Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the personal property in the angels is substantial, or accidental.*

Secondly it is asked whether the personal property is in the angels accidental, or substantial. And that [it is] accidental, seems [so] thus.

1. Boethius says that « every property flows from the genus of accidents, not only the property of an individual, but also of a species »; but the individual approximates accidents more than the species [does]: therefore much more strongly is an individual property of the genus of accidents. But personal distinction is an individual property: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor says, « that in divine [things] there is personal distinction by *origin*, in the angels by *quality*, in men by *either mode* »: if therefore both *quality* and *origin* state an accidental property in creatures, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, Porphyry says, « that the individual is constituted from properties, the collection of which it is impossible to find in another »: but such are accidental properties: therefore individuation is through accidents. But personal distinction is through the same [things] through which individuation is: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, human nature in Christ did not have personality nor personal distinction; but it is established that it had the [things] which are essential to a rational substance: therefore personal distinction is not substantial or essential either to man or to angel.

5. Likewise, all accidents being circumscribed, a thing does not fall under sense, but only under intellect; but « the universal [is grasped] while it is understood, the singular while it is sensed »: therefore, accidents being circumscribed, individuation is circumscribed, therefore also personal distinction, and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, personal distinction is a distinction according to *number*; but, quantity being circumscribed, it is not [possible] to understand number: therefore neither [to understand] personal distinction. But the *substantial* is understood, the accidental being circumscribed: therefore if personal distinction cannot be understood, accidents being circumscribed, therefore it is not substantial to an angel, but rather accidental.

**On the contrary:** 1. It is argued first through the text. For the Master says that « the first consideration is concerning substance », and under the first consideration he comprehends personal distinction: therefore it seems that personal distinction is substantial to an angel.

2. Likewise, « a person is nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature »; but an individual substance, insofar as [it is] of this kind, is in the genus of substance not by reduction, but directly, according to a straight line: therefore, insofar as [it is] of this kind, it is in the genus of substance: therefore personality is not in the genus of accident, because in the same genus is the white, insofar as white, and whiteness: therefore personality and person [are] in the same genus.

3. Likewise, « no accident is except in an individual substance »: therefore every accident follows the individuality of the essence, and both in the rational and in the irrational this holds true: therefore prior by nature is something individual of a rational substance, before it has an accident: therefore prior [is] the person: therefore also the distinction in personality.

4. Likewise, [things] which differ in personality differ in their substantial principles, as is plain in Peter and Paul; and [things] which thus differ are discerned substantially: therefore personal distinction states a substantial difference: therefore it is not an accidental property.

5. Likewise, there is no greater distinction in accidents than between opposites; but opposites do not make personal distinction, because one man is first white, afterwards black, first a boy, afterwards an old man; and yet he is the same individual and one person: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, diverse accidents, when they are in one  supposit, are one in number, like the grammatical and the musical: but this would not be [so], if diversity according to number or according to personal distinction came from accidents: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The personal property is not caused from accidents, but from the actual conjunction of principles, and in itself is something substantial; but that which follows upon this is in some mode in the genus of accidents.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that about this there is a threefold mode of speaking.

For some wished to say that personal distinction is an accidental property, because they say that it *is* in the genus of accident, and that it is also *caused* from accidents, like numerical distinction. But in this there is a difference, because *numerical* distinction is caused from a diversity of properties in which rational and irrational creature share; but *personal* distinction [is caused] from properties which are present properly to a rational creature. — But that is disproved in objecting through many reasons. Nor can it hold true that *individual* distinction is from accidents, since individuals differ according to substance, not only according to accident; and likewise it is to be understood concerning *personal* distinction.

And therefore another mode is of speaking, that *personal* distinction states an accidental property, which however is not *caused* from accidents, but from substance or substantial principles; just as unity, which is the principle of number, is in the genus of accident, yet immediately has its rise from substance. — But since *person* states the same as a supposit of a rational nature, as it is in the genus of substance; it does not seem probable that personal distinction states an accidental property only.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that *personal* distinction, although it seems to state an accident, because it states [it] through the mode of an accident, yet principally states something substantial; and if in some mode it imports an accident, this is consequently; that [accident] however immediately *has its rise* from substantial principles. — And this is plain thus. Personal distinction adds upon individual distinction; but individual distinction states two [things], namely *individuation* and consequently *distinction.* But individuation is from the indivision and appropriation of the principles; for the principles of a thing themselves, while they are conjoined, mutually appropriate one another and make an individual. But upon this follows being *discrete* or being distinct from another, and from this arises *number*, and so an *accidental* property, consequent upon substance. — And so *individual* distinction states something accidental, and something substantial; but the *personal* adds upon this the dignity of personality. But that dignity states two [things], namely the *nobility of a rational nature*, which is that a rational nature holds the primacy among created natures; whence it is not orderable to a more perfect form. And this nobility, although it be understood through the mode of a quality, yet is *essential* to a rational nature. — That nobility also states an *actual eminence*, so that in the supposit there be no other nature so principal as the rational nature, so that it be as it were *per se sonans* [self-sounding]. And therefore, because this is lacking to it in Christ, created rational nature does not make personality, and this is *accidental.* — It must be said therefore that, just as individual distinction is from the existence of a natural form in matter, so *personal* distinction [is] from the existence of a *noble* and *supereminent* nature in a supposit. And therefore, although on both sides *something substantial* be imported, and likewise *an accidental consequent* — this I say in a creature — yet there is not imported an accidental [thing] which is *caused* or has its rise from an accident, but rather it follows the form in matter, or the nature in the supposit.

