Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/30/q/bon-sent-II-d30-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the entity of original sin.*
### Question I. *Whether the corruption that is in human nature belongs to it from the beginning of its condition, or from the merit of sin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the corruption that we see in human nature belongs to it from the beginning of its condition, or from the merit of sin. And that it does not belong to it from the beginning of its condition, but from the merit of sin, seems [to follow] both from the order of divine justice, and from the order of wisdom, and also from the order of goodness. For a threefold order differs in creatures, since through *justice* there comes about the ordering of recompenses and merits, through *wisdom* the ordering of parts to one another, and through *goodness* the ordering of things to their end.

**Arguments.**

1. From the side of divine justice it is argued thus. To no one is a penalty justly inflicted unless a fault precede; but a penalty is nothing other than an involuntary suffering in a rational creature: therefore in no way was such a suffering in man before a fault had preceded in him: therefore such corruption was not in the human race from the beginning of its condition, but from the merit of transgression.

2. Likewise, from the supreme equity of justice no crookedness and obliquity proceeds; but human nature is corrupted not only by the corruption of penalty, but also by the corruption of crookedness, since we see that men are inclined to evil by the corruption implanted in them: therefore it never proceeded from divine justice that human nature should be corrupted in its beginning: therefore if it is corrupted, this is solely by the merit of sin.

3. From the order of wisdom it is argued thus. Wherever there is supreme wisdom, there is supreme beauty, as Augustine explains in the sixth book *On the Trinity*: *Why beauty (species) is appropriated to the Son*; but from supreme beauty nothing foul proceeds, nothing base, nothing that would offend the rational gaze; but in man, who uses reason, there are certain connatural passions of which he is reasonably ashamed: therefore such a passion was never in man from his first origin; and it was so, [if at all,] by the merit of transgression: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, wherever supreme wisdom is understood, supreme truth and supreme equality is understood; but from supreme equality no disproportion ought to proceed; but the duration and conservation of the body according to the state of the present misery is disproportionate to the soul, which is its form, since the one is temporal, the other perpetual: therefore human nature was never thus produced in its beginning by supreme wisdom: it seems therefore that it has fallen into this by its own fault.

5. From the order of divine goodness it is argued thus. From supreme goodness nothing proceeds that is more inclined to evil than to good, since *supreme goodness works all things for its own sake*; but *the senses and thoughts of men are prone to evil from their youth*, according to what sacred Scripture says: therefore in that corruption in which it is, human nature was not produced by supreme goodness.

6. Likewise, nothing that proceeds from supreme goodness is worthy of malediction; but there are many passions in us worthy of malediction, on account of which both Job and Jeremiah cursed the day on which they were born, and in the Law barren women were cursed: therefore it does not seem that human nature was created by supreme goodness in that corruption in which it now is. — It seems therefore that it has come into this corruption and state by the merit of fault, since this is against the order of goodness, wisdom, and justice, against which order it is unfitting that God should make anything.

**On the contrary:** 1. First it is shown that this is not repugnant to the order of divine justice, since man is not of greater innocence than a sheep or a lamb is; but a sheep was produced by God mortal and passible, in such a way that nothing is thereby derogated from divine justice: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that, if He had produced such a man as he now is, it would not seem that anything was derogated from the same.

2. Likewise, that it is not repugnant to the order of wisdom seems [true]. According to the same exemplar by which God produced man from the earth, He also produced other animals and mixed bodies; but it is not repugnant to the beauty of the divine exemplar that things composed of the four elements should be corruptible — rather, this makes for the order of the universe, as Augustine shows in many places: therefore it does not seem to be against the order of wisdom if God endowed men by nature with the same properties and passibilities that He also gave to other animals.

3. Likewise, that it is not against the order of divine goodness seems [true]. For it belongs to supreme goodness to give to each thing an inclination befitting its nature. But just as the rational soul has its delight *in the good simply*, so also the sensible [soul] *in the good as now [presented]*; and just as earth tends to rest downward, so fire upward. If therefore God gave to all their proper inclinations, then from the primary constitution of man there was a diversity of appetites in the sensible and the rational, and there was likewise a diverse appetite in the elements constituting the body. If therefore the diversity of the first inclination produces rebellion, and the diversity of the second inclination induces corruption; it seems that, if man had been constituted in this manner, nothing would be derogated from the order of divine goodness.

4. Likewise, that man was so constituted can seem to be persuaded by a reason taken according to the principles of natural philosophy. For since man is a *lesser world*, for whom all things were made, he ought to have a natural conformity to the greater world, which was made for his sake from its primary condition. But thus we see in the *greater world* that the lower spheres are moved by a contrary motion to the higher sphere, according to what the natural philosophers say: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that in man by nature the sensitive portion is moved against the judgment of reason. But this is the corruption that is most disordered in us: if therefore this is from the first condition, it seems that every other [corruption] is also.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by another reason, taken from the principles of moral philosophy. For the moral philosopher says that virtue is operative about the most difficult things, nor is there any praise of virtue where there is no difficulty: if therefore man was constituted disposed for virtue, it seems that from his first condition he had the difficulty of doing good and avoiding evil, and was disposed in such a way that every virtue could have its use in him: therefore it seems he was created with corruptions of this kind.

6. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by a reason taken according to the principles of theology. For the Holy Spirit says through Scripture that the way of attaining glory and sublimity is through ignominy and humility; the way of attaining the crown is through temptation and combat; the way of attaining rest and tranquillity is through labors and tribulations. If therefore man had to be so made that he was disposed to attain glory and victory and perfect peace; it seems that human nature was constituted, from the beginning of its condition, in the penalties and corruptions in which it now is.

