Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/29/q/bon-sent-II-d29-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the quantity of grace in the state of innocence.*

Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked how much grace the first man had.

And first there is the question concerning the quantity of the first man's grace with respect to the *multitude* of the gifts. Second, with respect to the *magnitude* of the gifts.

### Question I. *Whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall. And that he did, it seems:

1. *First*, by Damascene, who says that God made « man surrounded by every virtue and adorned with all goods »: therefore it does not seem that any habit of virtue which is in us was lacking to him.

2. Likewise, on the side of *cognition* we do not know more things than Adam knew, nor do we have more sciences in us: therefore by parity of reasoning, on the side of *affection*, it does not seem that we have more habits of virtues in us than the first man had.

3. Likewise, there is a connection among the virtues, as the Saints say, and as will be shown in its place in the third [book]: therefore if Adam had any virtue, it was necessary that he had them all: therefore he had as many as we have.

4. Likewise, either we *have* some virtue which Adam did not have, or not. If not: then he had as many virtues as we have. If so: then either Adam was capable of that virtue, or not. If not: then it seems that through sin the capacity for the good has grown in us; which is absurd to say. If so: since God gave grace to Adam according to his capacity, it seems that every virtue which he confers on us after the fall, he also conferred on Adam himself before the fall.

**On the contrary:**
1. The virtue of *fortitude* consists in the enduring of terrible things; but in Adam, in the state of innocence, there could be no such enduring: therefore neither [could there be] fortitude.

2. Likewise, *temperance* consists in restraining the depraved passions of the flesh; but such [passions] could not be found in established nature: therefore neither [could there be] temperance.

3. Likewise, *penance* consists in the detestation of evils committed; but in the state of innocence it in no way happened that one should grieve over evils committed: therefore at that time the virtue of *penance* could not exist in man.

4. Likewise, whoever has the gift of *perseverance* does not fall from righteousness; but Adam fell from righteousness: therefore he did not have *perseverance*. But many have this in the state of fallen nature: therefore not every virtue which now exists existed in the state of innocence.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** The gifts of grace freely given are related, in man before and after the fall, as exceeding and exceeded; but the gifts of sanctifying grace existed in equal multitude in both states.

**I respond:** It must be said that when a comparison is made of the multitude of the gifts of grace to the state of fallen nature and the state of established nature, this can be understood either of the gifts of grace freely given, or of the gifts of sanctifying grace. — If it be understood of the gifts of grace freely given, then they are related as exceeding and exceeded, for the reason that Adam had certain gifts of grace freely given in that state, such as immortality and impassibility, which none of his posterity had; and his posterity have certain gifts of grace freely given which he did not have, such as the grace of healings and the working of miracles and the kinds of tongues and the like. — Now the reason for this diversity arises from this, that some gifts were expedient for that time, and others belong to this one.

But if we speak of the gifts of sanctifying grace, then, since those gifts have a connection with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, it must be granted that they existed in equal multitude in the first man, in which they are found in his posterity. This I say with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, as the reasons brought forward for the first part show. But with respect to the acts which have an imperfection annexed, it did not happen that virtues, according to that state, were posited in Adam.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And through this the answer to the three objections is clear, of which one is about fortitude, another about temperance, and the third about penance; all of which proceed according to acts having some imperfection annexed; which imperfection indeed does not belong to those virtues according to every state, but only according to the state of present misery.

*To 4.* But to that which is objected concerning perseverance, it must be said that perseverance in one sense means the resolve of persevering in the good: and in this sense it is a virtue or a disposition following the virtues inseparably. In another sense perseverance is the continuation in the good unto the end; and thus it does not denote a habit, but rather denotes a state, and this the first man did not have. Yet from this it does not follow that he lacked any virtue during the time in which he remained in grace.

But if anyone should ask of what sort were the acts which the virtues had in the first man, [the virtues] which have an imperfection annexed in their acts according to the state of fallen nature; it must be said that those acts in the state of innocence were for the most part conformed to the acts which the virtues are to have in the homeland; but of what sort these are, the Master determines in the third book, distinction thirty-three, and there, in its place, it will be determined, God granting.