Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p1-dubia
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### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which he says, that *four [things] indeed seem to be attributed to the angels.* First, because he seems to *contradict* himself in the enumeration; for he enumerates six, as is plain, which are: simplicity of essence, personal distinction, memory, intelligence, will, and free choice. — Likewise, he seems to contradict himself in the repetition; for he says in the following chapter that there is a consideration about three [things], namely about substance, form, and power. — It is asked therefore concerning the sufficiency of those four. For it seems that *more* ought to be attributed, namely incorruptibility, spirituality, and the like, on the side of the *essence*; on the side of the *powers* also the irascible and the concupiscible; and thus intelligence befits them, as [does] memory. — Likewise, there seems to be a *superfluity*, because free choice is not distinguished from reason and will: therefore it ought not to be enumerated in the fourth place. — Likewise, the third attribute, which is reason, is taken either for the cognitive only, or for the cognitive and motive; if in the first mode: therefore it is badly divided into intelligence and will; if in the second mode: therefore free choice is superfluous.

**I respond:** It must be said that those attributes are befitting to the angel by its nature and in its creation as principal [ones], from which the others have their rise. And the *sufficiency* is taken thus: for in the angel there is to consider *being* and *power*, that is *substance* and *potency.* And about *substance* two [things], namely *that by which it is*, and in respect of this is the simplicity of essence; or the *that-which-is* itself, and in respect of this is personal distinction. Likewise about *power* there is to consider the *potency* itself, and in respect of this is the third, namely the naturally implanted reason. There is again to consider the *faculty of the potency*, and in respect of this is the fourth attribute, namely free choice.

Or otherwise: the angel can be considered in a fourfold way, namely *in itself*, and so the simplicity of essence; *to another angel*, and so personal distinction; *to God*, and so memory, intelligence, and will, in which the account of the image consists; in comparison *to those [things] which are subject* to their governance, and so it has free choice.

Or otherwise, and more according to the consonance with the [things] which are said in the text: in the angel there is to consider *substance, form, and potency.* But substance can be considered in two ways, as has been said, and so simplicity and personality befit it.  To form is attributed the beauty or comeliness of the image. To potency is attributed liberty. — And so it is plain how the four are reduced to three. It is also plain how the third attribute is divided into three, in which the image consists. It is also plain how the third attribute differs from the fourth. There is also plain the sufficiency and the response to the objections, because here the principal attributes are enumerated.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *He is understood to have had a differing thinness of essence.* On the contrary: simplicity regards the essence or substance, as he says in the text; but substance does not receive more and less: therefore etc. — Likewise, the simple states the privation of composition; but privations do not receive more and less: therefore etc. — Likewise, *more and less*, if it is imposed on anything, this is through unmixedness with its opposite; but a simple spirit is not mixed with any composition which would be opposed to angelic simplicity, and all have the same compositions: therefore all are equally simple.

**I respond:** To this it must be said that in the angels there is a degree of simplicity, and this the *degree of power* manifests, because one angel is more powerful than another; and the simpler anything is in spiritual [things], the more powerful. This also the *approximation to God* manifests; for if by nature one is nearer and more like to God than another, then it approaches more to the divine simplicity. This further manifests *cognition itself*, because one purges another by driving away ignorance: therefore one [is] purer and simpler than another. — And therefore the Master well says that there is a degree in the simplicity of essence.

As to what therefore is objected, that substance does not receive more and less; it can be answered by way of suppression, because one creature is a being in a truer mode than another. And as to what is said, that substance does not receive more and less, this is to be understood logically. — Or it must be said that it is one [thing] to say *essence*, another the simplicity of essence; and simplicity is a property of the essence.

As to what is objected, that it states a privation; it must be said that although it states a privation, yet not a pure privation, because it posits something; and therefore it can receive more and less.

As to what is objected concerning the mixture, it must be said that that does not hold true everywhere, but in those opposites of which each is some nature; but in others it is by a greater approach to its highest. Whence there is greater simplicity in an angel not on account of fewness of composition, but on account of a greater approach to the supremely simple; and this is on account of the greater nobility of the form, just as fire among corporeal [things] can be called simpler than air.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *In the very faculty of choice a difference is to be noted.* On the contrary: free choice is free from all coercion, nor can it be coerced in any way: therefore in the liberty of choice there cannot be a degree.

**I respond:** It must be said that the liberty of choice can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it states a *faculty* and a facility for going forth into the work; and so it states a *position* and follows reason and will, and these potencies follow substance; and according as substance [is] simpler, so also the potencies [are] more excellent and the faculty greater, and so there is a degree there; and in this mode the Master speaks. In another mode it is taken *privatively*, so that liberty be called [the] privation of coercion; and in this mode there is equality, because it is a privation at the limit; and so he objects.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *they are equal in this, that they are spirits and are immortal.* On the contrary: they are spirits and immortal for this reason,  because they are simple; but they are not equally simple: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as *spirit* deprives [of] corpulence, and *immortality* deprives [of] corruption — because on both sides and with respect to all the angels the privation of these is universal — therefore he says these to be equal; nevertheless however, if attention be paid to that which is of position there, so there could be a degree, as he objects. The Master takes [it] according to the more customary sense of the words, and according as such names have been accustomed to be understood by us.

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