Dist. 30, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/30/q/bon-sent-II-d30-a3-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article III. *On the truth of human nature.*

Next, concerning the third article, the inquiry is about the truth of human nature. And since two things concur for anything to be said about the truth of human nature, namely matter and form, it belongs to the fourth book to speak of the truth of human nature on the side of form, where the resurrection is treated; but it belongs to this place to inquire about the truth of human nature on the side of matter, where the Master inquires whether anything extrinsic can pass over into the truth of human nature. Concerning this, therefore, two things must be asked.

First it is asked whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature through the act of the generative power. Second it is asked whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature through the work of the nutritive power.

### Question I. *Whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature through the act of the generative power.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature through the act of the generative power. And that it does not, it seems:

1. First by the authority of authentic doctors, namely the Master of the Sentences and Hugh. For the Master in the text says thus: «Everything that is naturally in human bodies descends from the first parent by the law of propagation and has been increased and multiplied in itself, with no exterior substance passing over into it». Likewise master Hugh of St. Victor at the end of the sixth part: «From the substance of the rib, multiplied in itself by divine power without any extrinsic addition, the body of the woman was made, just as afterward we behold human nature, sown by the first parents into the subsequent generation, already so much multiplied from a small beginning that we see many thousands of men to have grown forth from it».

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown, secondly, by the authority of the Saints. For Anselm says, in his book *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter two, speaking of the first parents: «Since the whole of human nature was in them, and nothing was outside them, the whole was weakened and corrupted». And what is greater, Augustine in the tenth book *On Genesis according to the Letter* says that we were in Adam according to the seminal reason and according to corporeal substance; but the flesh of Christ was only according to corporeal substance. But if these things are true, that the whole flesh and the flesh of all posterity was in Adam: then nothing extrinsic passes over into it through the generative power.

3. Likewise, this seems so by the authority of the Gospels, in Matthew chapter fifteen: *Everything that enters into the mouth goes into the belly and is cast out into the privy*: therefore it does not seem that the body of the offspring is constituted from anything that is eaten by a man. And in Mark chapter seven: *Everything extrinsic entering into a man cannot defile him, because it does not enter into the heart, but into the belly, and goes out into the privy, purging all foods*. There the Gloss: «Although the thinnest humor and the liquid food, when it has been cooked and digested in the veins and limbs, glides down through hidden passages, which the Greeks call *pores*, to the lower parts and goes into the privy».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. First through the truth of generation. «For to generate is to produce someone from one's own substance»: if therefore all are truly and rightly said to be begotten of Adam and sons of Adam, we are all propagated from something that was his substance. But by the same reasoning that my hand or foot or any other member has to be constituted from that which was in Adam, by the same reasoning also the individual members. It seems therefore that the whole body of any man was constituted from the seed of Adam; and if this is so, nothing extrinsic passes over into the truth of human nature through the act of the generative power.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems so through the law of kinship: since the stock cannot contract [marriage] with anyone proceeding from itself, nor can those approaching the stock contract with one another; and this is for no other reason than the unity of flesh and blood: therefore it seems that the offspring is generated not from the superfluity of nourishment, but from the substance of the father, and not only from the substance of the near father, but even of the remote father; otherwise the law of kinship will be vain; which is not only against the truth of sacred Scripture, but even against the dictate of nature.

6. Likewise, this same thing seems so through the condition of the resurrection. For it is necessary that to each soul its own body be restored. Suppose therefore that someone nourished on human flesh generates offspring; if that seed has been taken from nourishment, since the nourishment of this was from the truth of another man's body, it would return to the first body: therefore the one who was generated from that seed would not rise again, since the soul would be deprived of its own body. If therefore this is impossible, it remains that that also is impossible, namely that anything extrinsic passes over into the seed; therefore what was cut off from the first parent is increased in itself, without the addition of anything else.

On the contrary: 1. The Philosopher in the book *On Animals* says that seed is «the superfluity of the last food»: if therefore physicians are to be believed in those things which they say concerning their science, and natural philosophers likewise in those things which they say concerning their science; since to determine concerning the generation of man belongs to the natural philosopher: he is to be believed when he says that seed is from the superfluity of nourishment, so that something extrinsic can pass over into the truth of human nature.

