Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/29/q/bon-sent-II-d29-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the gratuitous gifts were equally efficacious for meriting in man before and after the fall.*

Whether the gratuitous gifts were of equally great efficacy for meriting before the fall, as they are after the fall. And that they were of greater efficacy then than now, it seems.

1. The more perfect the knowledge, the more perfect the love; and the greater the love, the more acceptable our work is to God. The first proposition is plain from this, that you love as much as you know. If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the knowledge was clearer, it seems that charity was more efficacious for meriting.

2. Likewise, «that is whiter which is more unmixed with black»: therefore that is more meritorious which has less of demerit in itself; but all our merits are in some way mixed with fault, according to that of Isaiah sixty-four: *All your righteous deeds are like a menstruous cloth.* If, then, in Adam according to the state of innocence the merits had been wholly unmixed with fault, it seems that according to that state the gratuitous gifts were of much greater efficacy.

3. Likewise, merit is from grace together with free choice: the more, therefore, that free choice obeys grace, the more efficaciously grace goes forth into its act; but then nature was more obedient to grace than now, when it is corrupted: therefore then the gratuitous gifts were more efficacious for meriting.

4. Likewise, the love of visible things and solicitude about earthly things impede a man from being joined to God perfectly: if, then, in the first state no concupiscence flourished in man, it seems that he adhered to God more perfectly and more continuously, and so was more disposed for meriting.

**On the contrary:**

1. Second to Timothy, chapter two: *He is not crowned unless he has striven lawfully*; but a man is more assailed according to the state of fallen nature than according to the state of instituted nature: therefore if he conquers these struggles, he triumphs more gloriously; and if he triumphs more gloriously, he merits a greater crown: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that «art and virtue are concerned with difficult things»: therefore if this is true of itself, the more difficult the act of virtue, the more virtuous; and the more virtuous, the more efficacious for meriting: if, then, there is greater difficulty in fulfilling the divine commandments now, than there would be in the state of instituted nature; it seems that the efficacy for meriting is greater.

3. Likewise, if man had stood, either Christ would not have been incarnate, or, if he had been incarnate, he would never have suffered; but Christ by his passion did not merit for himself, but for us, and both our merits and the Sacraments have their efficacy from the passion and faith in it. If, then, among all things whatsoever that can please God, this was most acceptable to God, that Christ offered himself a victim to God and the Father, and from this our merits take their efficacy, and the merits in the state of instituted nature would not have had that efficacy: therefore it seems that they would not be more efficacious.

4. Likewise, «nature does not fail in necessary things», as the Philosopher says; if this is true in created nature, much more is it true in uncreated nature; and if divine providence does not fail the oxen, of which it has less care, much less does it fail men. But human nature stands more in need of being helped than it would need before the fall: therefore it seems that now God gives to man a stronger and more efficacious help. If, then, the efficacy of merits is reckoned according to the magnitude of charity and grace, it seems that now the gratuitous gifts are of greater efficacy in meriting.

### Conclusion

> It is reasonably gathered that now, by reason of greater difficulty and by reason of grace, the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, but not by reason of the promptitude of the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that the efficacy of merit comes principally from three things, namely from the *difficulty of the work*, from the *promptitude of the will*, and from the *magnitude of charity*. — The difficulty of the work contributes much to merit, and contributes so much that a man who is of much less charity than an Angel can merit so as to attain to angelic sublimity, according to what is gathered from that which is said in Matthew eleven concerning John the Baptist: *He who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.* For it is not to be doubted that John was exalted to the orders of the excellent Angels; and yet according to the state of the wayfarer he was of less charity than some of them. — The promptitude of the will also does very much; if the will is prompt according to what it has, it is acceptable for merit. For however great the grace in a man, unless there be a will agreeable to grace, it will never elicit meritorious works; and the more the will is subject to grace and conformed to it, the more a man is exercised in meritorious works. — The magnitude of charity is principally among all things that contribute to merit, because according to its quantity is reckoned the recompense of the substantial reward. For the weight of love is what gives worth to meritorious works.

