Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/29/q/bon-sent-II-d29-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature.*

Secondly it is asked whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature. And that he was, it seems:

1. By the text of Genesis 1: *Let us make man to our image and likeness.* But as Augustine expounds, and as was held above in the sixteenth distinction, the image is in things of nature and the likeness in things of grace: therefore if man was made to the image and likeness, it seems that he was created at the same time in things of nature and things of grace.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 17: *God created man of the earth;* and afterwards: *And according to himself he clothed him with virtue:* therefore man from his condition was clothed with virtue at the first; and if so, the same conclusion returns as before.

3. Likewise, the Damascene: "God made man innocent, upright, virtuous, without anxiety, without sadness, adorned with every virtue, ornamented with all gifts"; therefore it seems that man was created in things of grace.

4. Likewise, this seems so by reason. God made man perfect as to age and as to knowledge from the very beginning of his condition: therefore by like reasoning it seems that he made him perfect as to rectitude of will; but rectitude of will consists in the gift of grace: therefore it seems that he had the gift of grace at the beginning of his condition.

5. Likewise, for grace to be given to anyone, divine liberality and the fitness of the recipient are required; but God in the beginning, when he created Adam, was most liberal, and Adam from the beginning of his condition had the fitness for receiving grace: therefore from the very beginning of his condition God conferred grace upon him.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine says that "man at the beginning of his condition had whereby he could stand, but not whereby he could advance."

2. Likewise, the Master above in the twenty-fourth distinction: "Man could by the help of the grace of creation resist evil, but not perfect the good"; but if he had had grace making-gracious from the beginning of creation, he could have done both: therefore if he could not perfect the good, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace; but in man grace precedes glory: therefore by like reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, nature preceded the gift of grace in time.

4. Likewise, by grace a marriage takes place between God and the soul; but it is the law of marriage that it not take place without mutual consent: therefore it seems that grace ought to be given to no adult unless consent precedes. If therefore Adam existed before he could consent, then he did not have nature and grace at the same time.

5. Likewise, the gift of grace is fruitless unless it is recognized to be from God; for no one can keep grace within himself unless he is grateful to God for it: therefore if that which is superadded to things of nature holds the account of the gratuitous more than that which is implanted by nature; and the gift of grace is purely gratuitous: therefore it seems that the gift of grace was conferred on man not from creation itself, but afterwards.

### Conclusion

> *It is more probable that Adam had things of nature prior in time to things of grace.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.

For some wished to say that man was created not only in things of nature, but also in things of grace, both on account of God's liberality and on account of man's fitness.

But since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound the contrary, therefore there is another, more common and more probable opinion, that man had things of nature prior in time to having things of grace. Hence according to this opinion in the state of innocence two times are distinguished: for there was a certain time in which he had only things of nature; and a certain other in which he had both things of nature and things of grace. And according to the diversity of this twofold time the apparent contrariety in the authorities of the Saints is resolved. For some seem to say that man had grace, others that he did not, and both speak truly for different times.

Now the reason why the Lord willed to give grace after nature, when he could have given them together, is taken from a threefold order, namely from the order of wisdom, of goodness, and of justice. — The order of wisdom required this, that, just as gratuitous *being* is of another genus than natural *being*, so it should be conferred upon man at different times; and just as the elements of the world were created and distinguished prior in time to being adorned, for the commending of the order of wisdom: so likewise it should come to pass concerning man, who is a lesser world. — The order of goodness also befitted this; for by this order a thing is said to be ordered to its end. Therefore grace is then given to man in an orderly way, when it is given to him insofar as it is more useful and more fruitful. But the grace of God is the more useful and fruitful to us, the more gracious we are to God on account of it; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that from the very order of giving it might be recognized that the gift is gratuitous; and therefore it was not implanted from creation, but was superinfused upon a nature already perfect and constituted. — The order of justice also required this; for God according to the common law requires some preparation and disposition on our part for his infusing grace into anyone, whether in the one into whom he infuses it, as in an adult, or in another helping, as happens in an infant. And therefore grace was not created together with man, but was deferred, until man through the act and use of reason should in some way dispose himself to receive it, so that thus might be verified that saying of Augustine concerning the first man: "He who created you without you does not justify you without you."

It is clear, therefore, that a manifold order required this, that man should first be made in things of nature, before he should be adorned with the gifts of grace; and the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected: *Let us make man to the image and likeness,* etc.; it must be said that the likeness is there understood in things of grace *gratuitously given*. — Or it must be said that God is said to have made man to his image and likeness, not because as soon as he gave the image he also gave the likeness at the same time, but because he gave the one, namely the image, and made him fit for the other, namely for the likeness, which he afterwards gave him in due place and time. Hence as far as the force of the word goes, it cannot be concluded that the image of God and the likeness were in man at one and the same time.

*To 2 and 3.* And by this is clear the response to the two following authorities, namely of Ecclesiasticus and of the Damascene, for they are understood thus: not that God, as soon as he created man, clothed and adorned him with virtue, but that he then made him disposed, and not long after in time completed it.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the perfection of age and of knowledge, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the perfection of age and of knowledge is not so far removed from the perfection of nature as is the perfection of grace. Hence man by the power of nature implanted in him can attain to perfect age and advance to knowledge, but man can never by himself attain to the habit of grace, unless God infuses it of his pure goodness.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that man was fit and God was most liberal; it must be said that God awaited a greater fitness, which indeed would befit the order of wisdom and of goodness and of justice, as was shown before; and therefore he did not give grace at once, but deferred it, because God so works liberally that nevertheless his liberality does not exclude wisdom nor justice.

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