2. Likewise, on that text of Luke chapter eleven: *Blessed is the womb* etc., the interlinear gloss says: «From the same source both the milk for nourishing and the seed for procreating children flows forth; from the seed of the Virgin, therefore, he could be conceived who could be nourished by her milk».

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On True Religion*: «Foods not suited to the body are cast out through fitting passages, of which one part, most fecal, is returned to the earth to take on other forms; another part exhales through the whole body; another part takes on the latent numbers of the whole animal and is begun in offspring». Now he calls the seminal reasons «numbers». By this authority it is expressly gathered that seed is from nourishment. If perhaps you should say that Augustine understands this with respect to the part of the seed according to matter; the authority itself stands in the way, which says that «the nourishment takes on numbers», that is, seminal reasons; for that part is said to be the part according to species, upon which the active and converting power is founded. In the same authority he adds that from that nourishment thus drawn off all the members are formed. And it is plain according to physicians that the radical members have to be formed from the parts according to species, that is, from the radical humor.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. Every increase that occurs through nature either occurs through rarefaction or occurs through addition. If therefore all men have been naturally produced from that seed which was cut off from Adam; it is necessary that it has been increased either through rarefaction or through addition. But it could not be through rarefaction, «because there were not so many atoms in that seed as there are men produced from it»: if therefore it has been increased, this is through addition: something extrinsic, therefore, enters into the constitution of human

seed. But if you should say that there is a third mode of increase, possible through the multiplication of nature; against this it is objected through Hugh of St. Victor, who says that «to make something greater according to substance and quantity without addition, this is possible to God alone».

5. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be nourished through the nutritive power unless something extrinsic is added by which one is nourished: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impossible for the augmentative power to augment substance unless something extrinsic is added by which it is augmented; or if it can be increased in itself, why can it not be nourished through itself?

6. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of an agent that it can draw another matter to itself and convert it into itself, as fire converts air into itself. If therefore the generative power in man is complete and perfect, and the seminal reason in it is in the highest degree active; it seems that it can act upon extrinsic matter and convert it into itself and communicate to it the seminal reason; and if this is so, then through the work of the generative power something extrinsic can pass over into the truth of human nature.

### Conclusion.

> Something from nourishment passes over into the truth of human nature and, together with the radical moisture, comes to be of the truth of the offspring.

**I respond:** It must be understood here that, as plainly appears in the text, the opinion of the Master of the Sentences was that nothing extrinsic passes over into the truth of human nature through generation. Now this position appears very probable, if one attends to the words of the Saints, and together with this to the condition of the resurrection and the law of kinship. This position, therefore, some have maintained, saying that such multiplication, without the addition of anything extrinsic, occurs in human nature through a supernatural power; others, that it occurs through a supercelestial power; a third group, that it occurs through an elemental power.

The first said that just as God reserves to himself the creation of souls on account of their immortality, so too he multiplies and augments the substance of human bodies without extrinsic addition, as he multiplied the evangelical loaves, and as he multiplied the rib from which Eve was formed; and this because human bodies are ordained to immortality. Yet he is not said to work miracles in multiplying thus, because he does this as though he were doing it through nature. For nature, in feeding and nourishing, as it were fosters from without; but it is God who furnishes the nourishment from within. — But against this manner of speaking stand both sense and reason and authority. Sense stands in the way, because we thus see man produced from man, just as an ass from an ass, and as a plant from a plant. If therefore other natural bodies come to be from added matter, and our sense is not deceived; it must be judged that it is likewise concerning human bodies. — Reason too stands in the way, because there is no natural generation except that in which nature is truly acting and truly producing something like itself. If therefore the multiplication of man from man were through a power above nature, and not through the power of nature itself; the generation of man from man would not be natural; and if this is so, it would not be a true generation. — Authority too is repugnant. For Augustine says in the tenth book *On Genesis according to the Letter* that we were in Adam according to corporeal substance and according to the seminal reason, Christ only according to corporeal substance. But if our bodies were drawn out from the seed of Adam through a power above nature, then in him they would have to be said, like Christ also, to be only according to corporeal substance, not according to the seminal reason, since the seminal reason denotes an active power.