From these [things] is plain the truth of the problem and the dissolution of the objections in part. For if it be asked whether personal distinction is a *substantial*, or an *accidental*, property; if it be called a *substantial* property, because it immediately follows substance; thus it must be said to be substantial. If it be called *substantial*, because it does not exit the genus of substance; it must be said that in a certain mode *yes*, and in a certain mode *no.* Likewise if it be called an *accidental* property, because it is *caused* from accidents; thus it must be said simply that *no*; but if [it be called] *accidental*, because it *is* in the genus of accident; thus it can be said that in a certain mode *yes*, in a certain mode *no*, according to the distinction first made.

As to what therefore is objected, that personal distinction pertains to substance, and is not caused from accidents; this whole [thing] is to be conceded.

1. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that every property flows from the genus of accidents; it must be said that Boethius speaks of a *proper passion*, and says that this  flows from the genus of accidents, not because it is not caused from the principles of the subject, but because, although it be *caused* from them, formally it is nevertheless *in* the genus of accidents. In two ways therefore that reason is defective. First, because it errs in the understanding of this name *property.* For there is a property as to the *thing*, and there is a property as to the *mode*; and Boethius understands of that which *really* is a proper passion, not of that which is a property as to the *mode.* But an *individual* property or a *personal* property, although it seem to state a property consequent upon *being*, like an accident, really nevertheless states nothing but the appropriation of principles through indivision; this I say as to the *individual* property. Likewise the *personal* property states beyond this nothing but the dignity or nobility of a rational nature, which nobility is not accidental to it, but rather simply and altogether essential.

The aforesaid reason also errs in the bad understanding of the *predicate*, because *property* is said to *flow* from the genus of accidents, not because it flows from *accidents*, but because it flows from *substance*, existing of the genus of accidents; so in the matter proposed. Whence just as *unity*, which is the principle of number, has its rise from the principles of *substance*, accidentally related to it, but not from any principle which is in the genus of *accident*; so it can be understood concerning *personal* distinction, according to that which in it is accidental, namely the *comparison to another* person, with respect to which it has to be distinguished and numbered; and the *eminence of dignity* in the supposit with respect to another nature, which human nature did not have in Christ.

2. 3. As to what is objected, that personal distinction is through quality; it must be said that it is understood of a quality which is in the genus of quality as to the *mode*, but not as to the *thing.* For by these two the predicaments are distinguished either as to *essence*, or as to *mode*; and something is in the genus of substance which nevertheless has the mode of an accident; whence also it has been customary to distinguish a twofold quality, namely substantial and accidental. — Or it must be said that Richard speaks of personal distinction as to our cognition; and because our cognition is through accidental qualities, he said that created persons are distinguished by quality. — And through this mode is understood the word of Porphyry, who says that the individual is constituted from a collection of properties; for he speaks according to *reason* and cognition, not according to the *thing*; and thus the third [objection] is plain.

4. As to what is objected, that in Christ human nature did not have personality; it must be said that this is by reason of that eminence which *follows* upon nobility; and that supereminence states a certain accidental dignity, as was shown before, which can be lost not only through *loss*, but also through the *super-induction* of a worthier [nature], as will be better said elsewhere.

5. As to what is objected concerning sense and intellect, it must be said that although sense is only of singulars, the intellect nevertheless can be not only of universals, but also of singulars; whence that difference is not to be understood with precision. And this is plain, because the intellect alone comprehends the intrinsic principles of Peter and Plato; and, all accidents being circumscribed, it says them to be discrete and distinct.

6. As to what is objected concerning number, it must be said that just as upon *substantial unity* there follows *accidental* unity inseparably, which is not the principle of *indivision*, but consequent upon it; so upon *substantial diversity* there follows *number* inseparably; yet according to the thing and nature that distinction is from a substantial principle, not an accidental [one]. And so the whole is plain.