Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/29/q/bon-sent-II-d29-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.*

### Question I. *Whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence. And that he would, it seems.

1. Genesis 1: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good;* but the highest good cannot fail to take complacency in that which is very good: if therefore man held the chief place among the other lower creatures, it seems that he was very good; and if so, then God accepted him.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 11: *Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made;* but man in the state of innocence had nothing that was worthy of hatred, and everything that he had was made by God: therefore God loved him wholly; but what is thus loved by God is accepted by him: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Proverbs 8: *I love them that love me;* but man according to the state of instituted nature loved God for his own sake and above all things, because he was upright: therefore it seems that even apart from all grace God loved him; and if so, then he was acceptable to God.

4. Likewise, a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work and accepts it, when he fashions it according to his own will; but God, who is the supreme craftsman, had formed man to his own image, and had created him by the best plan: therefore it seems that from the natural endowments given to him man was pleasing to God.

5. Likewise, there is nothing that makes the soul more dear and acceptable to God than that it be wholly beautiful, and that there be no stain in it; but the soul of Adam in the state of innocence was wholly beautiful, and there was no stain in it, so far as pertained to its natural condition: therefore apart from all superadded grace it was acceptable to God.

6. Likewise, either God could make some creature so good that from its pure natural endowments it would be pleasing to him, or not. If not, it seems that he would not be omnipotent. If so, then it does not seem that, for nature to be pleasing to God, it is necessary that a gift of grace be superadded. If therefore man was perfectly constituted according to the exigency of the state of nature, it seems that he was pleasing to God apart from any superadded gift of grace.

**On the contrary:**

1. Hebrews 11: *Without faith it is impossible to please God;* but faith is a gift superadded to nature, according to what is said in First Corinthians 12: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature no one can please God.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 7: *God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom;* but wisdom is a gift of God superadded to nature, according to what is added below in the ninth chapter: *Send her out of thy holy heavens* etc.: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature it is impossible to be a friend of God.

3. Likewise, Dionysius in the book *On the Angelic Hierarchy*: «It is the law of the Godhead to lead back the lower things through the middle, and the middle through the higher»; but the middle goods are the natural powers, the greatest goods are grace and the virtues, which cannot be used ill: therefore according to right order the soul cannot return to God nor please God, unless it be perfected through the gifts of the virtues and of grace.

4. Likewise, there is nothing more excellent according to nature in man than the image itself; but the image is indifferent to being accepted and not accepted: therefore in order that any soul be accepted by God, it is necessary that beyond the natural endowments there be some gift superadded to nature.

5. Likewise, whenever God accepts a soul, he *espouses* it to himself in marriage. Hence he even calls the soul *his bride* in the Canticle. But however excellent any creature may be, it is always infinitely inferior to God: therefore it is never worthy to be taken into marriage, unless God condescends out of mere liberality; and this is to bestow grace: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when God accepts man, he *reckons him as his son,* according to what is said in John 1: *He gave them power to be made the sons of God.* But a creature, however noble it may be, is always the handmaid of God; but a servant cannot be adopted into a son without grace being made for him: therefore it is impossible that any creature be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded.

> **Conclusion.** Man in the state of innocence, in order that he be consecrated as a temple of God, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, had need of grace that makes pleasing.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that *something is said to be accepted by God* in two ways: in one way by a certain general acceptance, so that *to accept something* is the same as *to reckon it good and to conserve it in the good*; and by this acceptance not only the rational creature is accepted, but also every work of God. There is also another, special acceptance, by which God is said *to accept* that which is reckoned worthy of eternal beatitude; and by such an acceptance God accepts none but the rational creature; for that alone is the creature which «is capable of him and can be a partaker of him». And he accepts this rational creature when he *consecrates* it as a temple and *adopts* it as a son and *takes* it into marriage. For the holy souls, which are pleasing to God, are called both the temple of God and called daughters of God and called brides of God, according to what is gathered from the New and the Old Testament.