But others maintain the aforesaid position, saying that such multiplication is through a supercelestial power. For the body of the fifth essence, or the luminous body, is naturally apt to emit light from itself and to multiply itself, not by drawing the nature of light out of that body which it illuminates, but it multiplies matter and form together. And so in the matter at hand they wished to say that, because in human nature there is much of the nature of the fifth essence, it can be multiplied in itself. — But against this manner of speaking too stand sense and reason and authority. Sense, because no celestial body multiplies its light in itself, but if it multiplies, it multiplies it outside itself and in extrinsic matter. And again, we do not see that the sun in multiplying generates a sun or produces a sun; therefore if this multiplication in human seed is regarded according to the celestial nature; it will not be multiplied in itself except by something extrinsic superadded, nor from such multiplication will a man be produced from a man, just as neither is a sun produced from a sun. — Reason too stands in the way, since multiplication through a created power is from something actively similar. If therefore it belongs to form alone to act; and form is not made like to matter, but to another form: it is impossible, therefore, for

anything to be multiplied through a created power with respect to the material principle, neither elemental matter nor celestial. — Authority too is repugnant, since light going forth from a luminous body is not a body, nor does it have matter in itself; and this was shown more plainly above in the thirteenth distinction, where the authorities for this were also adduced. It is difficult, too, to explain according to this position how the nature of the fifth essence enters the constitution of human nature. And unless this is rightly understood, as was explained above in the seventeenth distinction, it cannot easily be maintained.

But a third group maintain that such multiplication occurs through the power of inferior nature, with a receptive potency concurring on the part of matter and an active one on the part of form. For matter, so far as it is of itself, does not have extension, but that it be extended so much or more, this is by reason of the form joined to it. Hence however little of matter be placed in any body, it would be capable of a very great extension, if there were some agent that could impress a form of so great an extension. But on the part of form there is in it a potency of multiplying its like; and hence it is that when the seed is aided and fostered by extrinsic nourishment, that seminal force in its matter can multiply itself and grow, with nothing resisting; and therefore it is not necessary that anything extrinsic pass over into the truth of human nature. And Augustine seems to hold this, when he says that «from one seed harvests of harvests and forests of forests, herds of herds, peoples of peoples, can be brought forth, in such a way that nothing is afterward found in all those things which was not previously invisibly in that first seed».

But against this position, although it seems more reasonable than the rest, nonetheless, as against the aforesaid ones, sense and reason and authority are repugnant.

Sense indeed is first repugnant. For if in those things which are generated, growth came about through multiplication without addition; then this world would be much greater than it was at the beginning, and would grow visibly day by day. For it could not be said that by resolution ten grains of wheat are reduced to one.

Reason too is repugnant, because matter is not the subject of transmutation except under some being. Hence, although the matter of corporeal things can be abstracted from the form of bodies by the intellect, it can nevertheless never be despoiled, through the power of any creature, of all extension and corporeal form; on account of which Augustine says in many places that it is impossible for a spirit to come to be from a body, both *On Genesis according to the Letter* and in the book *On the Immortality of the Soul*. If therefore this matter under such being has a fixed state and determination in its extension, beyond which nature cannot proceed, for the reason that, as the Philosopher says, «of all things that are constant there is a term and a ratio of magnitude and of increase»; and elsewhere, that from one fistful of earth fire can be generated in a thousandfold proportion, yet from one fistful only ten of water can be generated: if this, I say, is so, it is impossible to posit that some corporeal thing be augmented in itself without its own rarefaction and the addition of something else; this I say concerning the operation of nature. And it must be attended to here that one must speak in a quite different way of matter according to essence and according to being, that is, according to substance; nor is it to be said that there is as much of matter in one small stone as in one mountain, speaking according to being or substance; although in matter according to essence one is not to consider how much and how great. And thus reason does not agree with this position.