### Conclusion.

> Human nature has been cast down into these corruptions by the merit of the first transgression, not instituted [so] from the beginning of its condition.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, human nature has been cast down into these corruptions by the merit of the first transgression, not instituted [so] from the beginning of its condition. For the truth of faith proclaims this, the authority of sacred Scripture confirms it, the probability of reason manifests it. *Faith* cries this out and says that the Son of God suffered in order to rescue us from the death into which the first parent had led us. The *authority of sacred Scripture* confirms it, which says in Genesis 2 how man through the fault of disobedience incurred the penalty of mortality. *Reason* manifests it, as was shown above in the objecting, both from the order that regards divine justice, and from the order that regards wisdom, and also from the order that regards supreme goodness.

It must be noted, however, that reason in its inquiring can proceed in two ways: either insofar as it is *aided by the ray of faith*, and thus it proceeds by looking to the higher causes; or insofar as it is *left to its own judgment*, and thus it proceeds by examining natures and lower causes; for it acquires knowledge by the way of sense and experience. In the first way the catholic doctors and the faithful reason about the things that are of faith, and according to this manner of reasoning it is much consonant with reason that God did not make man, from the beginning, in the great misery and calamity in which he now is; rather, to say the contrary seems to a pious and sound mind to be [a thing] of great impiety. In the second way of reasoning the philosophers proceeded, who did not look in the condition of man to his principal Author, but looked to the constituting principles and the operations that he has by the power of nature; and according to this manner reason rather discords with catholic truth than agrees with it. And this is the reason why the philosophers, who were such great investigators of truth, did not arrive at the knowledge of the human fall, because it seemed to them very reasonable that man was so constituted; whereas to the catholic doctors not only by faith, but also by the evidence of reasons, the contrary of it appears certainly to be true. — Hence the reasons too which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that God made the sheep passible, which nevertheless did not sin; it must be said that the case of man and of the sheep is not alike; for man, who is a partaker of reason, is capable of beatitude and justice, and conversely of fault and misery. Hence just as in man to *be made crooked* is a fault, so also to *suffer* is a penalty; but in the sheep neither happens to be found. Therefore the passibility of the sheep makes nothing toward the order nor against the order of divine justice, whose [office] is to consider the exigency of merits; but it is not so with passion in human nature.

2. To that which is objected, that according to the same exemplar other kinds of animals were made corruptible; it must be said that the case is not alike, for the reason that other animals, unlike man, do not have a completive incorruptible form. But in man alone the soul is immortal by nature, as was shown above; and therefore mortality in other animals does not posit any disproportion of the perfectible to its perfection, as it posits in man; and on account of this, mortality in other animals is not so repugnant to the order which the wisdom of God preserves in the condition of things, as the mortality found in man.

3. To that which is objected, that it belongs to supreme goodness to give to each its own inclination; it must be said that this is true, the order being preserved which is attended to among things insofar as they are compared to one another; since goodness does not prejudice wisdom; and because according to the order of nature the body ought to be subject to the soul, and *sensibility* ought to be subject to reason: thus God ought to have given an inclination to the body of man as well as to the sensuality of the flesh, in such a way that the rectitude of reason would in no way be prejudiced. And hence it is that, even though sensuality desired *the good as now [presented]*, there was nevertheless no rebellion in the first man, since it desired only as reason dictated. But now there is rebellion, since it frequently desires beyond the judgment of reason; and on account of this we have been made brutish *and likened to senseless beasts of burden*, although man was in the beginning constituted in the honor and dignity of reason.

4. And through this the response is manifest to the following objection, which objects concerning the diversity of motions of the heavenly spheres. For although there seem to be a contrariety there, yet there is no contrariety there, but rather a right ordering, for the reason that the higher sphere always moves the lower, and never the lower the higher. But now in us it is not so, for the reason that we see *another law in our members, repugnant to the law of our mind and captivating us into the servitude of sin*.

5. To that which is objected, that virtue is operative of the most difficult things; it must be said that there is a certain difficulty which comes *from the kind of work*, and a certain other which comes *from the defect of the one working*. The first difficulty is of the essence of virtue. For virtue, insofar as it is virtue, is concerned with great and arduous things; but this difficulty in the first man was thus: for man would have obeyed God so perfectly and adhered to God so perfectly as the perfection of the virtue of obedience and friendship requires; and so of the other virtues. — And there is another difficulty which comes *from the defect of the one working*; and this indeed is not of the essence of virtue, but rather is accidental to virtue, insofar as it is virtue; and therefore, for man to be virtuous, it was not necessary that this difficulty be found in man in the beginning. And that this is true is plain. For the more one advances in virtue, the more he works with less difficulty on his own part; if therefore this difficulty were of the essence of virtue, then as man advanced, the excellence of virtue would be diminished in him; which no one doubts to be false.

6. To that, however, which is objected concerning the way of attaining salvation according to the instruction of sacred Scripture, it must be said that sacred Scripture was handed down to *fallen* man and delivers the documents through which he may be led to the fatherland, according as it befits the present state. Therefore from these it cannot be argued that man ought to have been made such that he should arrive by this way; for such ways are very harsh. But if man had not sinned, he would have arrived at his end not with harshness, but with all gentleness. And there is a likeness: for health is preserved through good and pleasant foods, but is not recovered except through bitter potions.