Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p1-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material.*

Thirdly it is asked whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material. And that [it is] on the side of the formal principle:

1. Richard says, « that both in the angels and in men there is personal distinction by quality »; but quality is either form, or holds itself on the side of form: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if something is present in certain [things] and is common in them by analogy, it is necessary that it be present through something analogically found in them. But personal distinction is in divine [things] and in the angels analogically; but in divine [things] it is in no way from matter, because God is pure form: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, personal distinction in a creature states the greatest nobility; but what is more noble is most removed from matter and most approaches form: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, personal distinction states the greatest actuality in a creature, because what is such is in no way possible toward another; but everything such follows form, not matter: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, nothing which is one in all is a principle of distinction; matter, as far as it is of itself, is unique: therefore in no way is it a principle of distinction: therefore neither of personal distinction.

6. Likewise, « a definition, as the Philosopher holds, is of an aggregate »: therefore since man is defined, not the form only, but the composite of matter and form is defined: therefore if man in common encloses matter in himself, and the rational nature likewise; if a person adds something upon the nature, since it cannot add matter, it must be that it adds something formal.

**On the contrary:** 1. Boethius: « The species is the whole *being* of individuals »; but *being* is from form: therefore the *individual* does not add form upon the species, therefore neither [does] the *person* [add form] upon the nature. If therefore it adds something, [it adds] either *matter*, or *accidents*; but through *accidents* there cannot be personal or individual distinction: therefore it is necessary that [it be] through *matter.*

2. Likewise, if a person added some form upon the nature, then just as the species is definable, because it adds a difference and form upon the genus, so  too the individual would be definable; which is false.

3. Likewise, if the individual or person adds an individuating form upon the most special species, I ask whether the Creator can make another form altogether like to it. It is established that [He] can, because there is no accidental form whose like we cannot conceive: therefore likewise in a substantial [form]. But if He makes a like [one], that is common to several; but no such [thing] is an individual: therefore it is impossible that personal distinction be from a formal principle superadded to the species.

4. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is distinction according to number; but that is from matter, as the Philosopher says in the first Philosophy: « Matter altogether behaves numerably »: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is being *this*, or *here and now*; but this is matter, because in the book *On the Heaven and the World* it is said, « that it differs to say *heaven* and *this heaven*, because, when I say *heaven*, I say the form; when I say *this heaven*, I say the matter »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, in creatures in which there is personal distinction by origin, it is not on account of anything else, except because the generator generates another; but, as the Philosopher says, « the generator does not generate another except on account of matter »: therefore in created things personal distinction is on account of matter.

### Conclusion

> Insofar as personal distinction states singularity, it, like individuation, arises from the conjunction of a twofold principle; insofar as it states dignity, it follows principally the account of form.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is the same question of *individuation* which is now moved concerning *personal distinction*; and concerning it there was a contention among philosophical men.

For some, leaning on the word of the Philosopher, said that *individuation* comes *from matter*, because the individual does not add upon the species except matter. And they posited this because they said that universals state only *forms*; and then matter is first touched when one arrives at *this something*.

But to others it seemed otherwise, namely that individuation is *from form*, and they said that beyond the form of the *most special species* there is an *individual* form. And what moved these to posit that was that they understood the order in forms according to generation and nature to be by the same mode by which they are ordered in the genus, so that the form of the most general genus comes first to matter; and so descending down to the species. And still that form does not constitute the individual, because it is not wholly in act, but beyond this form an *individual* [form] follows, which is wholly in act, just as matter was wholly in potency.

Each of these positions has something which to a man not much understanding could reasonably seem improbable. For how *matter*, which is common to all, will be the principal principle and cause of distinction, is very difficult to see. *Again*, how *form* would be the whole and chief cause of numerical distinction is very difficult to grasp, since every created form, as far as is of its nature, is born to have another like [itself], just as the Philosopher himself says it to be even in the sun and the moon. Or how shall we say that two fires differ formally, or also the other [things] which are multiplied and distinguished in number from the mere division of the continuous, where there is no induction of a new form?

Therefore there is a third position, sufficiently plainer, that individuation arises from the actual conjunction of matter with form, from which conjunction one appropriates the other to itself; as is plain, when the impression or expression of many seals is made in wax which previously was one, and the seals cannot be multiplied without the wax, nor is the wax numbered, except because there come to be in it diverse seals. If however you ask from what it comes *principally*; it must be said that the individual is *this something.* That it be *this*, it has more principally from *matter*, by reason of which form has its position in place and time. That  it be *something*, it has from *form.* For the individual has *being*, has also *to-exist.* To-exist matter gives to form, but the *act of being* form gives to matter. — *Individuation* therefore in creatures arises from a twofold principle.

But *personal* *distinction* states *singularity* and *dignity.* Insofar as it states *singularity*, this it states from the very conjunction of principles, from which results the *that-which-is* itself. But *dignity* it states principally by reason of *form*; and so it is plain whence personal distinction is originally, speaking in creatures, whether in men or in the angels.

What therefore is objected against the first part proceeds by reason of *nobility* and *dignity*, as it is however in that supposit, or *that-which-is*, whose distinction comes in divine [things] from *origin*, in creatures from *original principles*, as in the first book was shown. But if it be asked: what is that *common* [thing] according to which it is present? it must be said [that it is] the property of dignity incommunicably existing in the hypostasis; yet it is found otherwise here, otherwise there. All the following reasons proceed by the aforesaid way.

1. 2. 3. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that it cannot be *from form*, but *from matter*; it must be said that those reasons prove, as is plain, that it is *not wholly* from form, because no form is individual except through the conjunction of itself with matter. And *universals* likewise, because they state *forms*, do not concern matter except by reason of their individuals, for which they stand when they are defined or made subjects. Whence those reasons are to be conceded, that the individual does not add another form which would be individual of itself.

4. 5. 6. As to what is objected, that individuation is from matter; it must be said that through those authorities it is not given to be understood that matter is the principle of individuation, except as a cause *without which not*, but not as the *whole cause.* Nor however can personal distinction be attributed to matter in the same way as individuation, on account of this, that it states dignity, which more principally regards form, as the reasons to the first part show.

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