Authority too stands in the way. For Hugh says in the sixth part, where he distinguishes six works, «of which the first is to make something from nothing. The second is to make something from something according to substance and quantity, into something greater. The third work is to make something from some things according to substance and quantity, into something less. The fourth work is to make something from something, yet not according to substance and quantity, into something greater. The fifth work is to make something from some things, yet not according to substance and quantity, into something less. The sixth work is to make nothing from something». Concerning these six kinds of works he adds that «the first work and the second and the third and the last are possible to God alone». Since therefore such multiplication, as he says in the same place, pertains to the second kind of work, it will not therefore occur by the power of inferior nature. — But if this authority is not sufficient, this is shown by the author-

ity of Augustine, in the fifth book *On Genesis according to the Letter*, near the end of the book, where he says thus: «Those things which are produced from seed were all in the seed at first, not in the bulk of corporeal magnitude, but in causal potency. For that magnitude has been gathered together by an abundance of earth and moisture; but in the tiny grain there is a more wonderful and more excellent force, by which the adjacent moisture, mixed with the earth, had the power to be turned, as it were as material, into the quality of that tree, into the diffusion of branches, into the greenness of leaves». Therefore the seed is not increased in itself without the addition of something else. Still more expressly *On Genesis according to the Letter*, at the end of the tenth book: «What is more absurd than to think that any body, while the quantity of its nature remains, grows on every side, unless it be rarefied». Therefore if the quantity of the seed cut off remains and is not rarefied and grows on every side, this cannot be without the addition of matter, unless this come about miraculously. — In whatever of the aforesaid modes, therefore, the opinion of the Master be maintained, whether also all the modes be blended into one, or each be adapted by itself; very many difficulties arise, on account of which many refuse to maintain the opinion of the Master in this part.

The second opinion concerning this position is that of certain men who follow the words of the natural philosophers and physicians, saying that, by means of the generative power, not only does something pass over into the truth of human nature, but rather the whole truth of the offspring generated is from the extrinsic thing added, because it is from the superfluity of nourishment. Now they say that this is so because the mode of operating is orderly and delightful and expeditious. Orderly, because there the operation of the generative power begins where the operation of the nutritive power ceases. For nature first intends [the good] for itself rather than for another; and therefore the matter of generation is the superfluity of the last food, which indeed, although it be superfluous for the work of nutrition, is nevertheless necessary for the work of generation. This mode also is delightful, since nature is delighted in the emission of the superfluous and is saddened and grieves in the emission of what is necessary and conjoined to itself. If therefore nature is most delighted in the work of generation, the matter of generation is from the superfluity of nourishment. This mode also is expeditious, because, since the third food is in proximate potency to be converted into the individual members, if nature must fashion a body from some humor, it will fashion it from that one; but since it does not fashion it from what is necessary, it remains that it fashions it from the superfluous. Since therefore nature operates as briefly and delightfully and orderly as it can, therefore they say that such a mode of procreating, namely from the superfluity of nourishment, is most fitting to nature. It is fitting also, as they say, to the divine disposition and to the ordination of bodies to the resurrection. For since the seed does not rise again in the one generating, but in the one generated, that humor does not seem to have been of the truth of the one generating, but rather of the superfluity of moisture.

But although this manner of speaking seems very probable to one attending to the words of the Philosopher; nonetheless, as against the other manner of speaking too, sense and reason and authority stand in its way. — Sense indeed, because we see offspring sometimes made like to a great-grandfather, and as it is made like to the great-grandfather, so it can be made like to the one who preceded all the way to the tenth generation: therefore so on thereafter: therefore it seems that there is something in this first son drawn down from the first parent. And again, since we see a man weakened by coitus, and death hastened by the frequency of such an act; it seems that not only is there an emission of the superfluous in the seed, but rather also of some radical moisture; and thus the offspring is not only from the superfluity of nourishment, but also from the truth of the one generating. — Reason too stands in the way, because if the offspring were only from the superfluity of the father's food, neither would there be a true generation, since generation is from the substance of the one generating, nor would there be a true kinship; rather a man would have more to do with the pig from which the nourishment was taken than with the father who generated him. — Authority too is repugnant, since Augustine expressly says, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, that we were all in Adam according to corporeal substance and according to the seminal reason. And what is greater, the Apostle says that we all sinned in Adam, and that Levi was in the loins of Abraham when he was tithed, to the Hebrews chapter seven.

