Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the matter of corporeal and incorporeal things is one in number.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] is one according to number, or according to another unity. And that it is one in number, it seems thus:

1. Everything which is so one that it does not receive distinction is one in number; matter through its essence is so one that it has no distinction at all according to its essence, because every distinction is from form: therefore it is necessary that matter in all [things] be one in number.

2. Likewise, «everything which is one is one either in genus, or in species, or in number»; but matter is not the same in spiritual and corporeal [things] by a unity of genus or of species, since that is only from form: therefore by division matter is one in number.

3. Likewise, a perfect stopping-point cannot be except in one: therefore just as there is a stopping-point in the genus of the efficient [cause] and the end, so [there is one] in the genus of matter; but in the genus of the first efficient [cause] and the ultimate end the stopping-point is such that there is only one first efficient [cause] by essence, to which all are reduced: therefore it seems likewise, since on the part of resolution there is a stopping-point in the essence of matter, that it is one in number.

4. Likewise, when it is said: the matter of a stone is matter, and the matter of an Angel is matter, it is said either univocally, or equivocally, or the same is predicated of itself. But not equivocally, because then Angel and stone would be called substances equivocally; not univocally, because univocation is only in forms and in those [things] which state form: therefore it must be that the same is predicated of itself: therefore if the matter of a stone and the matter of an Angel are not several matters but one, it remains that matter is one in number in spiritual and corporeal [things].

5. Likewise, let us understand the matter either of spiritual or of corporeal [things] by abstraction from all forms; matter is understood as simple, matter is understood as one, in no way multiplied nor distinguished; but supervening forms do not change the essence of matter, but only [its] being: therefore if it was before, as to essence, one in number, then [it is] now, when it has forms.

6. Likewise, let us understand, by the impossible, that God made an Angel from one stone; then the form and being of the matter would be changed, but the essence would be saved: therefore matter, since it is one by essence, even in this transmutation is the subject of that change; but that change is one in number: therefore matter by essence remains one in number. It is argued therefore thus: if in that Angel so produced and in the pre-existing stone the matter is one in number, and that Angel is as distant from corporeal nature as another Angel: therefore it seems that in the other Angels and in the other corporeal things the matter is one in number.

**On the contrary:**

1. One in number regards individual or individuated being; but matter in corporeal and spiritual [things] is not one by an individual unity: therefore neither is it one according to number. The major is plain; the minor is proved by this, that «whatever [things] are the same in number as some individual are among themselves one in number»; but an Angel does not differ in number from its matter, nor a stone from its [own]: therefore if the matter of a stone and of an Angel is one in number, then stone and Angel are one in number; which is false.

2. Likewise, one and many are differences of being, and of being in act; but matter is wholly a being in potency: therefore if the dividing [members] befit only those to which the divided befits: therefore in no way can matter be called by essence one in number.

3. Likewise, if from one gold diverse vessels are made

after they are made, now that gold ceases to be one on account of the distinction superinduced: since therefore from matter creatures differing in genus and species are made, it seems then that matter is numbered in them: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, opposites are not compossible about the same [thing] in number — this is plain, because they mutually expel one another — but opposite forms are about matter, as it is in diverse [things]: therefore it is impossible that matter be one in number.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that the same in number be a being and a non-being, because between being and non-being there is the greatest distance; but an Angel according to its form and matter is in act; the soul of Antichrist is neither according to matter nor according to form, but rather is to be created according to its whole: therefore it is impossible that the matter of an Angel and of a soul be the same, or of another diverse creature.

6. Likewise, creation is terminated not only at being but also at essence: therefore where there are diverse creations, it is necessary that the terms be diverse by essence; but the creation of the soul of Peter and of the soul of Antichrist is one and another, and in both the essence of matter is produced: therefore it is necessary that matter here and there be other by essence: therefore it is impossible that it be one in number.

7. Likewise, to be simply one in many — this is a property of God, or to be one in all: therefore it does not befit another, or if it befits another, least of all does it befit that which is most distant from God; but matter is most distant from God, since it is near nothing: therefore in no way does it seem to befit it that it itself be one in number in all, or even in many.

### Conclusion

> The matter of spiritual and corporeal things, since it has a unity neither of universality nor of individuation, can according to essence be called one in number by homogeneity.

**I respond:** It must be said that the position of the philosophers and physical men was and is this, that matter in whatever [things] it is, is by essence one and one in number. — And they assign the reason for this, that matter, this very [thing] which it is, is a being wholly in potency; and therefore it must be that in whatever [things] it is, it be by essence one in number.

