Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/3/q/bon-sent-II-d3-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first inquiry is made about the meaning of that word of Job: *This is the beginning of the handiwork of God* etc., why it is called handiwork. If by reason of the body fitted to it, as he explains below, how is this true, since it did not have that from the beginning? — Likewise, God wishes all to be saved: therefore He made that Angel that he might be beatified, not mocked: therefore it is ill said that he should be mocked, etc.

I respond: It must be said that every creature, by reason of its fragility, is called handiwork, especially the rational creature, when it is not consolidated by grace. Since therefore Lucifer was excellent among the other creatures, and he himself spurned grace and did not stand in the truth; therefore he is called the beginning of the handiwork. Hence another translation has: he is the beginning of the ways of God. But although God foreknew that he would be evil, nevertheless He made him, because He also at the same time foresaw to what good uses He would accommodate him, namely to the victory of the Saints and to the enlarging of the crown. This conjunction can therefore be understood as consecutive or as causal. Consecutively, as is frequently taken in the Gospel: now this was done, that it might be fulfilled, because it is consecutive to this; thus the mocking of the devil followed, although he was not made on account of it. But if it be understood causally, then the consequent is put for the antecedent. For finally the devil was made for the exercise and for the promotion of the good, on which follows the mocking of the devil himself, who, while he intends to cast down, promotes. Hence the sense is that God made the devil, whom He foresaw to be evil, for the exercise of the good, on which follows his mocking.

### DOUBT II.

Likewise inquiry is made about the meaning of that word: *Wisdom is the fruit of piety*, how it is to be understood, since it seems rather to be the principle of piety than the fruit. — Likewise, nothing seems to the purpose, because the foreknowledge of the fall is not wisdom, but only knowledge.

I respond: It must be said that wisdom is here named not from taste (*sapor*), but from being wise (*sapere*); and wisdom here means cognition descending from above through inspiration or through revelation. But this is twofold: one kind is from the Word, another is in the Word. The foreknowledge of the fall, therefore, could only be a cognition descending from above, because the future is contingent, of which no certitude can be had according to inferior causes; either therefore it is in the Word, or from the Word. If in the Word, thus it is the fruit of piety; for no one comes to the vision of the Word except through piety of soul; and because the devil did not have this, therefore he could not know this in the Word. If from the Word, thus it is the fruit of piety, because from the mercy of God excluding ignorance. And in this way, if the foreknowledge of the fall were given to an innocent, it would be not from piety, but from cruelty, as will appear below, because the innocent would be tortured without fault. And thus the meaning of that word is plain, and how it avails for the purpose.

### DOUBT III.

Likewise inquiry is made about the meaning of that word: *The natural cognition was threefold*: does it distinguish formally or materially? If materially, then there are far more; if formally, on the contrary: there was one mode of knowing.

I respond: It can be said that the distinction is both as to the number of knowables and as to the grade. As to the number, because the knowable is either the Creator or a creature; and the creature either corporeal or spiritual. — There is also an order, because the knowable is either above, or below, or beside; and thus is enclosed every difference of the knowable, by reason of which the Master distinguishes cognition rather than by reason of the mode of knowing.