From this position, therefore, if it be carried through, it seems to follow that there would not be a true generation or kinship at all; but from the preceding one, if it be posited that nothing of the nourishment passes over into the offspring, it seems to follow that there is no natural generation. — If therefore it is to be held for certain that the generation of man from man is both true and natural; we must hold a middle way between both of these positions, so that we say that something of the superfluity of nourishment passes over into the seed, yet the seed is not wholly from the superfluity of nourishment, but rather there is something there of the radical moisture; and from both the seed has its propagation. Hence just as we see concerning the nutritive power that there is a moisture both radical and nutrimental, namely that which flows; so it must be understood also concerning the generative power,

that in it there is a certain radical moisture, and also a certain flowing and reflowing moisture, and in the generation of the offspring the one runs together with the other. Adam therefore transmitted, when he generated his first son, something of that radical moisture, and that little was mixed by the power of nature with the whole body of the son by a perfect mixture, because no part could be marked out in the body of the son in which there was not something of that moisture which he drew down from the father. If therefore the son of Adam in generating offspring likewise cut off something of his own radical moisture; it was necessary that he transmit something of that which he had taken from the father, and so on thereafter. And for so much are all said to have been in Adam, not because the matter of all our bodies was there totally, but because there was there a certain amount of matter and the seminal reason, that is, a potency of converting another nature to itself, so that it would suffice for the procreation of all, when there was added to it that in which it could multiply itself. — And there is an example: if someone should have leaven, which he should mix with a perfect mixture into the whole dough; nothing would come to be of that whole leavened dough that would not be said to come to be of that dough; and likewise, if that dough were mixed further into another larger dough, and proceeding thus, well-nigh innumerable leavened loaves could be made from a little leaven by the addition of leavenable matter. So too in the matter at hand, from a little seed by the addition of moisture capable of receiving the seminal reason, innumerable men can be propagated.

And this mode agrees well enough with reason and is not repugnant to the words of the Philosopher and is drawn from the words of Augustine, as appears by looking at the authority set forth before, which is taken from the book *On True Religion*, where he says that «the nourishment takes on the latent numbers of the whole animal and is begun in offspring». And he explains the mode at the end of the fifth book *On Genesis according to the Letter*, as appears in the authority set forth before, where it is shown that from a little seed a great tree is generated. To this manner of speaking, therefore, as more intelligible and more in accord with philosophy and sacred Scripture, I adhere more. For I believe that blessed Augustine held this, as I can gather from his words. And according to this mode the truth of kinship and of generation is preserved, for the reason that something radical is drawn down from the parent into the offspring. Generation and propagation are nonetheless maintained to be natural, because this comes about through the addition of nourishment. — And therefore those reasons are to be conceded which show that something of the nourishment passes over into the truth of human nature by means of the work of nature, because not only that radical [moisture] which is cut off from the father comes to be of the truth of the offspring, but also that together with the superfluity of nourishment joined to it, in such a way that what was superfluous for the one is necessary for the other; for each was the foundation of the fashioning of the whole body generated.

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary from the authority of the Master, it must be said that they commonly do not assent to their words in this part, nor do I myself well understand them; nor however do I affirm that they said something false, but rather I understand a different opinion.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Anselm and Augustine, the response is now clear. For they say that we were in Adam, not because no other matter has been converted into our body except that which was in Adam, but if any other has been converted, this is only by conjunction with that which was cut off from Adam. And if you should say that Anselm himself says that the whole of human nature was in Adam; it must be said that he does not say this with respect to possible existence, but with respect to actual existence, because nothing was actually of the truth of human nature except what was in Adam. Yet something possible was there toward this, that it should come to be of the truth of human nature, but this by the operation and power of the flesh of Adam.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of the Lord in the Gospel and from the Gloss, it must be said that neither the text nor the Gloss in any way understands that man passed out the whole of what he eats, but that, when a man eats, there occurs a separation of the pure from the impure through the digestions made within, and the pure and what is conformed to nature is retained within, and the impure is expelled without; and for so much the Lord said that nothing which enters into the mouth defiles a man; and thus the word of the Lord is most true, according as it avails for the matter at hand. — Yet it could be said that «the privy» is there called not only the lower passage through which the discharges run, but all the subtle passages through which the straining-off of foods occurs. And the Gloss says that the Greeks call them *pores*; and thus it does not follow that the whole nourishment goes out without, and nothing of it passes over into the truth of the offspring.