The first kind of acceptance does not require that a gift of grace be superadded beyond those things which are of the condition of nature. But the second kind of acceptance cannot but be gratuitous, both on account of the gratuitous condescension of God, and on account of the exaltation of the creature beyond the bounds or the state of nature. — For a gratuitous condescension is necessarily required in an acceptance of this kind.

For that God the immense should wish to dwell in the soul as in a temple, that again he should wish to reckon a servant as a son, that he should wish to take his handmaid into marriage; no one doubts that this is of mere grace and of most liberal condescension. — An *exaltation* of the creature also, beyond the state of nature, is found in such an acceptance. For that a creature should be consecrated as a temple, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, this is above the natural completion of every creature; and therefore neither the consecration nor the adoption nor the union of the soul with God comes about through any property of nature, but through some superadded gift of grace, which consecrates the soul, that it may be a temple; assimilates it, that it may be a daughter of God; which adorns the face of the soul, that it may be fit to be the bride of God. And all these things grace that makes pleasing brings about, to which is joined holiness so closely that it can in no way be defiled, a conformity to God joined so closely that it can in no way be made unlike to God; a spiritual comeliness joined so closely that it can in no way be deformed; and therefore it renders the soul acceptable to God. And it is the ground of acceptance according to those three properties aforesaid, which indeed belong to it not according to a figure or transferred sense, but according to *truth* and *propriety*. — And so it is plain that man in the state of innocence had need of grace that makes pleasing in order that he be pleasing to God. And this necessity is taken on the side of the *mode of accepting*.

There could nonetheless be taken yet another ground on the side of the one *accepting*. For God, who made all things for his own glory and stands in need of nothing, most chiefly requires honor from the rational creature. And since we render honor to God when we refer all things to him as to the author and end of all, God decreed not to lead man to the perfection of glory through something that would take its rise from the principles of nature, but through a gift added to the natural endowments, so that from this man might be more pleasing to God and might attribute to God the whole work of his salvation. — And so it is plain that no one can be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded to nature; and the grounds adduced for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**

*To 1, 2.* To the grounds for the opposite it is easy to reply from the things that have been said. For the first two authorities are to be understood of acceptance and love according to the general mode; but we are speaking here of acceptance according to the special mode, by which God accepts the soul itself, so as to reckon it worthy of eternal glory.

*To 3.* To that which is objected: *I love them that love me* etc.; it must be said that this is understood of the love of charity, which is not without grace; and this differs very greatly from the natural love by which man loved God for his own sake and above all things, as was shown above, in the third distinction.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work; it must be said that this is true of that *general* acceptance and complacency, by which someone reckons something to be good; but of that acceptance by which someone so accepts something as to reckon himself bound to it to repay something great, it does not hold true. For this is found only with regard to a divine work, which has free choice, and with regard to which praise and blame are by nature in place.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that nature as instituted, apart from all grace, would be wholly beautiful and without stain; it must be said that even if it were without stain, it would nevertheless not be wholly beautiful with that beauty which is from grace. For the beauty of grace is conciliative of holy love, according to what the Gloss says upon that verse of the Psalm: *That he may make the face cheerful with oil;* the Gloss: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for conciliating holy love».

*To 6.* To that which is objected, whether God could make such a nature as would be acceptable to him without a gift of grace; it must be said that although he himself could do all things as omnipotent, nature nevertheless would not be capable, whence the impossibility comes on the side of the creature. For if he were to do this, it would be nothing else than to make the gift of grace to be a gift of nature, and grace to be nature. But this is impossible, since the gift of grace is beyond the bounds of nature. Hence just as it is impossible that man be made *blessed by nature* by God, although he can be created blessed, because beatitude consists in a good that is above all nature; so also is it to be understood in the matter of grace. — *Moreover*, granted that he could do it, he nonetheless did not decree it, because it was not fitting. And the ground of this has been stated, namely that from this the divine glory be preserved, to whose prejudice God accepts no one; and that grace itself likewise be preserved, which can in no way and ought in no way to be *ungratuitous*; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that it be reckoned to be given gratuitously.