Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the matter of which the Angels are composed is the same as the matter of corporeal things.*

It being secondly granted that they have a composition of matter and form, the name of matter being taken broadly for every potential [principle] which comes with another to a constitution as the foundation of the thing; it is asked concerning that matter whether it is the same as the matter of corporeal things. I do not speak of identity according to numeral essence, as old Socrates is the same to himself [as] a boy according to substance; but I speak according to identity of common nature, so that, just as all rings of gold are said to have the same matter by nature or essence, although it is numerically varied, and one part according to substance is in one, another in another. And that it is the same by essence, it seems.

1. By the authority of Augustine, *On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture*, the first chapter: «Almighty God, out of formless matter, which He Himself first founded from nothing, divided the multiform species of all things, that is, of sensible and insensible, intellectual and lacking intellect». What [is] more express than this?

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: «In every genus there is to be found one first [thing] by which all the things which are in that genus are measured», as the Philosopher holds in the tenth [book] of the First Philosophy; but substance is one genus, not only according to the logician, who considers the intentions of things, but according to the metaphysician, who considers the essences of things: therefore in the genus of substance there is some one [thing] by which all in that genus are measured. But that cannot be an extrinsic principle, since by its greater and lesser intrinsic participation the things of that genus are more and less: therefore since an intrinsic principle is only form or matter, it will be either matter or form. If matter, I have what I propose; if form; but the unity of form necessarily presupposes the unity of matter: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whenever some common passion is in some subjects, it is necessary that it be in them according to something common; but number is in spiritual and corporeal [things] uniformly, because by the same number by which you number ten men, also ten Angels — for the number of the Angels will be supplied from men — therefore it is necessary to find some common nature in them, according to which this passion is [in them]. But this cannot be form: it remains, therefore, that [it is] matter.

4. Likewise, let the matter of corporeal things be abstracted from every form, again the matter of spiritual [things]; either it is distinguished, or not. If not: then they are the same by essence; if so: since every distinction is from form, then it will have form. If you say that perfect distinction is from form, but that just as matter has incomplete being, so also incomplete distinction; on the contrary: that in which spiritual and corporeal [things] most differ is simplicity and composition: but matter abstracted from every form is as simple as a point: therefore it has no partibility: therefore if they do not differ in this, it does not seem [that they differ] in another. If you say [they differ] by capacity; on the contrary: matter is not its capacity by essence: therefore it happens to be abstracted from capacity. Let then the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] be abstracted from capacity; I ask by what they differ; there is none at all to give, no difference to assign: therefore the essence is the same by nature.

5. Likewise, the form of the genus is abstractable from the forms of the species or from the differences; but substance states the form of the genus, corporeal and incorporeal are differences: therefore from these it can be abstracted. But the form of the genus is naturally prior to the form of the differences, as the Philosopher says, that animal is prior to man. Let then the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] be considered under the form of the genus: nor do they differ as to the form which follows the essence of matter itself: therefore much more strongly they do not differ as to matter itself, as it seems.

6. Likewise, when it is said: the matter of corporeal things is matter, the matter of spiritual [things] is matter; either there is agreement in name only, or in relation, or in essence. If in name only: then since there is equivocation in the first principle, then there is no univocation. If in comparison; let it be abstracted from that comparison, then either it will be said by agreement in essence, or pure equivocation.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, twelfth [book] of the Confessions: «Two [things] You made, Lord, one near You, the other near nothing». And again in the twelfth: «There are two [things] lacking in times: one which without any defect of contemplation and without any interval of change enjoys Your eternity; the other which was so formless that it had not [a form] out of which it might be changed into [another] form». If, therefore, [the things] which are rightly divided — one does not enter into the constitution of the other — if the angelic nature is divided against corporeal nature or [the nature] of corporeal things: therefore etc. If you say that he speaks of it according to being; this is nothing, because he speaks of it, as is plain in the antecedents and consequents, according as it was deprived of every form, or as it is understood under all-comprehensive formlessness, and so is considered as immutable: therefore etc. Bede too and other Saints so divide [it].

2. Likewise, whatever [things] communicate in matter are mutually transmutable, as Boethius says in *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*; but spiritual and corporeal [things] are not of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: just as the potency of acting essentially follows form, so the potency of receiving essentially — indeed more essentially — follows matter; but it necessarily follows that, if there are diverse first and essential potencies of certain forms, so that to some effect or act one form is ordered, to which not another, [then] they differ by essence. Since therefore the matter subject to corporeal forms can in no way receive spiritual forms by individual perfection, nor conversely, because never can a body be made from an Angel, nor conversely: therefore they differ by essence.

