Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/29/q/bon-sent-II-d29-a1-q2
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### Article I. *On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.*
### Question II. *Whether man in the state of instituted nature could merit without the gift of grace.*

Secondly it is asked, whether man in the state of instituted nature could go forth into a meritorious work without the gift of grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. Augustine in the book *On Nature and Grace*: « Who does not know that man was so made that in him free choice was established for living righteously according to its possibility and capacity »? Therefore it seems that by the natural freedom of choice he could live righteously, and therefore also do meritorious works.

2. Likewise, Damascene: « Remaining in that which is according to nature, we are in virtue »; but virtuous works are meritorious: therefore free choice, remaining in the integrity of its nature, could without any grace do meritorious works.

3. Likewise, *the works of God are perfect*, and « a thing is perfect, as the Philosopher holds, when it attains its proper virtue »: therefore if man was created perfect, he could go forth into the operation for which he was made; but this is the operation by which one arrives at glory: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in all creatures, if they are distant from their term, to which they are ordered, a power has been given by which they may be able to arrive at that end, just as is evident in fire, which, when it is below, can by its lightness be borne upward: therefore either free choice was more wretched than the other creatures, or, if the other creatures by nature have the power of arriving at their end, it seems much more strongly that man too could have this by the virtue of nature before the state of misery.

5. Likewise, « nature does nothing in vain nor falls short in necessary things »; but nothing is more necessary to man than that without which he cannot be made blessed: therefore, since the power of meriting is of this kind, it seems that this belonged to him by nature, every grace set aside.

6. Likewise, grace being set aside, let us understand that man in the state of nature keeps the divine commandments; either therefore *he merits something*, or *nothing*. If *nothing*, then he works in vain; but to work in vain cannot be without some penalty; but this could not be in instituted nature. If *he merits something*, since a right work is ordered to beatitude, it seems that from pure natural endowments he can merit the eternal reward.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter six: *The grace of God is eternal life*; and the Gloss: « God crowns nothing else in us than his own gifts ». Both from the text and from the Gloss it is gathered that one does not happen to merit eternal life without grace.

2. Likewise, God in no way needs our goods: therefore if he accepts our goods, this is not on account of any usefulness to himself, but if it is, this is through mere benignity: therefore unless the divine justice condescends through grace, it seems impossible that it should reckon anyone worthy of glory on account of any works that he does.

3. Likewise, merit and reward ought to be proportionate; but nature, however eminent, is disproportionate and of another genus than is the beatitude of glory: therefore it is impossible to merit glory through pure natural endowments.

4. Likewise, substance is nobler than operation; but God never accepts a man without the gift of grace: therefore neither does he reckon a man's operation meritorious, unless it proceeds from free choice and from grace.

### Conclusion

> Man in the state of instituted nature could not without grace do a meritorious work, on account of the condition both of the one who rewards and of the reward.

**I respond:** It must be said that grace is necessary for meriting not only according to the state of fallen nature, but also according to the state of instituted nature, although according to the state of fallen nature free choice has greater need of the gift of grace. — For in the state of instituted nature grace was necessary, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and also on account of the condition of the reward. On account of the condition of the one who rewards: because God himself does not need our goods; therefore he neither accepts man on account of his works, nor can any merit bind him according to the account of what is given and received; therefore, in order that some good work of his creature may be pleasing to God for rewarding, it is necessary that the influence of his gratuitous goodness precede in the one working, through which the creature may exist as pleasing to its Creator. — Likewise, on account of the condition of the reward, it was impossible for free choice to merit without the help of grace that makes pleasing, for the reason that that reward which we merit is eternal beatitude. But eternal beatitude consists in having him who is the whole and supreme good, and who is exalted above every nature and *dwells in inaccessible light*; and therefore it is impossible that man should by meriting ascend and arrive at that supreme good, except through some help which is beyond nature. — Thus therefore man in the state of instituted nature could not merit without the gift of grace, both on account of the condition of the one who rewards, and on account of the condition of the reward.

But in the state of fallen nature he needs grace for meriting not only on account of these conditions, but also on account of the condition of the one working and of the meritorious operation. — For the one working in the state of fallen nature is always in sin and an adversary and enemy of God, unless he be relieved from sin through the gift of grace; and therefore, whatever he does, unless his will be anticipated by grace which reconciles him to God, he merits nothing by the merit of condignity, for the reason that he is an adversary and enemy of God. But God does not accept works, unless he first accept the person, as is intimated in Genesis the fourth:

*The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his gifts*; he says first *upon Abel*, and afterwards he says *upon his gifts*. — Also on account of the condition of the operation grace is necessary, because no operation is meritorious unless it is right; and none is right, unless it be done from a right intention; and no intention can be right except that which prefers the supreme good above every good. But no intention can do this in the state of fallen nature without the gift of grace. And therefore, of whatever kind or however great an operation a man does without grace, he does not merit, because God does not weigh *how much*, but *out of how much* he does this.

It is evident, therefore, that the necessity of grace for meriting is manifold, namely on account of the conditions of the one who rewards and of the reward, of the one working and of the good operation, so that this fourfold necessity concurs for the state of fallen nature, and a twofold for the state of instituted nature. And this is what the Master says in the text, that man needed operating and cooperating grace according to the state of instituted nature, although not according to every mode of operating grace.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of Augustine and Damascene, it must be said that this was said, not because the power of free choice and of nature is sufficient for a meritorious work, but because nature well-ordered agrees with grace and disagrees with fault.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that *the works of God are perfect*; it must be said that there is a perfection with respect to first being, and there is a perfection with respect to second being. And the perfection with respect to second being is twofold. For there is a certain one which has its origin from the perfection according to first being, just as that perfection which is observed in accidents, which arise from the principles of the subject. There is another perfection with respect to second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, but rather is above it, just as is the perfection in gratuitous or glorious being, which indeed is *in us*, not *from us*, but *from God*. When therefore it is said that *the works of God are perfect*, this is understood with respect to first being and with respect to second being, which is caused by him. But with respect to that second being, which is not caused by the perfection according to first being, it is not true. For God did not make all blessed and glorious, but he beatified those alone *whom he predestinated to be made conformed to the image of his Son*; for this he disposes to give through merits as a laudable good. And the reason for this was assigned above, in the twenty-seventh distinction.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that other creatures can arrive at the end for which they are, through the virtue of nature; it must be said that it is not alike, because the end of the rational creature is the supreme good, which is above every nature. But the end of other creatures is a created good, which is below the bounds of nature: therefore the rational creature has greater need of the gift of grace, that it may be able to arrive at its end, than the other creatures.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that nature does not fall short in necessary things; the response is already evident from what has been said. For this is understood of necessary things which indeed are observed with respect to first being, or with respect to second being which is caused from the principles of nature. But with respect to that second being which is above nature, it is necessary that nature fall short, and such is gratuitous and glorious being. Yet from this no prejudice arises to nature, because God supplies the defect of nature and is always at hand, when time and place present themselves, to complete and to give what nature could not.

*To 6.* To that which is objected last, whether man would merit something or nothing, if he did works; it must be said that he would not merit something of condignity, but of congruity; and thus by meriting he would dispose himself to grace, and therefore he would not work in vain. — From what has been said it is evident how much human nature in the state of innocence needed grace.

*(Scholion: see a1-q1. SCHOLION III and IV of that article concern these two questions jointly: « Few of the ancients treat these two questions explicitly ».)*

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