Dist. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-littera
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### *Distinction 3.*

### *Part I.*

### Ch. I. *Of what kind the Angels were made.*

Behold, it has been shown where the Angels were, as soon as they were created. Now it is consequent to investigate of what kind they were made in the very first beginning of their condition. And four [things] indeed seem to have been attributed to the Angels in the beginning of their subsistence, namely a *simple essence*, that is indivisible and immaterial; and *personal distinction*; and, by a reason naturally implanted, *intelligence, memory*, and *will* or *love*; also *free choice*, that is the free faculty of inclining the will either to good or to evil. For they could, through free choice, without violence and coercion, be turned to either alternative by their own will.

### Ch. II. *Whether all the Angels were equal in essence, wisdom, [and] freedom of choice.*

Here it must be considered whether in their spiritual substance and rational wisdom and freedom of choice, which were in all, all were equal — so that the first consideration is about *substance*, the second about *form*, the third about *power*. For the person is substance, wisdom is form, choice is power. And to *substance* indeed pertains the subtlety of nature, to *form* the perspicacity of intelligence, and to *power* the aptitude of the rational will. — Those rational essences, therefore, which were persons and were spirits and by nature simple and by life immortal, are rightly understood to have had a differing tenuity of essence and a differing perspicacity of wisdom and a differing aptitude of choice; just as in bodies there is some difference according to essence and form and weight: for some have a better and worthier essence and form than others, and some are lighter and more agile than others. In this way, then, it must be believed that those spiritual natures received, befitting their purity and excellence, differences both in essence and in form and in faculty in the beginning of their condition, by which some were constituted higher, others lower, by the wisdom of God, bestowing greater gifts on some, lesser on others, so that those who then by natural goods excelled others, these also afterward by the gifts of grace would preside over the same. For those who were created by nature more subtle and by wisdom more perspicacious, these also were endowed with greater gifts of grace and constituted more excellent than others in dignity. But those who were made by nature less subtle and by wisdom less perspicacious, had lesser gifts of grace and were constituted lower by the wisdom of God, ordering all [things] with an equable governance. In the very faculty of choice a difference is to be noted according to the differing power of nature and the differing force of cognition and intelligence. And just as a differing vigor and subtlety of nature does not bring infirmity, and a lesser cognition does not introduce ignorance of wisdom, so a lower freedom imposes no [necessitated] will of necessity on the choice.

### Ch. III. *What [things] the Angels had in common and equally.*

And just as in the aforesaid the Angels differed, so also they had certain [things] common and equal: that they were *spirits*, that they were indissoluble and immortal, was common to all and equal; but in the subtlety of essence and the intelligence of wisdom and the freedom of will they were differing. These intelligible distinctions of the invisible natures He alone could comprehend and weigh, who made all [things] in weight, number, and measure.

### *Part II.*

### Ch. IV. *Whether they were created good or evil, and whether there was any delay between creation and the fall.*

That too seems worthy of investigation, which is also asked by many, whether the Angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any delay between creation and the fall, or whether without delay in the very beginning of creation they fell. — For some have thought that the Angels who fell were created evil and did not by free choice decline into malice, but were made by God in malice, nor was there any delay between creation and the fall, but from the beginning they apostatized; but others [they thought] were created fully blessed. Those who fortify their opinion by the authority of Augustine on Genesis thus saying: «Not without reason can it be thought that from the beginning of time the devil fell, and never lived at peace with the holy Angels and blessed, but soon apostatized; whence the Lord says: *That one was a murderer from the beginning and stood not in the truth*, that we may understand that he stood not in the truth from the time he was created, who would have stood, had he willed to stand». The same in the same [work]: «It must not without reason, he says, be thought that from the very beginning of time or of his condition the devil fell and never stood in the truth. Whence some [hold] that he was not bent into this malice by free choice, but that he was created — though by God — in this [malice], according to that [text] of blessed Job: *This, he says, is the beginning of the figment of God, which God made, that it might be mocked by His Angels*; and the Prophet says: *That dragon, which You formed to mock him* — as though the devil were made evil and envious from the first, not depraved by [his own] will». — These and other testimonies are used by those who say that the Angels who fell were created evil and fell without delay; but that those who persevered were created perfect and blessed, they establish by the authority of Augustine, who on Genesis says that by «heaven» is signified the spiritual creature, which from the beginning, when it was made, was always both perfect and blessed.