4. Likewise, partibility is in corporeal things: either then from the part of form, or from the part of matter radically. Not from the part of form, because «every form consists in a simple essence»: therefore principally from the part of matter and originally. Either then it follows matter itself in itself, or not; if not, [then] as if matter is simple, as far as is of itself, like a point: therefore just as a point cannot be matter or a part of a surface, so neither [can] matter [be] a part of a body. And if this is absurd — because dimensions according to an infinite character follow matter in itself: since therefore [matter] is in corporeal and spiritual [things], it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, this is shown from the part of the end, because the Angels were made to see the brightness of the highest light: but the matter of corporeal things is of itself darkness; the more it is intermixed and the more it is united to it, the less it knows and the more it is dark. If therefore the form of the Angel is united to its matter by the greatest indivision, its substance would be most unfit for contemplating the light. If therefore for this alone it was made, it never has matter conformable [to it] by a unity of nature [with] corporeal matter.

6. Likewise, it seems that matter is not to be posited as the measure of the genus of the substance of things, because the [things] which participate more of the character of matter are less beings, and it itself is the most ignoble [thing] in the genus of beings, since [it is] «near nothing». If therefore that one [thing] which is the measure of the genus must be the most perfect in that genus, like whiteness in the genus of color: it is plain etc.

### Conclusion

> By a twofold way it is shown that the solution, both the negating and the affirming, says the truth; but those are asserted to judge better who metaphysically understand matter according to its essence and posit it to be the same.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this question the wise seem to contradict the wise. For great and profound clerics, both in theology and in philosophy, who were more the inquirers of truth, were diversified.

For some posited that matter in spiritual and corporeal [things] differs and has no unity except of analogy. — Others posited that it is one by essence. — But if anyone wishes diligently to consider which of these positions is the more probable and the truer, and to attend to the moving reasons, he will see that each opinion according to diverse ways says the truth, so that neither are deceived.

But the reason of this diverse position was the diverse mode of knowing matter. For matter is knowable in two ways, namely by privation and by analogy. Cognition by privation is, first by removing form, then disposing toward form, and considering the bare essence itself in itself as it were an intelligible darkness. — But cognition by analogy is by a like relation; but the relation of matter is by potency, and so this cognition is by the comparison of matter to form by means of potency. But the potency of matter can be compared to form in two ways: either in so far as it furnishes it a support in the character of a being, and so the metaphysician considers [it]; or under the character of the mobile, and so the natural philosopher considers [it].

Those considering matter, therefore, according to the privation of every form, both substantial and accidental, [say it] is the same; in spiritual and corporeal [things], they said, by essence, because if each matter be separated from all forms and from all accidents, no diversity at all will appear.

But those considering matter according to analogy, namely under the character of potency, in so far as it furnishes the support of form in the character of a being, said it is the same according to analogy, because there a like relation is had. For just as the matter of corporeal things sustains and gives to its forms to exist and subsist, so also the matter of spiritual [things]. There is also there a character of participation according to more and less. For in spiritual [things] it stands under the substantial form only, in the higher bodies under the substantial form and quantity, in the lower under the substantial form and quantity and contrariety. And since that which is purely in the genus of substance participates more of the character of [something] standing per se and independent, but that which approaches more the nature of accidents is more distanced; hence it is that spiritual substances are prior and more truly substances, then the higher bodies, lastly the lower bodies. And these did not say that it was the same properly, because neither is the matter of corporeal things born to sustain spiritual forms, nor conversely. — But those considering according to analogy under the character of potency, in so far as it furnishes the support of form in the character of the mobile, said also that it is the same by analogy. Since, just as in corporeal [things] there is something which sustains the variations as to corporeal properties, so in spiritual [things] as to spiritual [ones]; and there is there a character of prior and posterior in participating. For matter can be a support of variation according to position and form, as in corruptible bodies; or to position only, as in the higher [ones]; or to the reception of influence and habits, and [their] loss, as in spiritual substances.

And according to this consideration matter is properly in corruptible bodies, less properly in incorruptible bodies, least of all in spirits — and hence too it is that they are sometimes called *immaterial*, because they have the least of this possibility — and according to this matter is the lowest. And these did not posit the same matter, since matter in the Angels has not the possibility for the transmutation of substantial forms, nor is it capable of receiving corporeal forms. And hence it is that the Philosopher says that of spiritual and corporeal [things] the matter is not one, considering the potency of matter in relation to form as mobile.

From these [things] the reason of the diversity and the way of these positions is plain, and that they say the truth according to diverse ways and according to diverse modes of understanding. And so the diverse reasons run, and the authorities are found [tending] to opposite parts. And the response to the objections is plain. Nor is there a contradiction, if one rightly understands both.

Or it can be said otherwise, that when we speak of the unity of matter, we speak of it as the resolution of [things] caused [by principles] stands toward it; therefore in three ways we can speak, according as there are three who teach [how] to make resolution to the material principle. For the natural [philosopher], who considers generation and corruption, resolves to matter: to it the universal physicist resolves, who considers every mobile body, whether to position or to form; to it the metaphysician resolves, who considers every being: and each one resolves according to the amplitude of his consideration.