But this reason is good, which is better plain if it is treated through. For because matter is wholly a being in potency, therefore through its essence it has no act, no form, therefore no distinction; if it has no distinction and is not nothing, it must then be one without multitude, and so one in number. — Further, because [it is] a being wholly in potency, therefore it can be neither a genus nor a species, which state act in some mode; and therefore it cannot be common to those to which it is common by a unity of universality or univocation: therefore it is one neither in genus nor in species, and yet nonetheless is one, and so is one in number. — Again, because it is a being wholly in potency, therefore of itself it is infinite and [open] to infinite forms; but God, because He is infinite, is everywhere one by His infinity, which comes from the perfection of the highest actuality: so also matter, because [it is] infinite, in all things-made-of-matter is one on account of its infinity, which comes from the imperfection of the highest possibility. — Lastly, because matter is a being in potency, its unity cannot be a unity of individuation, whether by continuity, as a mountain is one, or by actual simplicity, as an Angel is one; but if it has a unity, it has a unity of homogeneity. But this unity remains at once in diverse [things], as is plain: if from the same gold many vessels are made, they are of the same gold by homogeneity; but the gold which is in one differs from the gold which is in another to such a degree that they are not one by continuity. If therefore matter is one not by actual simplicity, like an Angel, nor by continuity, like a mountain or a lump of gold, but by homogeneity alone; and this is not removed by the advent of forms: so matter is one under all forms, just as [it is one] all forms being abstracted. But, all forms being abstracted, there is no distinction in matter, but rather it is understood as simply one. Now therefore matter is in all things-made-of-matter one in number, because it is a being wholly in potency; and this is the right reason and cause.

From these [things] for the most part the objections are plain, since from the aforesaid it can be gathered what that unity is by which matter is called one. For it is not an actual unity, of the kind that is the unity of Coriscus in the marketplace and the theater, and of the kind that is the unity of God; but that is

a unity rather of possibility, and can be called [a unity] of homogeneity, which is so ample that it sustains the reception of a greater multitude of diversity of forms superadded than the unity of any universal form, even of the most general genus; and this is on account of the highest possibility. Whence it is called one in number, because it is one without number, just as a sheep lacking a mark, with respect to sheep having a mark, is said to be marked; in this mode matter can be understood [as] one in number.

1. To what then is objected: one in number regards an individual; it must be said that it is true in so far as one in number states an accident, or in so far as it follows actual being; but it is not true in so far as it regards essence, since in this mode it extends to a unity of greater capacity than is individual unity; and from that it does not follow that [things] which are the same as one [are the same as one another], etc., just as it does not follow that man and ass are united in animal, therefore they are one among themselves.

2. To what is objected, that one in number is a difference of being in act; it must be said that it is true of the one which states a complete unity. For unity and truth and goodness are properly and completely in a complete creature; nevertheless, however, as Augustine says *On True Religion*, they are found incompletely in matter. As therefore matter is incomplete of itself, so it has a unity according to itself [that is] incomplete, yet possible, as to being, to be completed through form, by whose advent there is constituted an individual one in number by an actual and complete unity, from whose advent also distinction comes to be, and a multitude arises in things.

3. To what is objected concerning gold, it is not similar, because gold has a unity of continuity and of individuation, which is opposed to numeration and discontinuity; and this is because gold, although it is the matter of the cup, is a being in act; not so prime matter with respect to things-made-of-matter, as was shown before.

4. 5. 6. To what is objected, that opposites cannot suffer one another about one [thing], and that the same cannot be at once a being and a non-being, and be introduced into being by diverse changes; to these three [there] is one response, namely that that is true of the [thing] which is so one that its unity is repugnant to multitude, as is one individual; but of the [thing] which is so one that it is not repugnant to multitude, but rather on account of its possibility admits every diversity, it does not hold true; rather it has at once and at one time opposites, can also at once and at one time be in the thing, and can be in the potency of an agent, and be produced by diverse productions, just as [it can] be informed by diverse forms. And this is plain, because the form of humanity is one by a unity of universality; therefore it is at once true that there is a man who is generated, and there is a man who is to be generated, and there is a white man, and there is a black man, and in all these there is one universal form. — But if you say that it is not similar, because humanity is not one in number, like matter; I say that although it is not one in number but in species, yet the unity of matter, which is a unity of homogeneity, is of greater amplitude than humanity itself, and admits a greater diversity. And therefore there is no opposition, no contradiction at all from the comparison of opposites to the unity of matter by essence, but only from the comparison of opposites to the unity of matter according to being. Whence just as, if two cups are made of conformable gold, one can be destroyed, the other remaining, or one produced, the other being in produced being; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

For if anyone wishes to understand the unity of matter, he must abstract the mind from individual unity and ascend above the act of imagination and conceive [it] wholly [as] a being in potency through privation; and so he will be able somewhat to grasp [it]. For as long as matter is conceived as extended mass, the unity of essence considered is in no way attained.

7. To what is objected last is plain enough. For just as God is infinite, and matter [is] infinite, yet by another mode of infinity, which is rather by recess than by access; whence it does not befit form but matter: so it must be understood of that unity. For God is one in many, so that [He is] most perfect and wholly act, and this is of Him alone; but matter is one in all, and this because by its essence it cannot be distinct; not so is it of form. And so all [the objections] are plain.