. Nor yet is anyone thereby excused: just as if a master should command a servant to give him something to drink, and the servant had no water, if he could acquire it he would not be excused; so it must be understood in the case at hand. — Taking *posse* in the *second way,* whether one can do it in himself or through divine help, Augustine understands, and his word suggests this:

« Who, he says, sins in that which can in no way be evaded »? And so Jerome too understood, when he said that he is « anathema who says that God commanded the impossible ». But Pelagius took it in the *first way,* and therefore he erred and attributed more to free choice than it could do. — In another way also it has been customary to respond, that the aforesaid words are understood of *natural* incapacity, not of that incapacity into which a man has thrust himself by *his own fault:* as Anselm gives the example of the servant who had to go to the market and threw himself headlong into a pit. But the first manner of explaining excludes the error of Pelagius more.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the text: *Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself*. For this seems to be false by experience. For it is easier for a man to fast and to bear great labors than to love his enemy; it is easier also to scatter all his goods than to subdue his own will. Likewise, if this were true, then it seems that, since the goodness of a man consists in the will, a man could make himself such as he would will.

**I respond:** To this it can be said that this is understood with the help of the grace of God, for this reason, that a good will, as to the *act of willing,* does not receive an impediment, if it has the help of grace, but as to the *exterior work* it does receive an impediment. Hence we can will all good things, but not do them all. And thus Augustine seems to understand it, by including the help of grace, not excluding it, as Pelagius excluded it.

In another way it can be responded that *to will* is taken in us in two ways: in one way, as it names the act of the affective power, which is a certain natural power; in another way, as it names the act of free choice. In the first way to *will* something is the same as to be *affected* about it; in the other way to *will* is the same as to *choose*. Hence according to these two acts the will of *appetite* and the will of *choice* are distinguished in us; not because these two wills are essentially different in us, but because the manner of willing is in one way and in another. I say therefore that the word of Augustine is not understood of the will of *appetite,* which sometimes adheres so much to some thing that it can scarcely or never be separated from it; but this is understood of the will of *choice,* by which one wills, to will what he wills, or to nill. And this is always in our power; yet it does not follow from this that *justice* is in our will, because it is not efficacious except insofar as it prevails over the will of appetite; and it does not prevail over the latter except through grace. Hence there are many sinners who would wish to be just, and would wish that they might never crave evils: nevertheless they remain in their injustice, because they are not helped by the divine grace.

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