For the lower physicist, who deals with generation and corruption, considers matter as it is the principle of generation and corruption; and so it is only in these lower [things]. And since all such [things] are mutually transmutable, therefore he only says the same matter of the generable and corruptible. — The higher physicist considers matter itself [as] mobile, whether to position or to form, and sees the same passion in the lower and the higher, by which they are mutable to position, like the partibility of the mobile, whose principle is matter; and therefore he resolves to the matter of every corporeal thing, and according to this physicist the matter is the same in all corporeal [things]. — The metaphysician considers the nature of every creature, and most of all of the substance being-per-se, in which there is to consider both the act of being, and this form gives; and the stability of existing-per-se, and this that on which form rests gives and furnishes; this is matter. And since per-se being in spiritual and corporeal [things] states a community, not an equivocation, and a community of genus and of thing, not of analogy only; therefore one must recur to the unity of the principle; therefore according to the metaphysician in all beings-per-se the unity of matter is to be posited.

The consideration of all these philosophers is true, but they judge differently. For the physicist does not say the matter is the same except in corporeal [things], because he never comes to consider matter according to essence, but only according to being; and without doubt it has some being in corporeal [things] which [it does] not in spiritual [ones], and some in corruptible [ones] which [it does] not in incorruptible [ones]. — But the metaphysician considers not only according to being but according to essence; and because, every being abstracted, there is not to be found nor even to feign a diversity in matter; therefore he says it is one by essence.

And therefore, when the theologian treats this question, he either treats it like the natural [philosopher] or like the metaphysician, because he himself can take the modes of all the sciences, since they serve him. If as the natural [philosopher], he will say it is not the same; if as the metaphysician, he will say it is the same by essence, differing according to being. And since the metaphysician judges in a nobler mode than the inferior sciences, therefore those who posited matter the same in spiritual and corporeal [things], raised higher, judged better, although according to diverse considerations both could say the truth, as was shown before.

The reasons proving matter the same by essence in spiritual and corporeal [things] are therefore to be granted, as Augustine manifestly intimates in the book *On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture*, who was a most lofty metaphysician.

1. To what then is objected, that matter is distinguished against the angelic nature; it must be said that he speaks of matter according to being, not according to essence. — Or otherwise, it is distinguished by reason of the actuality which is in the Angel, by reason of which it most highly among creatures approaches God, and by reason of the possibility which is in matter of itself, by reason of which it is near nothing.

2. To what is objected: of which [things] the matter is one etc.; it must be said that he speaks of matter according to being, that is of transmutable matter, by reason of which things are said to be mutually transmutable; and therefore that statement is to be understood according to the physicist and in the genus of the physicist, and the other like statements which say that matter is diverse. For all speak of matter according to being.

3. To what is objected concerning the potency of receiving, it must be said that the potency of matter considered in itself is not more to this form than to another, but rather is related indifferently to every [form]. For matter considered in itself is neither spiritual nor corporeal; and therefore the capacity following the essence of matter is related indifferently to form, whether spiritual or corporeal; but because matter is never despoiled of all being, and that which is once under corporeal being is never stripped [of it], and likewise that which is under spiritual being: hence it is that the matter following being in spiritual and corporeal [things] is one and another.

4. To what is objected concerning partibility, it must be said that this is not by reason of matter itself, because matter, abstracted from every form, is simple; yet it does not have actual simplicity, like a point, but is simple because it lacks actual extension, but has the possibility to it; and when the nature of corporeal form is given to that matter, then it is reduced to act. Whence when it is said that extension is from matter, it is not to be understood that [it is] from matter according to its essence, but according to being, as it receives corporeal form, which is born to be in matter only with extension, although it itself in itself «consists of a simple essence».

5. To what is objected, that matter is darkness; it must be said that it is called darkness by reason of the privation of form, which form is light; and therefore matter with privation would be repugnant to contemplation. And because in the Angels it was made under perfect act, the privation being removed; hence it is that the character of darkness is removed from it; and so that is plain. For it is not darkness by essence, unless perhaps one says darkness comparatively: just as every creature is darkness with respect to the highest light, so also matter can be called darkness both with respect to God and with respect to the form by which it is perfected.

6. To what is objected, that matter is not that by which all [things] are measured; it must be said that, although some have wished to say that matter, by reason of which it is a foundation, gives fixed being, and in that respect there is in it the character of measuring, because it savors and participates more of the nature of the genus of substance, which is more supported in itself; yet that is not fitting to say, that matter itself is that one [thing], since this must be the most complete, as is said in the tenth [book] of the First Philosophy, «that whiteness is the measure of all colors». And therefore it must be said that we do not posit matter as one because it itself is the measure, but because, if matter is not one, it is impossible to posit some one measuring [thing], since that presupposes it. But what that one [thing] is, which is the measure of all [things] which are in the genus of substance, this [belongs] to another inquiry.