Dist. 30, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/30/q/bon-sent-II-d30-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the quiddity of original sin.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely what original sin is. And concerning this two things are asked:

First it is asked, whether original sin is concupiscence.

Second it is asked, whether it is ignorance.

### Question I. *Whether original sin is concupiscence.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether original sin is concupiscence. And that it is, it seems.

1. To the Romans, chapter six: *Let not sin reign in your mortal body*, where the Gloss says: *Sin*, that is, "the tinder of sin"; but the tinder of sin is nothing other than concupiscence: if therefore the tinder of sin is sin, and is not actual sin; it remains that it be original.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter seven: *I did not know that concupiscence was sin* etc., the Gloss: "Concupiscence is that from which all evils proceed." If therefore that which is the origin of all evils is original sin; it seems that original sin is nothing other than concupiscence.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. As the acts are, so are the habits; but to lust is sin: therefore the necessity of lusting after evils is also sin. But we contract the necessity of lusting from nature: if therefore the sin which is contracted from nature is original sin: it seems so etc.

4. Likewise, in every sin there is some turning toward a changeable good, whether in act or in habit: if therefore original sin is sin, then there is in it some disordered turning toward a changeable good. But a disordered turning toward a changeable good is nothing other than concupiscence: therefore it is necessary that original sin be concupiscence.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter seven: *Sin, taking occasion, wrought in me by the commandment all concupiscence*; but this cannot be understood of actual sin: it is understood therefore of original sin. If therefore the working is not the thing worked, then concupiscence is not original sin, nor conversely.

2. Likewise, Bede says that four things are inflicted upon us

on account of the first sin, namely ignorance, infirmity, malice, and a fourth, concupiscence, conflated out of these; but what is inflicted for sin is not sin itself: therefore if these are inflicted upon us by the merit of original sin, according to what Bede says: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, concupiscence remains together with grace; original sin cannot remain together with grace: therefore original sin is not concupiscence. If you say that concupiscence remains together with grace insofar as it is remitted, and thus is a punishment; but insofar as it is intense, it does not remain, and thus is a fault; on the contrary: more and less do not diversify the species: therefore if remitted concupiscence is not a fault but a punishment, by parity of reasoning it seems that neither is intense concupiscence. — Likewise, concupiscence, after it has been remitted, can be intensified and recalled to its former dominion, as is plain by experience: if therefore original sin were repeatable, then so too would baptism be; which is against the institution of the Church.

There is therefore a question as to what original sin is by its essence. And since by the Master, and by Augustine, it is said to be *concupiscence*, as is plain in the text, but by Anselm in the book On the Virginal Conception it is said to be *the lack of due justice*, the question is how these two terms can both be true at once; and in which of these terms is more explained what original fault is.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Original sin is concupiscence, insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *actual* sin does not bespeak total privation, since it bespeaks not only an aversion but also a certain turning; nor does it bespeak total privation of *the good*, but rather leaves the aptitude and some act, depriving it of a circumstance with respect to it: so too in the *original* it must be understood after its own manner. Hence just as *actual* sin is not said to be in someone from this alone, that he lacks justice — for then a stone would be said to have sin — but from this, that he has some inclination toward something, in which, where justice ought to be, it is not found: so too *original* sin is said to be in someone not only because he lacks original justice, but also because he has a crookedness and a necessity of lusting. Hence just as we see in bodily sickness, for instance in paralysis, that such a disease is present from a certain dissolution of power, yet so that the motive power is not wholly removed, as in a dead man, but in some manner remains, unable to govern the member; and thus there follows, partly from a positive cause, partly from a defect, the trembling of the hand: so it must be understood both in actual and in original sin. Therefore just as, if someone were to ask what the sin of the flesh is, it could be made known to him in two ways, namely by reason of the *disordered inclination*, so that it be said to be an immoderate appetite for a thing manageable according to the flesh; and by reason of the *privation of the good*, so that it be said to be a privation of chastity and continence; and in either way it is answered fittingly enough: so, when it is asked what original sin is, it is rightly answered that it is *immoderate concupiscence*; it is also rightly answered that it is *the lack of due justice*; and in one of these answers the other is enclosed, although the one makes known the original itself by reason of that which is in it having the mode of a *turning*, the other by reason of *privation*.

It must therefore be granted, as the reasons show, and as the Master says in the text, that original sin is *concupiscence*, and this not any whatever, but concupiscence insofar as it encloses within itself the lack of due justice. And this is *immoderate* and *intense* concupiscence, so much so that it is a predominance of the flesh over the spirit, and such is always joined to the *lack of due justice*, and according as it is in us from our origin, it is called *original sin*. And this is what the Gloss says upon that text: *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven*, the Gloss: "It calls the tinder iniquity, which before baptism is not only *punishment* but *fault*; but after baptism it is *punishment* only, and not *fault*. For when the original is destroyed, it is not destroyed so that it be not at all, but so that it be not sin." — The reasons therefore which show this must be granted. But to the reasons to the opposite it is plain enough to respond through the things that have been said.

**To the arguments to the opposite:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that sin works concupiscence; it must be said that this is understood of concupiscence as to the act; which the commandment is said to work, because it occasion-

ally excites in us concupiscence itself, which holds itself after the manner of a habit.

*To 2 and 3.* But to that which is objected, that concupiscence is inflicted upon us by sin; it must be said that it is understood of concupiscence insofar as it is *remitted*, and thus takes on the character of punishment; and in this way it is not original fault, but its sequel. — And through this the response is plain to what is objected next, that it remains together with grace; for it does not remain, as was said in the objecting, insofar as it is *intense*, because thus it bespeaks a perversion of the soul, and through this the privation of original justice; but insofar as it is *remitted* by the presence of grace, this it does not bespeak. And if you object that more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that, although this holds in *natural* matters, it nevertheless does not hold true in *moral* matters, since virtues and vices in morals are attended to according to a mean, and its extremes, which are the superfluous and the diminished. And this is true not only with the moral philosopher, but also with the theologian, who says that love of a creature *below* God or *under* God is not mortal sin; but if it be directed *above* God, it becomes mortal sin.

But to that which is objected, that remitted concupiscence can again be intensified; it must be said that, although it can be intensified and be intensified, this is by *actual* sin; but *intense* concupiscence was not said to be original sin, except insofar as it was thus contracted from the *first origin*; and since this cannot be except once, however much and however often concupiscence be intensified, original sin is not repeated.