But to others it seems that all the Angels were created good and in the very first beginning of creation existed [as] good, that is without vice, and were *honest*, that is innocent, but not just, that is having the exercise of virtues. For they were not yet endowed with the virtues which were added to those who stood firm in [their] confirmation through grace, while others by free choice became proud, and therefore fell. They also say there was some little delay between creation and the fall and the confirmation; and in that brevity of time all were good, not indeed through the use of free choice, but through the benefit of creation; and they were such as could stand, that is, not fall, through the goods of creation, and [could] fall through free choice. For they could sin and not sin, but they could not advance to the merit of life, unless grace were superadded, which was added to some in [their] confirmation. And to confirm this they use the testimony of Augustine, who on Genesis says that the angelic nature was first created formless and called «heaven», afterward formed and called «light», when it was turned to the Creator, adhering to Him by perfect love. Whence first it was said: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, and afterward was subjoined: *God said: Let there be light, and light was made*, because in the first [statement] it treats of the creation of the formless spiritual nature, afterward of the formation of the same. — Reason too is opposed to those who say that the Angels were created evil. For that which was theirs from Him could not be not-good, and was wholly good, since it was wholly from Him. In this way it is proved that all the Angels were good when they were first made, but with that goodness which the beginning nature had received.

And therefore Augustine, exterminating the opinion of those who think the Angels were created evil, proves by authority and reason that they were created good; and the foregoing words, which they adduced for themselves, how they are to be understood, he opens, thus saying on Genesis: «All [things], he says, God made very good. The nature of the Angels, therefore, He made good. And because it is unjust that God condemn this in anything which He created, by no merit; it must be believed that not the nature but the evil will is to be punished, nor that his nature was signified when it is said: *This is the beginning of the figment of God* etc., but the airy body which God adapted to such a will, or the very ordination of God, in which He made him useful to the good even against his will, or the very making of the Angel; because, although God foreknew [him] to be evil by will, yet He made him, foreseeing how much good He would do from him by His goodness. It is therefore called the figment of God, because, since God knew that he would be evil by will, that he might harm the good, yet He created him, that from him He might profit the good; and He did this, that he might be mocked. For he is mocked when his temptation profits the Saints; just as also evil men, whom God, foreseeing them to be evil, yet created for the utility of the Saints, are mocked, when by their temptation an advance is afforded to the Saints. But he himself is the beginning, because he precedes in antiquity and in primacy of malice. But this mocking is done to the evil angels and evil men through the holy Angels, because He subjects to them the evil angels and evil men, that they may [prevail] not as much as they strive, but as much as they are permitted». — Behold, he plainly shows how the aforesaid words of Job are to be understood, and he asserted the angelic nature to have been created good.

Then, how the words of the Lord which he set forth above are to be taken, Augustine opens, where he also determines his own words which he had foretold, evidently teaching that the Angels were created good and after creation, some little delay being interposed, fell, thus saying: «That it is thought the devil never stood in the truth, never led a blessed life, but fell from the beginning, is not to be so taken that he be thought created evil by the good God, because from the beginning he would not be said to have *fallen*. For he did not fall, if he was made such, that is evil. For from what

would he fall? Made therefore first, he at once turned himself away from the truth, delighted by his own power, and did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, which, received, he did not loathe, but by not willing to receive it he lost. He could not therefore be foreknowing of his own fall, because *wisdom is the fruit of piety*. But continuously, as he was made, he fell, not from that which he received, but from that which he would have received, had he willed to be subject to God». — Behold, here he plainly declares that the Angels were created good and after creation fell; and there was there some little delay, though very brief. Which Origen confirms on Ezekiel, saying: «The serpent, an enemy contrary to the truth, did not however from the beginning nor at once walk upon his breast and belly; just as Adam and Eve did not at once sin, so also the serpent for a time was not a serpent, while he tarried in the paradise of delights; for God did not make malice». — Behold, he plainly says that after creation, a little delay being interposed, [the devil] fell. And therefore those words seem to be taken thus: *He was a murderer from the beginning* or *a liar*, that is, immediately after the beginning, when he promised himself equality with God and slew himself, who is called «man» in the Gospel. *Nor did he stand in the truth*, because he was not in it, but from the beginning of time, that is immediately after the beginning of time, he apostatized. It can also be taken thus: *From the beginning he was a murderer* or *a liar*, that is, from the time man was made, whom through envy he cast down into death and deceitfully seduced. From the aforesaid, then, it is clear that all the Angels were created good, and that after creation some fell from the good which they would have had, had they persevered.

### Ch. V. *Of the threefold wisdom of the Angels before the fall or confirmation.*

Here it is wont to be inquired what wisdom they had before the fall or confirmation. There was in them a threefold natural cognition, by which they knew that they were made, and by whom they were made, and with whom they were made, and they had some knowledge of good and evil, understanding what was to be sought, or to be rejected, by them.

### Ch. VI. *Whether they had any love of God or of themselves before the fall.*

It is also wont to be asked whether they had any love of God or of one another. To which it can be said that they had a natural love, like memory, understanding, and ingenuity, by which they loved God and themselves to some extent, by which however they did not merit.

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