If, then, a comparison be made of the efficacy of meriting in the gratuitous gifts according to the state after the fall and according to the state before the fall, it can be answered that as to the *first condition*, namely as to *difficulty*, the virtues are more efficacious now than they were then. For now virtue is more assailed and by being assailed is more proved and tested than then, as is plain in the holy Martyrs. — And thus proceed the reasons showing that the gratuitous gifts are now more efficacious for meriting.

But as to the *second condition*, namely as to the *promptitude of the will*, the virtues would have been more efficacious in meriting then than now, because the will then would have been as it were continually in good works pleasing to God without delay; but now, whether from weariness or from surprise, it frequently ceases from good works and is intent sometimes on harmful things, sometimes on useless things, both on account of the difficulty toward good, and on account of the proneness toward evil. And as to this condition there proceed the reasons proving that the gratuitous gifts in the state of instituted nature would have been more efficacious for meriting. — And by this the response to both parts is plain; for they proceed according to diverse ways, according to which the gratuitous gifts stand in meriting as exceeding and exceeded; and there is found in them, according to diverse conditions, a greater and a lesser efficacy. And thus there is no contradiction among those reasons; for both conclude what is true according to a diverse way.

But if it be asked further about the greater efficacy as to the *third condition*, then it must be answered that either a comparison is made of a particular person to a particular person, or of a state to a state. If in the first way; it must be said that they would stand as exceeding and exceeded. For it can be believed quite probably that there are some who have greater grace than some who would have been in the state of innocence, if Adam had stood; but others a lesser grace than some, as it is wont to be said, when the state of the written Law is compared to the state of the evangelical Law. — But if a state be compared generally to a state, then it does not seem altogether certain in which state the Lord would have bestowed on man the greater gift of charity and grace, because according to diverse conditions there is found a greater and a lesser fitness in the man receiving; and what is more, the magnitude of the grace distributed is reckoned rather according to the *discretion* of the distributor, which lies hidden from our knowledge. This part, however, seems more probable and more consonant with the authorities, so that we say that God has bestowed greater gifts of grace on fallen man than he would have given to man, if he had remained in the state of innocence: both because man stands in need of greater help of grace; and also because it befits God to draw a greater good out of evil than is the good that is harmed by taking away the evil; and also because the Mediator and Intercessor *intercedes for us*, whom it befits to be *heard in all things for his reverence*. Hence, since he appears before the face of God always to intercede for us, and was offered for us on the cross and is daily offered; it seems quite probable that a greater gift of grace is bestowed on us than if he had not been incarnate or offered for us. And this seems expressly to be intimated in John seven, when it is said that *the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.* Hence when he ascended on high, then *he gave gifts to men.* From this threefold reason, therefore, of which one is in the commendation of mercy, and the second in the commendation of wisdom, and the third in the commendation of divine justice; it is gathered quite reasonably that now the gratuitous gifts are more efficacious for meriting than in the state of innocence, not only by reason of difficulty, but also by reason of grace and charity; although it can be said not absurdly that there was greater efficacy in meriting then than now, by reason of the promptitude of the will. — And by this way proceed the reasons which are adduced for the first part, as is plain to one who attends; for otherwise they do not compel.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that the love was then greater because the knowledge was greater; it must be said that this is true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the concupiscible power; but it is not true of the love insofar as it stands on the part of the grace elevating the soul. And if one object that both are commensurate with knowledge; it must be said that this is not true of every knowledge, but of experiential knowledge; and this did not flourish more in the first parent than in holy men, who were and are in the state of fallen nature.

*To 2, 3, 4.* But to that which is objected, that merit was more unmixed with demerit in the state of innocence: it must be said that this comes from this, that the will is not so prompt on account of the heaviness of the conjoined flesh and the proneness of the contracted concupiscence; and that reason proceeds on the part of the promptitude of the will; and likewise the two following reasons.

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