4. To that which is objected, that generation is from the substance of the one generating; the response is now clear. For I say

that something of the radical moisture of the parent passes over into the offspring, and by reason of it the truth of generation is preserved there; nor however is it necessary that there be an identity according to the whole of the one generating with the one generated. For just as the one generating does not give the whole of himself, but a part of himself, so too the one generated did not come out from the one generating according to the whole, but according to some part; nor was that whole which it drew from the one generating radical to the one generating, but something is added to the radical, that it may be able to be increased.

5. To that which is objected from the law of kinship, the response is now clear. For the law of kinship is just as well preserved if the son is drawn down from the father by drawing from him the radical humor with the addition of an extrinsic thing, as if nothing were added from without, indeed much more truly. For the addition of the extrinsic thing brings it about that the line of consanguinity is at some point terminated, and that those who are more distant from the stock are joined by a lesser bond of consanguinity. And if it be objected that, if something of the radical is drawn down, then by parity of reasoning the whole could be drawn down; and that it would be necessary for it to be multiplied in itself, since «not even so many atoms were in the body of Adam»; it must be said that seed is both quantitative in bulk and quantitative in power. And the quantity of power belongs to the side of form and can be called the seminal reason, and this, since it is a form, is multipliable, that is, it can induce its like into the matter set beside it. But the quantity of bulk, although it be small, can nevertheless be so extended as to be mixed with a very great quantity through that nature by which every body is infinitely divisible; and thus it can be mixed with a great quantity and draw the whole to its own nature; and from that whole quantity something can come to be that would not come to be from the seed itself by itself; and however many come to be from that whole quantity, they are said to be made through itself. Nor however is it necessary there to distinguish diverse parts, from which diverse things come to be in that primordial seed, but only in the proximate [seed], for the reason that it has been increased by the addition of superfluous nourishment.

6. To that which is objected from the law of resurrection, some respond that a man cannot be generated from the flesh of another man, for the reason that the nourishment, and that which is converted into seed, must be in potency with respect to that into which it is converted; but the flesh of man according to species is in act, and therefore cannot be transmuted into another man. — But this does not seem to suffice, for the reason that from flesh worms can be generated; and consequently a plant and fruit could be generated, and then it would be in potency with respect to human flesh; and thus through many transmutations it seems that from it seed could come to be.

But others say that, since the flesh of man is capable of every transmutation, like other things too, that from it seed can be generated; and then it will rise again in the one generated, for the reason that it has a more essential relation to him, and the Lord will supply for that one by adding from elsewhere, or by multiplying by a power above nature, as he does in the little child. — But by whatever reasoning it is said of one part that it can be converted, by the same reasoning [it is said] also of any part whatever, and thus a man could lose his whole body.

Therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that the flesh of man according to species cannot become the flesh of another man according to species, on account of the necessary ordination which it has to the soul which vivified it. But whether that ordination is founded in the appetite of the dusts, or in the providence of the Creator, is difficult to discern. In whatever way it be, however, the response to this is plain. But this is found more plainly determined in the fourth book, where it is made manifest what rises again, and in what. — But the seed will rise again in the one generated, not in the one generating, although it has been said here that the seed is from the radical moisture of the one generating. For seed is radical to the one generating in one way, and to the one generated in another. For to the one generating it is radical according to a part of himself, it is also radical with respect to the generative power, not with respect to the nutritive power; but the generative power and its moisture is ordained to another. Hence if the moisture of the generative power be cut off from anyone, whether another be generated or not, it will never rise again in him; and hence it is that although in the emission of seed a cutting-off of some radical moisture occurs, there is nevertheless no penalty there, since that moisture by nature was ordained to another. Hence also there remains there the expeditious and delightful and orderly mode of operating; and this whole is because that moisture in the one generating was [ordained] to another. But in the one generated, because from it the whole body is fashioned, it is as it were the foundation of the whole body, and then, when the soul is united to it, it begins to be truly and properly of the truth of human nature. For then it first begins to have a necessity for the resurrection; but before, it was only possible. Hence if some woman should miscarry before the union of the soul, that would in no way rise again.